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ABSTRACT
In this work we investigate the feasibility of the project of showing that a 
certain kind of generalisations that philosophers call ‘Epistemic 
Principles’, which state conditions for the achievement of epistemic 
goods such as justifications and entitlements, fulfil general conditions for 
their correctness. First, we identify the veritistic commitments 
underlying the project; it is argued that some common interpretations of 
such commitments are mistaken and a minimal interpretation of them is 
outlined. The minimal interpretation is then defended against some 
charges of explanatory deficits.
We explicate how the project of showing that an epistemic 
principle is correct is motivated and constrained by the veritistic 
commitments expounded in the first chapter. Then we show how a form 
of epistemic circularity constitutes a major obstacle for that project. We 
discuss several forms of circularity and argue that only one of them 
threatens the project, we explain the exact nature of the obstacle it poses 
for the project.
Then we examine various strategies that attempt to avert the 
obstacle; some by freeing the project from the veritistic commitments 
that constrain it, others by constructing an allegedly apriori way of 
carrying out the project, without giving up its initial veritistic 
commitments, and still another by reconceptualising the very 
explanatory goal of the project. All o f them are examined in detail and 
found unsatisfactory.
However, it is argued that the doubt that our results cast on the 
feasibility of the project does not warrant a generalised pessimism about 
the possibility of obtaining philosophical knowledge concerning 
epistemic principles, for the results that sustain that doubt constitute 
themselves knowledge of epistemic principles.
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INTRODUCTION
This is an investigation into the feasibility of the project which attempts to show that 
we are justified, or otherwise enjoy a reassuring epistemic position, with respect to 
our entrenched conviction that we possess ways of belief formation that deliver 
justification or other epistemic goods for us. We can call this the ‘reassuring project’. 
In the context of this project that conviction is captured in some generalisations 
called ‘epistemic principles’. These principles have a conditional form, in their 
antecedent they mention conditions sufficient for the achievement of the epistemic 
good mentioned in the consequent. We fix the discussion on one single epistemic 
principle about perception; this is the specimen we take to investigate the project:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that p , one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
(EP) formulates what ordinarily we take to be conditions for prima facie epistemic 
justification through perception, this is our entrenched conviction. The reassuring 
project undertakes the task of showing that this ordinary attitude is justified, that we 
are justified in believing that the conditions mentioned by (EP) are conditions 
sufficient for justification of belief.
The justification for which (EP) gives conditions is epistemic justification. So 
the conditions mentioned in the antecedent must be constrained by whatever it is that 
is distinctive of epistemic justification. Beliefs can be evaluated from different points 
of view; the reassuring project needs to specify what is distinctive of the epistemic 
evaluation of belief. Chapter I articulates as an underlying presupposition of the 
reassuring project the idea that what is distinctive of epistemic evaluation is that it is 
evaluation relative to the goal of truth. The idea is that what endows cognitive 
performances and the beliefs they produce with epistemic value of any sort is that 
they aim at truth. This is the core tenet of what we call a ‘veritistic’ conception of
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epistemic value. The central veritistic tenet is a mere slogan and there have been 
different ways of interpreting it; we discuss several interpretations that we label 
‘psychologism’ because they reduce the role of truth in epistemic evaluation to the 
role that the concept of truth plays in the desires or motives that a cognitive agent 
may have concerning truth-linked goals he can intentionally pursue. We argue that 
this kind of psychological relation to truth-linked goals is inadequate to account for 
what we ordinarily take to be sufficient sources of epistemic value. The reassuring 
project needs to understand the central veritistic tenet in a non-psychologistic manner. 
We propose that a minimal teleological understanding of truth as the ultimate 
epistemic goal is enough to issue an adequate constraint on epistemic goods. The 
constraint in question is that the conditions deemed sufficient for an epistemic good 
must be truth-conducive. We call this a ‘truth-conducive constraint’. Some 
philosophers have argued that truth cannot be the only ultimate epistemic goal 
because supposing that it is results in our inability to explain the epistemic good of 
paradigmatic examples of cognitive achievements; the second part of Chapter I 
discusses some of these objections to the minimal veritism and sketches responses to 
them. The purpose of this discussion is to show how the minimal idea that truth- 
conducivity is what distinctively constraints epistemic goods is deeply entrenched in 
a proper understanding of such goods.
If principles that define conditions for epistemic goods are subject to a truth- 
conducive constraint then they are correct only if they fulfil such a constraint. This 
means that (EP) is a correct epistemic principle only if perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source. Therefore, in order to show that our conviction that (EP) is 
correct is justified the philosopher engaged in the reassuring project has to show that 
we are justified in taking it that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. It can 
easily be seen that this task essentially relies on perception and hence it seems to be 
infected with some sort of vicious circularity. Chapter II discusses what the kind of 
circularity in question is and what is exactly vicious about it in relation to the 
reassuring project. We argue that the kind of circularity exhibited by the argument 
that uses perception to show that we are justified in believing that perception is 
truth-conducive consist in the fact that the justification for the premises of such 
argument depends on what its conclusion asserts. We call this form of circularity 
(DT). In identifying (DT) we contrast it with other kinds of circularity and with the
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specific epistemic vices that they engender. In particular we contrast (DT) with the 
kind of circularity that is thought to engender the epistemic vice known as 
'transmission-failure’. Transmission-failure occurs when one has justification for 
certain premises and one competently infers a conclusion form them but one fails to 
thereby acquire a justification for that conclusion. It has been argued that this 
epistemic vice is produced in an argument or reasoning when the justification for its 
premises depends on an antecedent warrant for its conclusion. This is the specific 
type of circularity that is thought to produce transmission-failure; we call it ‘(DW)’. 
We examine in detail the general grounds that have been offered to charge arguments 
with (DW) and transmission-failure, we argue that they are not cogent grounds for 
the charge and in particular that they are not cogent reasons to charge the form of 
argument used in the reassuring project with (DW) and transmission-failure. That 
leaves us with the question of what is the epistemic vice produced by (DT) with 
respect to the attempt to show that we are justified in believing that perception is 
truth-conducive. The last section of Chapter II formulates the vice, that we call the 
Conditional Position Problem (CPP). It consist in the impossibility of getting past an 
explanatorily vacuous position in which the veritistic philosopher cannot conclude 
that we are justified in believing that perception is truth-conducive but only that we 
are justified in thinking that it is i f  it is. We explain in detail the problematic nature 
of this position.
Chapter III investigates several strategies for avoiding the Conditional 
Position Problem. One consists in freeing epistemic principles from truth-conducive 
constraints. We explain how lifting such constraints would indeed enable the 
veritistic philosopher to overcome (CPP). The master argument for freedom is then 
presented and the consequences usually drawn from it are expounded. One 
consequence of lifting truth-conducive constraints from epistemic goods is that an 
alternative epistemic constraint needs to be imposed on such goods, if there is going 
to be still something distinctively epistemic about such goods. It is argued that the 
constraints set to replace truth-conducive constraints are inadequate inasmuch as they 
fail to make intelligible the epistemic defeat of the goods they are supposed to 
constrain. A second major strategy for avoiding (CPP) consists in avoiding reliance 
on perception altogether in showing that we are justified in believing that perception 
is truth-conducive, this would mean to show this apriori. We examine two different
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attempts to construct such apriori route to the reassuring epistemic position sought in 
the project. We argue that one of them involves a conception of the correctness of 
epistemic principles in which they are not subject to straightforward truth-conducive 
constraints but to a ‘subjecti vised’ version of them, which proves to be as inadequate 
as a constraint on epistemic goods as the constraints examined in the context of the 
first strategy to overcome (CPP). We then conjecture that truth-conducive constraints 
do not seem to be a negotiable component in a proper understanding of epistemic 
goods, so we examine an attempt to construct an apriori route to the reassuring 
epistemic position that fully respects truth-conducive constraints. We argue that this 
attempt subtly smuggles empirical presuppositions and hence fails to achieve the 
apriority that would enable the veritistic theorist to avoid (CPP).
In the first section of Chapter IV we discuss yet another possible strategy for 
avoiding (CPP), this one tries to modify the very goal pursued in the reassuring 
project. It proposes to conceptualise the goal in terms of showing that we have a 
strategic entitlement to take on trust, rather than in terms of showing that we have 
justification to believe, that perception is truth-conducive. We argue that the pursuit 
of the reconceptualised goal is still thwarted by a problem exactly parallel to (CPP).
Given that the goal of the reassuring project proves to be elusive we explore 
the question of what are the consequences of this result for the possibility of gaining 
philosophical knowledge about epistemic principles at all. We argue that the fact that 
the veritistic philosopher cannot satisfy himself in showing that there is a reassuring 
epistemic position, conceptualised as a justification or as an entitlement, with respect 
to our conviction that perception is a source of epistemic goods, does not warrant a 
generalised pessimism about the possibility of gaining philosophical knowledge 
about fundamental epistemic principles. For not only there are aspects of such 
principles the knowledge of which our results leave untouched, but the very piece of 
knowledge that the goal of the reassuring project is unattainable is itself a valuable 
piece of philosophical knowledge concerning epistemic principles.
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Chapter I
Goods and Goals
1.1. Veritistic Epistemology and Divisions of Philosophical Labour
In this first chapter we attempt to identify and articulate the plausible minimal 
commitments of the philosophers who pursue the project of providing a 
philosophical explanation of the generalizations they call ‘Epistemic Principles’. 
Borrowing terminology from Alvin Goldman we call such commitments ‘veritistic’ 
because they manifest endorsement of the idea that truth is the touchstone of a proper 
understanding of epistemic achievements and values. Epistemologists committed to 
this general veritistic idea differ enormously otherwise. An objective of this chapter 
is to articulate a minimal veritistic shared commitment that can plausibly be held to 
underlie the project they all pursue.
Most philosophers that have worked in the aforementioned project have not 
attempted a defence of their minimal veritistic commitments, but recently such 
commitments have become the explicit target of opposition and attack. A second 
objective of this chapter is to examine the arguments of this opposition and sketch 
veritistic responses to them. The veritistic responses to that opposition suggested 
here will be sketchy; a full treatment of the issues implicated would need a separate 
investigation. However, such a defence is not essential for reaching our conclusions 
concerning the philosophical explanation of epistemic principles; we admit such 
conclusions are conditional on endorsement of minimal veritism. But the veritistic 
ideas on which those conclusions are conditional are deeply entrenched and in this 
chapter we want to illustrate how they are more entrenched in our understanding of 
epistemic evaluation than their opponents seem to acknowledge. Later chapters will 
add evidence for this claim about the deep entrenchment of veritism.
Let us begin with some typical statements of the minimal veritistic 
commitment we will articulate and support:
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...our central cognitive aim is to amass a large body of beliefs with a 
favourable truth-falsity ratio. For a belief to be epistemically justified is for it, 
somehow, to be awarded high marks relative to that aim.1
Epistemic evaluation is undertaken from what we might call the “epistemic 
point of view”. That point of view is defined by the aim of maximizing truth 
and minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs.2
...the distinguishing characteristic of this particular species of justification 
[i.e. epistemic justification] is, I submit, its essential or internal relationship to 
the cognitive goal of truth. Cognitive doings are epistemically justified, on 
this conception, only if and to the extent that they are aimed at this goal....3
In order for evaluations to be epistemic, it must be that the person’s beliefs 
are measured against the standard of how good a job they do of realizing his 
goal of now believing truths and now not believing falsehoods.4
The veritistic commitment expressed in these passages has two components. The first 
is phrased in terms of there being a goal, namely truth or true belief or a high truth- 
falsity ratio in a body of beliefs or some other truth-linked goal, which cognitive 
activity aims at. The second component is the idea that there’s a relation that holds 
between cognitive activity and its truth-linked goal which renders the former 
susceptible of a distinctive type of evaluation, namely epistemic. These are the two 
components of the minimal veritistic commitment that in this chapter we need to 
articulate in a plausible manner.
The terminology of activity, goals and aims suggests intentional agency and 
voluntary control. Alston’s and Foley’s quotations above are a case in point; they 
explicitly state the veritistic idea by saying that maximising the truth-falsity ratio in 
one's body of beliefs is an aim we have. The epistemic goal is conceived here in such 
a way that individual people can have it as the content of their intentions, and the 
relation between cognitive performances and the epistemic goal is then construed as 
a special case of a psychological relation of intending or desiring to bring about the 
goal or states of affairs conducive to the goal. Most statements of the veritistic 
commitment to be found in the literature encourage this ‘psychologistic’
1 Alston 1985: 84.
* Ibid.: 83.
J Bonjour 1978: 5.
4 Foley 1987: 124.
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understanding of the central veritistic idea, but such interpretation of veritism is 
inappropriate for the type of cognitive performances that will be discussed in the rest 
of this investigation. It is beyond question that some cognitive endeavours are guided 
by an overt intention of maximising truth-falsity ratios or of achieving other truth- 
linked goals. Paradigms of that type of cognitive activity are essentially social 
cognitive practices, like research programmes in science and standard teaching in 
universities. But not all cognition plausibly fits this model of being intentionally 
guided by an overt intention to achieve a truth-linked goal; individual episodes of 
perception, of memory and of various forms of ratiocination need not be so guided in 
order to bear a relation to a truth-linked goal that makes the doxastic states they 
engender susceptible of epistemic evaluation. The rest of this thesis deals with 
epistemic principles that concern this latter type of individual cognitive episodes for 
which the intentionalist or psychologistic understanding of the core veritistic 
commitment is implausible. Section (1.2) below expounds in detail why such 
understanding is inappropriate for a treatment of the type of cognitive episodes in 
question and section (1.3) sketches an understanding of the veritistic commitment 
which is adequate for that type of cognition.
The underlying dichotomy of types of cognition presupposed in this 
investigation is closely related to Goldman's distinction between individual and 
social epistemology.5 The subject matter of this investigation is a project within 
individual epistemology. The epistemic principles to be discussed later concern 
cognitive achievements assumed to be such that they can be philosophically studied 
in abstraction from the social practices in which they can be embedded. The 
prototype of such achievements is discrete episodes of unaided visual perception; the 
basic epistemic principle we will discuss concerns this specific type of achievement. 
This type of cognitive achievement contrast w ith those that are essentially embedded 
in wider practices of social interaction, like the ones mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. Whether this contrast runs deep enough to warrant the assumption that the 
former kind of achievement can be philosophically studied in abstraction from the 
latter is an issue that this thesis will not address; its theme is a philosophical project 
that makes that assumption, not the assumption itself.
5 See Goldman 1999a: 4.
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The inadequacy of the psychologistic reading of the core veritistic 
commitment for the study of the individual type of cognition relates to the fact that in 
this type of cognition we deal with the ultimate and fundamental source of epistemic 
value. This means that the explanation of the epistemic value of individual cognitive 
performances and achievements need only cite a relation to a truth-linked goal which 
itself doesn’t depend on nor involve a different type of cognitive performance. The 
epistemic value of essentially social cognitive performances is not ultimate and 
fundamental in that sense because its explanation must cite the epistemic value of a 
different type of cognitive performance, namely individual ones. There’s an 
asymmetric explanatory relation between the epistemic value of individual and 
essentially social cognitive performances. For example, suppose we want to explain 
the epistemic value of a specific implementation of a pedagogical technique which 
sets students to work in a laboratory collectively in the execution of a series of 
experiments. We want to explain how good this social cognitive practice is for the 
learning of certain truths. In constructing such an explanation we need to advert to 
the individuals’ episodes of perception and ratiocination that are involved in the 
collaborative practice and to the epistemic good such actual episodes have. If those 
individual episodes were themselves epistemically deficient that would undermine 
the overall epistemic value of the implementation of the collaborative practice, but if 
the individual episodes were themselves epistemically good their value would 
contribute to the overall value of the collaborative practice. Even if the epistemic 
value of the individual episodes or performances doesn't 4add-up’ to the value of the 
collaborative practice, the former necessarily contributes to the latter. By contrast, in 
explaining the epistemic value of individual cognitive performances there’s no 
further distinct type of performance whose epistemic value could be cited in the 
explanation. In this sense the epistemic value of individual performances is ultimate 
and fundamental, it is not constituted by the value of other types of performance (in 
particular, not of social performances); their epistemic value derives from a relation 
to truth which accordingly needs to be also ultimate and fundamental. A 
psychological relation that an individual or a group of individuals can establish with 
a truth-linked goal is not ultimate and fundamental in the required sense, as will be 
argued in the following two sections of this chapter, hence the inadequacy of 
psychologism for the individual type of cognition.
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We will leave open how adequate psychologism is for the understanding of 
veritism as applied to essentially social cognitive practices; we will only argue that it 
is definitely not adequate for a veritistic treatment of basic individual cognition and 
thus for the explanation of ultimate and fundamental epistemic value. Here we are 
relying on a first division of philosophical labour: our project demands leaving on 
the side the issue of how to properly formulate veritism with respect to essentially 
social cognitive practices, and how such veritistic explanation would link with the 
veritistic explanation of ultimate and fundamental epistemic value.
The articulation of the minimal veritistic commitments for the treatment of 
individual cognition obviously employs the notion of truth. Many different 
philosophical debates intersect in this problematic node. In order to carry out our 
investigation we need to apply here a second division of philosophical labour. In 
general we can distinguish three broad categories of philosophical problems 
concerning the notion of truth:
A. Semantic issues related to how to understand, characterise, analyse or explicate 
the truth-predicate.
B. Metaphysical issues related to how we should conceive the truth-makers for 
different domains of discourse, e.g. as objective, response-dependent, evidence- 
transcendent, etc.
C. Epistemological issues related to how to understand the role of truth in the 
explanation of epistemic evaluation.
These areas of problems can definitely be connected: endorsing and defending a 
certain view in one of them may bring commitments in the others. But expounding 
such interconnections gives material for several separate investigations. In order to 
pursue ours concerning veritistic epistemic principles we need to focus on the 
epistemological issues, leaving aside their potential connections with the other 
groups of issues. The minimal conception of truth as a type o f  representational 
success which will be identified later in this chapter as part of the minimal veritistic 
commitments, can be thought to bring with it problematic further commitments with 
respect to issues in (A) or (B). We will not discuss this kind of possible difficulty; we 
will focus only on some of the epistemological consequences of the minimal 
veritistic commitments as they arise within a specific philosophical project.
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I. 2. Psychologistic interpretations of veritism
The previous section pointed out that the common statements of the core veritistic 
commitments strongly encourage a psychologistic reading which is inadequate for 
the explanation of fundamental epistemic value. The present section argues for that 
inadequacy.
Recall the twofold minimal veritistic commitment: the idea that there is a 
truth-linked goal of cognitive activity and that there’s a relation between cognitive 
performances and that goal which makes the former susceptible of epistemic 
evaluation. A psychologistic understanding of veritism explicates the relation in 
question as a special case of a psychological relation and the truth-linked goal as a 
case of an object of a psychological state. There are serious doubts as to the 
psychological plausibility of supposing that there is a truth-linked goal that is the 
object of a psychological state of cognizers whenever his cognitive performances are 
susceptible of epistemic evaluation.6 But for the sake of argument let us assume that 
there is a plausible truth-linked goal suitable for a psychologistic reading of veritism. 
We will now argue that a psychological relation that people can establish with such a 
goal cannot endow their cognitive performances with fundamental epistemic value, 
i.e. it is not a condition for making them candidates for epistemic evaluation.
A straightforward psychological relation of the intended sort would be that a 
cognizer has the formation of true beliefs as the intentional aim issuing from a 
general desire that motivates her intellectual performances. How should we construe 
the content of such a general desire or intention for true belief? It wouldn't be 
plausible to construe it as a desire for true belieffor its own sake, for very rarely any 
such desire can be attributed to us. Most of the cases of wanting to know the truth are 
cases of wanting the truth just as an instrument for something else, not for its own 
sake. In all such cases our cognitive performances could have epistemic value even if 
not accompanied by the desire for truth for its own sake; such desire could not then 
explain the presence of epistemic value in all cases, even if it would remain an open 
question if it could add some epistemic value to those performances that does 
motivate. The content of the general desire or intention that the psychologist needs
6 See David 2001 for discussion o f  the problems related to the formulation o f  the required truth-linked 
goal.
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better be compatible with wanting true belief not for its own sake. We can specify a 
general desire with that property as a desire for true belief as such; for even when we 
want true belief only as an instrument to fulfill other non-epistemic interest, for 
example find the nearest petrol station, we still want our true belief as such, as true 
belief, since the fulfillment of our interest typically depends on our belief being true. 
There might be other problems as to the psychological plausibility of a general desire 
for true belief as such, but for the sake of argument let us suppose that there is such a 
general desire that spreads throughout the space of possible cognitive performances.
We want to elaborate on an interesting problem for this kind of psychologistic 
view that we think is briefly hinted at by Ernest Sosa, he writes:
If the evaluation of a quality is epistemic then presumably it will concern how 
well it suits believers for grasping the truth in certain salient
field/circumstance conditions But must such a quality take the form of a
practice that can count as a motivation voluntarily held by the agent/subject? 
It is this that seems problematic.7
And this is why Sosa thinks that's problematic:
Sooner or later we shall need to recognize that our virtuous epistemic conduct 
must derive at some deep level from our virtuous nature, a nature not itself 
due entirely to one’s free and autonomous choice. Any choice due to the 
agent must derive from something in the agent’s nature, lest it be 
unacceptably arbitrary or fortuitous. But that in the agent from which it
derives cannot be prior choices unto infinity Requiring a logically prior
choice without exception would lead to the vicious regress or to the 
unacceptably arbitrary. Virtuous conduct must derive from something in the
agent’s constitution not itself a logically prior choice  that in one’s
character to which the admirable performance is attributed cannot be some
o
logically prior truth-conducive practice, or policy or motive or virtue.
We can flesh out the problem that Sosa sees in the following way. If we suppose that 
what makes a certain cognitive performance or practice (of belief formation) 
epistemically good is that it is guided or otherwise accompanied by a general desire 
for true belief as such, then a vicious regress is triggered. In the presence of that 
supposition each performance or practice Pn must have been adopted or executed 
because of the general desire of believing truths as such, but since that adoption or
7 Sosa 2001: 56.
8 Ibid.: 56-7.
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execution should not be fortuitous relative to that desire the view we are assuming 
also requires that the adoption or execution of Pn be supported by a prior belief Bn-1 
to the effect that beliefs produced through Pn tend to be true. But, in the present view, 
if Bn-1 is to have epistemic value it must be the result of the general desire for true 
belief as such plus a prior belief Bn-2 that the practice or performance that yields Bn- 
1 tends to produce true beliefs. But, in the present view, if Bn-2 is to have epistemic
value and so on ad infinitum. This regress impedes our understanding of how a
relation to truth, conceived as an intentional aiming, can be the source of the 
epistemic value of particular cognitive performances.9 Since the regress is produced 
by the psychologistic supposition that what makes a certain cognitive performance or 
practice (of belief formation) epistemically good is that it is guided or otherwise 
accompanied by a general desire for true belief as such, we should reject that 
supposition in explaining how a relation to truth can be the source of the epistemic 
value of individual cognitive performances.
It might be replied that a regress need not be triggered. One can accept that in 
order for S's belief that p formed through M to have epistemic value it must have 
been accompanied by the intention of reaching the truth, but it could be argued that 
this intention is ambiguous. It could be either of the following two:
A. S had the following intention: 4T will use M in order to find out the truth”.
B. In using M S had the following intention: “I will find out the truth”.
(A) can plausibly be viewed as triggering a regress, for it is plausible that having 
such an intention rationally commits one to believe that M is a good way of getting to 
the truth, and with this belief in place we have the beginning of the regress described 
above, because we need to explain where the epistemic value of that belief comes 
from. But (B) doesn’t seem to have such an effect, for it doesn’t seem to rationally 
commit one to have the problematic belief concerning the truth-conducivity of M. 
Think here of children who do want to find out what’s the case for the sake of the
9
We have to be careful. We are not denying that one can aim intentionally at true belief. One can, 
even if, as discussed latter in this section, in so aiming one typically (but not necessarily) makes true 
belief an instrumental means for the fulfilment o f  non-epistemic interests or desires. What we deny is 
that such intentional aiming is the fundam ental relation  that endows individual cognitive 
performances with epistemic value. One’s ability to aim intentionally at truth cannot constitute the 
fundamental relation we need to explicate.
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matter without believing that the actual method they instinctively use is good for that 
purpose. Also, most adults, when using basic perceptual means for settling a question, 
say the number of objects on a table, plausibly proceed with the intention of finding 
out what’s the case but without the belief that the method they use is efficient for that 
purpose. So, reading the intention as in (B) it wouldn’t seem to trigger the kind of 
regress described.
Let us assume that the intention understood as in (B) doesn’t trigger a regress 
because it doesn’t commit the subject to believe that the method or practice which he 
intends to use is truth-conducive. But if the choice of method M  is not determined by 
the content of the intention, it becomes unclear why such intention should endow the 
beliefs formed through M  with any epistemic value. The efficacy or inefficacy of M  
clearly influences whether the beliefs formed through M  have epistemic value. So if 
M  were efficient and the content of one’s intention determined the use of M  it would 
be plausible to cite that intention in explaining the source of the epistemic value of 
one’s beliefs formed through M. Similarly, if M  was ineffective and the content of 
one’s intention determined the use of M  it would be plausible to cite the intention in 
explaining why the beliefs lack epistemic value. But if the content of the intention 
doesn’t determine the use of M, citing the intention in explaining the epistemic value 
of the beliefs would look irrelevant. The (B) reading of the problematic intention 
would seem to escape the regress described above at the price of depriving the 
intention from the capacity to play the theoretical role that the psychologistic view 
under discussion needs it to play.
In order for it to be plausible that an intention of aiming at truth plays any 
epistemic role in endowing an issuing cognitive performance with epistemic value it 
must be understood as in (A). But positing an intention with that content in the 
explanation of epistemic value triggers a regress that impedes our understanding of 
how the posited psychological relation can be the source of epistemic value. A 
psychologistic reading of the central veritistic commitment produces this problem 
and therefore leaves us with no satisfactory account of the fundamental role of truth 
in the explanation of epistemic value.
There are some versions of psychologism that do not succumb to that 
problem because they are not put forward as explanations of fundamental epistemic 
value. L. Zagzebski has advanced a view of that sort. She thinks that truth “typically
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operate[s] in our psychology not as an end in any sense, but as a motive”10 and she 
believes that the operative motive in question is love of true belief; she thinks that 
this motive has intrinsic value and that “it is capable of conferring additional value 
on the acts it motivates”.11 We can see how she thinks that the motive of love of truth 
adds value to the cognitive performances it motivates by means of a comparison with 
the role she also assigns to motives in moral action. Consider three different relations 
acts can have to compassion (understood as the aversion to the suffering of others). 
We can distinguish (a) acts that have the consequences of compassionate acts, i.e. the 
elimination of the suffering of others, without having it as an aim nor as a motive; (b) 
acts that have the elimination of the suffering of others as an aim, without being 
motivated by compassion; and (c) acts that have compassion as a motive. Here are 
examples of those various types of acts. An act of type (a) could be talking next to 
someone who, unbeknownst to us, gets her pain alleviated just by hearing a human 
voice; an act of type (b) would be talking to that same person with the intentional 
aim of alleviating her suffering, but in doing so one is motivated not by the desire to 
alleviate her suffering for the sake if it but, say, by the desire for relief from the 
nausea produced in us by the sight of the suffering person. An act of type (c) would 
be talking to that person while being motivated to do so by the desire to alleviate her 
suffering for the sake of it. Zagzebski thinks that on the epistemic side we can have 
an analogous tripartite division of cognitive performances. Performances that (a*) 
have truth as a consequence, without having it as an aim nor as a motive, e.g. as 
when we get true beliefs by accident; (b*) performances that have truth as an aim, 
without having the motive of the love of truth, e.g. as when we what to know the 
truth not for its own sake but only as a means for the achievement of a further goal; 
and (c*) performances that are motivated by the love of truth, as when one seeks for 
the truth for its own sake.
Zagzebski's central claim is that other things being equal, performances of 
type (c*) are epistemically more valuable than performances of types (a*) and (b*),12 
and that the explanation of this inequality is the motive present in (c*) but absent in 
(a*) and (b*). As she puts it: “I propose that love of truth is a motive that confers
10 Zagzebski 2003a: 146.
11 Ibid.: 147.
12 Ibid.: 148.
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value on acts of belief in addition to any other value such acts might have”.13 
Whatever problems Zagzebski’s view might face, the regress problem sketched 
above does not seem to be one of them. That criticism demonstrates that one cannot 
explain all epistemic value as arising from a psychological relation between 
cognitive performances and a truth-linked goal; there must be some epistemic value 
which is not explicable by any such relation, that is fundamental epistemic value. But 
this is consistent with the idea that the presence of a psychological relation, like the 
motive of the love of truth Zagzebski describes, can add value to the epistemic value 
that the performances it motives may already have. The regress criticism presented 
above only entails that such added value is not fundamental epistemic value and that 
the source of that additional value is not the ultimate source of the fundamental 
epistemic value of a cognitive performance.
Because Zagzebski’s view is not concerned with fundamental epistemic value 
it avoids the regress problem for psychologism. However, there’s a concern about the 
nature of the additional value that in her theory springs from the motive of love of 
truth. We need to ask if there’s in effect some additional epistemic value that arises 
from those motivational origins.
She thinks that the motive of love of truth confers additional value on the 
performances that it motivates because the motive is intrinsically valuable and this is
14so because true belief is itself intrinsically valuable. But this claim does not seem to 
sit well with standard evaluative practice; for it is not clear that in cases where our 
cognitive performances are motivated by the love of truth there’s any epistemic value 
accruing to the corresponding cognitive performances just in virtue o f that 
psychological relation. Imagine two scenarios. In the first out of pure love of truth S 
undertakes the task of forming true beliefs about absolutely trivial topics, e.g. the 
names and associated numbers in a particular page of the phone book or the number 
of grains in a scoop of sand from the beach.13 In the second scenario S undertakes the 
same task but not out of love of truth, but because the task is part of one of those silly 
TV shows. Suppose that S  uses exactly the same methods of belief formation and 
arrives exactly at the same true beliefs in both scenarios. Moreover, the two scenarios 
are identical, the only difference being that that in the first S acts motivated by the
|J Zagzebski 2003a: 149, my emphasis.
14 Ibid.: 147.
15 1 take these examples from Sosa 2001: 49.
20
love of truth and in the second he doesn’t. It is exceedingly implausible that S’s 
cognitive performances in the first scenario have some epistemic value that they lack 
in the second just because in the first they are motivated by that (quite notorious) 
love of truth.
In later work Zagzebski modifies her view by saying that the value of the 
motive of the love of truth comes not only from the intrinsic value of true belief but 
also from the place it occupies in the constellation of motives that are constitutive of 
a good life, or in her Aristotelian terminology, a life of eudaimonia,16 She holds, for 
example, that the love for truth is valuable because true belief is typically a
• 17prerequisite for successful execution of acts motivated by morally good traits. But
what should we make of cases where the true beliefs we form are not prerequisite for
the success of any morally good acts? Presumably the true beliefs of subject S in the
first scenario about the phone book and the grains of sand are of that sort. Maybe
Zagzebski could classify S’s love of truth in that scenario as pathological, for being
severed from the other kind of motives that she holds makes love of truth valuable.
In that way she would explain why love of truth in such scenario does not add any
epistemic value to S’s cognitive performances. But even in cases where one’s love of
truth is adequately related to the other motives constitutive of a good life, there’s still
a concern as to whether the value that love of truth can contribute to cognitive
performances in virtue of being so related to those other motives is epistemic in
nature. For if love of truth is valuable because true belief is typically a prerequisite
for successful execution of morally good acts, then the value attached to love of truth
derives from truth’s instrumental status relative to recognizably non-epistemic ends.
But this makes it difficult to see how the alleged additional value conferred by the
18motive of love of truth on cognitive performances could be epistemic in nature.
A psychologistic interpretation of the central tenets of veritism is inadequate 
for the explanation of fundamental epistemic value, for it leads to a vicious 
explanatory regress. It also seems to be inadequate to explain any additional 
epistemic value cognitive performances may have, for it posits as sources of that 
value relations to non-epistemic ends and thereby it becomes unclear why we should
16 See for example her 2003b.
17 Zagzebski 2003b: 24.
18 In (1.5.2) below we discuss in detail this intuitive problem for Zagzebski’s view.
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conceptualise that additional value as epistemic in nature. These difficulties give us 
reason to look for a non-psychologistic interpretation of the central tenets of veritism.
1.3. Minimal Veritism
The previous section exposed the flaws of a psychologistic interpretation of the core 
veritistic ideas that there’s a truth-linked goal of cognitive performances and that a 
relation to it is the source of fundamental epistemic value. The flawed interpretation 
is a case of psychologism because it attempts to reduce the role of a truth-linked goal 
in the explanation of fundamental epistemic value to a role the notion of truth can 
play in an individual’s psychology as a general desire, intention or motive to pursue 
true belief. We observed that the concept of truth can play some of these 
psychological roles, but we argued that the role of truth in the explanation of 
fundamental epistemic value cannot be reduced to any of those. The present section 
sketches a minimal version of the core veritistic ideas that escapes the flaws of 
psychologism and can be seen to reasonably represent the minimal veritistic 
commitments of the project to be discussed in the subsequent chapters.
Three theses characterise what we’ll call 'MINIMAL VERITISM’ (MV):
a. Truth is the ultimate epistemic goal relative to which epistemic achievements 
are assessed.
b. A cognitive performance derives fundamental epistemic value from a 
fundamental relation to truth.
c. Truth's having that fundamental relation to cognitive performances is 
autonomous from any non-epistemic goals.
The rest of this section explains the meaning of these theses. (MV) does not assert 
that truth is the only epistemic goal or value tout court; it only says that truth is the 
ultimate epistemic goal. This means that (MV) can allow for a plurality of epistemic 
goals but entails that what there is of epistemic value in each of them must be 
explicable in terms of a relation to truth; whereas explaining the epistemic good of
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truth doesn’t require citing a non-ultimate or derivative epistemic goal.19 Thus, 
according to (MV) there is an asymmetrical explanatory relation between truth and 
other epistemic goals: truth’s explanatory place in that relation is ultimate whereas 
the place of all other epistemic goals is derivative. For example, consistency and 
knowledge are epistemic goals distinct from truth; however, the explanation of their 
epistemic value must cite the concept of truth: consistency is epistemically good 
because it rules out ways of failing to attain a truthful system of beliefs and states of 
knowing are epistemically good at least for guaranteeing true belief. But on the 
other hand, as we will see below, the explanation of why truth is an epistemic good 
need not mention consistency, knowledge nor any other derivative epistemic goal.
(MV) does not deny that individuals can value and pursue truth because they 
value and pursue a variety of other non-epistemic goals, but it denies that the 
explanation of the relation between cognitive performances and truth that endows the 
former with fundamental epistemic value should advert to any of those non-epistemic 
goals or to the reasons why individuals happen to value them. That is what it means 
to say that such a relation between cognitive performances and truth is autonomous 
from non-epistemic goals. For example, people value having true beliefs because that 
is conducive to fulfilling their practical goals. Having a correct belief as to the 
location of the nearest restaurant is a means to satisfy my hunger, thus getting my 
belief right here is valuable (partially) because it is a means for something I value for 
non-epistemic reasons. (MV) doesn’t deny these facts about the insertion of truth in 
wider practices of evaluation; what it denies is that the explanation of the 
fundamental epistemic value that a cognitive performance derives from its relation to 
truth should mention the place that truth can occupy in those wider practices. It 
denies that such an explanation should mention the value that a true belief derives 
from being a prerequisite for achieving something we value because it fulfils our 
non-epistemic interests, like our interest for food or for fame. Citing such a source of 
value would make fundamental epistemic value dependent on non-epistemic values, 
which contravenes the autonomy of epistemic value stated in (MV)-c.
19 Goldman 2001: 31 calls something close to this version o f  veritism 'unitarianisnr, because it holds 
that the unifying epistemic theme o f  all epistemic goals and virtues is truth.
20 Some opponents to veritism have objected that even if  truth must be cited in accounting for some o f  
the epistemic value o f  other epistemic goals, a connection with truth does not suffice to explain all the 
epistemic value in such derivative epistemic goals, therefore truth cannot be the only ultimate 
epistemic goal in the present sense. A couple o f  instances o f  this type o f  objection to veritism are 
discussed in (I. 4) and (I. 5) below, where veritistic responses to them are sketched.
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Some philosophers who would agree that the value of having one’s non- 
epistemic interests satisfied doesn’t enhance or contribute to the epistemic value of 
cognitive performances would insist that the presence of some such interests is 
nevertheless a condition o f  possibility for the corresponding cognitive performances 
to be epistemically assessable. A. Goldman puts forward a view of this sort. He 
motivates his view by considering cases where a subject is ignorant of absolutely 
trivial facts about which he lacks all interest; for example, about who won the 
women’s breast stroke at the 1976 Summer Olympics. Goldman is convinced that in 
such cases the subject’s ignorance fails to affect the epistemic value of his belief 
corpus because the subject lacks interest on the corresponding facts. He writes:
Does S’s ignorance on all of these matters constitute, or even contribute 
toward, the impoverished V-condition of his creedal corpus? Does such 
ignorance imply that his creedal state should receive a low V-value, or V- 
ranking? If S is totally uninterested in these questions, I am inclined to say 
that his knowing no answers to them doesn’t not count against the V-value of
91his beliefs states.
And consequently he concludes that:
...an agent S’s belief states... have [epistemic] value or disvalue when they 
are responses to questions that interests S (or, more generally, when other 
agents are interested in S’s knowing the answer).22
...veritistic value should always be assessed relative to questions o f  interest.
In (1.2) we argued that the presence of a standing (epistemic) interest and 
concomitant intention to know the truth about a specific subject matter does not by 
itself endow with any epistemic value the performances that it can motivate. 
Goldman’s view is importantly different from that view we have already criticised. 
He is not saying that the presence of the interest (epistemic or non-epistemic) is the 
source of epistemic value, he just says that the presence of (non-epistemic) interests 
is a condition o f possibility for the corresponding performances to have any 
epistemic value. We will show that this role that Goldman assigns to non-epistemic 
interests is at odds with standard epistemic practice.
21 Goldman 1999a: 88-89. ‘V ’ means veritistic in Goldman’s abbreviation.
“  Ibid.: 88. His emphasis.
Ibid.: 89. His emphasis.
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As we have seen, he motivates his view on cases of steady states of ignorance, 
throughout a given period of time, which run together with steady lack of interest in 
the relevant questions. Now, given that in his framework ‘ignorance’ means 
withholding o f judgment24 we can see that even in his motivating cases his view is 
implausible. In such cases the subject’s lack of interest doesn’t preclude the presence 
of epistemic value or the possibility of epistemic assessment, for his withholding of 
judgment can itself be the result of vicious epistemic practice, e.g. biased survey of 
evidence. For example, suppose that I withhold judgment as to who is going to win 
the next presidential election and I am not interested on the matter. According to 
Goldman my withholding of judgment is not assessable with respect to epistemic 
value simply because I am not interested in who is going to win the next presidential 
election. But this is false if my withholding of judgment on the matter is itself the 
result of vicious epistemic practice, e.g. if I have an irrational belief that the agencies 
publishing electoral tendencies are dishonest. In such a case my withholding of 
judgment does merit a low epistemic mark in virtue of being the result of an 
irrational belief.
The implausibility of Goldman's view is clearer in cases where there’s a 
change in credal state, say from ignorance to belief or from acceptance to rejection, 
together with a change in interest. For example, suppose that at // one believes that 
the library will be opened tomorrow as usual and one has a standing interest on the 
matter because one needs to return an overdue book. One knows that there might be 
a strike within the next few days, so one keeps on alert for updating one’s knowledge 
on the matter. At U one reads an email from the provost saying that the University 
will be closed tomorrow because of the strike; accordingly one changes one’s belief 
state from acceptance to rejection of the proposition: “The library will be open 
tomorrow as usual". However, in the same email one learns that overdue books need 
not be returned, thus one loses interest in the question whether the library will be 
open. In a case like this it is obvious that the fact that one ceases to be interested in 
the question is no obstacle to epistemically evaluate one's credal change; moreover, 
the fact that one happened to be interested in the question at any time is irrelevant for 
epistemically assessing the credal change. Regardless of whether one has or stopped 
having an interest on the question we can still assess epistemically relevant
24 Goldman 1999a: 89.
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properties of one’s credal change, for example the reliability of the method that 
produced it.
The presence of non-epistemic interests might be in some circumstances 
causal pre-conditions for the initiation of the execution of cognitive performances 
that are epistemically assessable, but as the above examples suggests they are not 
preconditions for the epistemic assessment itself, for the performances are 
epistemically assessable even when they are not causally preceded by any such 
interest. This confirms that the relation between cognitive performances and truth 
responsible for fundamental epistemic value is autonomous from all non-epistemic 
interests and goals, not only because these do not contribute to the epistemic value of 
performances they might initiate, but because they are not even conditions for the 
possibility of assessing them epistemically.
In the context of (MV) the claim that truth is the ultimate and autonomous 
epistemic goal must be understood with reference to representational states of 
individuals, not with reference to individuals themselves. If it makes sense to say that 
individuals have truth as a goal it has to be an intentional goal of them. As we argued 
in (1.2) individuals can and do intentionally aim at true belief, but that is not the kind 
of relation that underlies truth’s role in the explanation of fundamental epistemic 
value. We suggest that the claim that truth is the ultimate and autonomous epistemic 
goal must be understood not in intentional terms but in teleological terms. Producing 
true beliefs is the representational function of certain psychological systems, that 
function is fulfilled when the system succeeds in producing true beliefs. In this sense 
true belief is the goal of those systems, it is achieved when the relevant systems fulfil 
their representational function. That a psychological system of an individual has as 
its representational function to produce true beliefs is entirely independent from the 
intentions, desires and motives that the individual might have. He cannot intend to 
have or not to have that function; his psychological system has that function simply 
in virtue of being a system capable of producing beliefs at all.
Truth’s role as the representational goal of psychological systems capable of 
belief is establishable apriori, as T. Burge has pointed out:
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...it’s apriori that a representational function of a psychological system of 
belief is to form true beliefs. Understanding what a belief is suffices apriori to 
warrant the view that such a system has as function to represent truths.25
Burge does recognise that most functions of psychological capacities can be 
established only empirically; his claim is only that a specific type of function, i.e. the 
representational function, of a specific type of psychological capacities, i.e. those 
capable o f  belief can be established apriori from a proper understanding of what 
belief is. Given that there are psychological systems capable of forming beliefs, it 
seems that we can effectively deduce apriori that the representational function of 
those systems is to form true beliefs. For from a proper understanding of what belief 
is we know that true belief is a species of veridical representation; we also know 
apriori that a representational function is a function to form veridical representations, 
i.e. representations that fulfil the representational goal. From these pieces of apriori 
knowledge it obviously follows that the representational function of systems capable 
of belief is to form true beliefs.
Truth is the ultimate and autonomous epistemic goal because it is the 
representational goal of systems whose performances produce true beliefs, and both 
performances and beliefs are epistemically evaluable relative to that representational 
goal. Accordingly, the relation that endows cognitive performances and beliefs with 
fundamental epistemic value obtains when the representational systems of the 
individual are in good order and succeed in representing his normal environment 
veridically. We will call this relation ' truth-conducivity’. This means that the truth- 
conducivity of a cognitive performance is necessary for it and the belief it produces 
to have fundamental epistemic value. At this stage there’s some explaining that we 
will have to leave for later. We need to explain how we are going to understand the 
notion of truth-conducivity; we will do this in (1.5.3) and (II.1). We also need to 
respond to arguments that challenge the view that truth-conducivity is necessary for 
epistemic value; we will do this in (III. 1.2), (III.1.3) and (III.3.1).
The above claims about the apriori status of truth’s role as the ultimate and 
autonomous epistemic goal is neither incompatible with nor undermined by the 
apparent anthropological findings that suggest that some societies or cultures value
25 Burge 2003: 509.
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other goals in belief fixation and revision over truth. For example, Hongladarom 
(2002) reports that some practices in Thai society show that in that culture other 
values, such as continuity of tradition, are put on a higher level than truth, and trump 
truth in case of conflict with respect to belief revision. Some writers take these 
empirical findings to show that truth is not necessarily the overriding ultimate 
epistemic goal and that whatever epistemic goals a human group has it is a 
contingent matter that they have them. Those findings are neither incompatible 
with nor undermine the minimal veritism articulated here; the reason for this is not 
that we assume a general thesis to the effect that apriori claims, like the one at the 
heart of minimal veritism, are non-revisable in the light of empirical evidence. No 
such thesis is being relied on here. The reason for the irrelevance of the 
anthropological findings is rather that they concern what groups of people value or 
prefer as a touchstone of belief fixation and revision, and we have insisted that 
minimal veritism is not a theory about what people value or prefer. None of the three 
theses that define minimal veritism assign a role to people’s values or preferences in 
the explanation of fundamental epistemic value. Minimal veritism is a theory about 
the source of some epistemic value (i.e. fundamental) which is independent of any
7 7preferences and intentions of cognitive agents. Relative to such a theory the 
aforementioned anthropological evidence is off the point.
The anthropological evidence does show that there may be non-epistemic 
dimensions of evaluation of beliefs; for example, how conducive they are for the 
continuation of certain political order. The evidence also suggests that people can 
assign more importance to non-epistemic dimensions of evaluation of belief than to 
the epistemic dimension of evaluation identified by minimal veritism. But this is not 
incompatible with minimal veritism either, for it does not rank the epistemic 
dimension of evaluation above non-epistemic ones. Minimal veritism is not a theory 
about any such ranking of dimensions of evaluation of belief."
26 See Hongladarom 2002: 88-90
27 This claim must be viewed in light o f  the arguments o f  (1.2) above.
28 Goldman 1999a: 31-33, marshals some historical and anthropological evidence to argue that a 
concern for truth can be found across epochs and cultures as the touchstone o f  the epistemic 
evaluation o f  various practices. In describing that evidence Goldman is counter-attacking the kind o f  
relativistic view w e’ve discussed in the text. Goldman feels that the historical and anthropological 
evidence is relevant for his veritistic theory because his framework is one for the study o f  essentially 
social cognitive practices, unlike the minimal veritism discussed here which is a framework for 
individual cognitive practices in the sense explained in (1.1). Given that the aim o f  the minimal 
veritism sketched here is the explanation o f  the fundamental epistemic value that attends individual 
cognitive processes and events the historical and anthropological evidence is irrelevant, for the
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For minimal veritism the ultimate source of epistemic value is thin: it is just a 
fundamental relation to a type of success that corresponds apriori to a type of 
representational state. Hostility to the thinness posited by veritism in the explanation 
of fundamental epistemic value need not look out at alien societies where different 
epistemic goals seem to override truth in belief fixation; in (1.4) and (1.5) we’ll see 
that some philosophers criticise veritism alleging its inability to fully explain the 
source of the epistemic value of even the most universal and cross-cultural epistemic 
achievements. Those philosophers think there are other sources of epistemic value 
beyond the one recognised by veritism. In assessing the views of those thinkers we 
will rely on the following Principle on the Authority of Standard Evaluative Practice: 
When a putative source of epistemic value is identified we have to ask what reason 
we have to conceptualise it as epistemic. If there’s an operative taxonomy in standard 
practice that conceptualises the putative source of value in admittedly non-epistemic 
terms, then we have a prima facie principled reason not to conceptualise it as 
epistemic. That reason is principled because it derives from general patterns implicit 
in standard evaluative practice, but it’s prima facie because it can be defeated by an 
argument for a different conceptualisation. In the remainder of this chapter we will 
discuss those prominent challenges to veritism, and we will suggest possible 
veritistic responses to those challenges. The purpose of the discussion is not to 
assemble a full-blown defence of minimal veritism but only to show that departing 
from it while maintaining a proper understanding of epistemic evaluation is not as 
easy as its adversaries seem to suppose.
I. 4. Explanatory Deficits I? The Nature of Understanding
The end of the previous section discussed the relevance for veritism of epistemic 
practices of alien cultures that appear to be incompatible with veritistic claims. The 
rest of the chapter examines an objection to veritism which attempts to undermine it 
not by looking at the peculiarity of certain epistemic practices, but by arguing that it 
fails to explain satisfactorily even what are acknowledged to be the most universal
reasons expounded in the text. I leave open what one’s position concerning that empirical evidence 
should be if  one’s aim is the explanation o f  epistemic value o f  essentially social cognitive practices; 
Goldman’s stance is one possibility in theoretical space.
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epistemic achievements: knowing and understanding. The argument here is that the 
epistemic nature and value of such achievements cannot be entirely explained in 
terms allowed by minimal veritism. We will now examine this kind of problem for 
veritism and suggest veritistic ways of dealing with it.
1.4.1. Understanding, knowing and doxastic states
It has been recently argued that the concentration of modem epistemology on 
skepticism viciously narrowed the spectrum of epistemic achievements actually 
studied in the discipline to knowledge and justification. Accordingly, the notion of 
truth became the touchstone in the understanding of successful or valuable aspects of 
cognition. From this point of view, the obsessive concentration on truth and 
knowledge has resulted in the dismissal of epistemic achievements whose nature, it is 
claimed, cannot be fully explicated in terms of those traditional touchstones alone. It
->n
is claimed that one of those dismissed epistemic achievements is understanding. J. 
Kvanvig, for example, believes that “understanding is a cognitive achievement 
distinct from knowledge”, and argues against the view that “the kind of 
understanding at issue when regarding our cognitive successes and achievements is 
some type of deep and comprehensive knowledge concerning a particular subject, 
topic, or issue”.30
In Kvanvig’s sense understanding consists in: “an internal grasping or 
appreciation of how the various elements in a body of information are related to each 
other in terms of explanatory, logical, probabilistic, and other kinds of relations.”31 
The view he argues for is that understanding in that sense is not a species of 
knowledge. His central case for this view consists in showing that what is essential 
for knowledge, namely, non-accidental true belief, is not essential for understanding 
and therefore that the latter cannot be a species of the former:
...understanding does not advert to the etiological aspects that can be crucial 
for knowledge. What is distinctive about understanding is the internal
29 Kvanvig 2003 and Zagzebski 2001 blame on scepticism the dismissal o f  epistemic achievements, 
like understanding, which they believe are not suitable for a veritistic treatment. Riggs 2003 mentions 
wisdom  as another neglected epistemic goal; in fact he thinks that wisdom is the “highest epistemic 
good” o f  which understanding is merely a component (2003: 216).
30 Kvanvig 2003: 188.
31 Ibid.: 192-3.
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seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-inducing 
relationships in a body of information.... When we think about knowledge,
however, our focus turns elsewhere immediately We think about the
possibility of fortuitousness, of accidentality, of being right but only by 
chance.32
He describes a case where one has understanding of a body of information without 
having knowledge of the propositions in that body precisely because one is the 
beneficiary of a kind of epistemic luck, which is incompatible with knowing. John 
has read loads about the history of the Comanche dominance of the southern plains 
of North America in the nineteenth century. The books John read are accurate on the 
matter, so by reading them he has thereby amassed an impressive understanding of 
that historical phenomenon. Now, suppose that nearly all the books on the topic that 
John didn 7 consult are inaccurate and wrong on the matter; John happened to pick 
up the history books that are accurate but his choice was random; he could easily 
have picked up the inaccurate ones: he was merely lucky in not doing so. Because his 
possessing correct information on the historical facts is the result of that luck John 
lacks knowledge.33 Kvanvig contends that even though John lacks knowledge of the 
propositions in his body of information about the Comanche dominance he 
nevertheless does have understanding of that historical phenomenon. Understanding 
survives a kind of epistemic luck that prevents knowledge; thus understanding is not 
a species of knowledge.
The claim that the subject has understanding in a case like the above can be 
contested, but we will grant that claim and then concede that it follows from it that 
the achievement Kvanvig calls ‘understanding’ is not a species of knowledge. We 
will argue that even if this is correct, explaining the nature of understanding doesn’t 
constitute a problem for a veritistic account of epistemic achievements, for what 
there is of epistemic value in understanding can still be explicated in veritistic terms. 
First, let us try to get a better grip on what understanding exactly is. As
already quoted Kvanvig claims that understanding “requires an internal grasping
or appreciation of how the various elements in a body of information are related to 
each other in terms of explanatory, logical, probabilistic, and other kinds of
^ Kvanvig 2003: 198.
The type o f  luck here is the same that prevents knowledge in a traditional fake-bam case, see 
Goldman 1976.
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relations”34, it “is the internal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other 
coherence-inducing relationships in a body of information”.35 According to him 
someone achieves understanding when “the person has seen the right kinds of
36relationships among the various items of information grasped”, and he stresses the 
fact that the mere obtaining of such relations between items of information possessed 
by the subject is not enough for understanding, since it also requires that “the way in
37which all the information fits together must be part of what the person is aware o f .  
We must ask what this ‘grasping’, ‘seeing’, ‘appreciating’ or ‘being aware o f  the 
explanatory relations distinctive of understanding consist in. Since in everyday 
language the straightforward uses of such expressions is factive, we could 
hypothesize that such locutions are equivalent to or entail knowledge; thus 
appreciating how the elements in a body of information fit together and seeing the 
explanatory relations that link them would simply be knowing that such relations 
obtain. However, Kvanvig cannot assume this natural reading because it will make 
understanding equivalent to knowing that the relevant explanatory relations obtain, 
and what he attempts to show is precisely that understanding is not a species of 
knowledge. In Kvanvig’s example which we described above, epistemic luck is fatal 
not only for knowledge of the individual propositions in one’s body of information 
but also for knowledge of the explanatory relations that hold between them, because 
one learns about such relations through the same source, which is correct but one has 
been lucky in selecting it. In the example then, epistemic luck also prevents 
knowledge of the explanatory relations holding between the pieces of information 
one possesses without preventing one’s understanding (or so Kvanvig claims). 
Therefore, understanding cannot consist of knowing that such relations obtain. 
Kvanvig cannot coherently adopt the natural reading of the locutions he uses to 
explain the nature of understanding.
In a less natural reading of the locutions they are doxastic, when one 
appreciates or grasps that p, one endorses in judgment or at least is disposed to judge 
that p. This reading makes states of appreciating and grasping that p  species of 
believing that p\ we will understand ‘doxastic states’ as belief states. Since all 
believing is propositional, on the present reading understanding would consist in
34 Kvanvig 2003: 192-3.
25 Ibid.: 198.
36 Ibid.: 193.
'7 Ibid.: 202. All emphases in the quotations in this paragraph are mine.
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believing certain complex propositional contents that articulate the explanatory 
relations that obtain between various items of information one possesses. Given our 
previous discussion we must accept that such beliefs need not be knowledge, yet not 
just any set of such beliefs will endow one with understanding. If one capriciously 
forms beliefs that happen to articulate correct explanatory relations between various 
facts about Comanche history that one has memorized, one does not thereby 
understand anything of Comanche history. The reason is not that the way one arrived 
at those beliefs is unreliable, that it could easily have lead one to falsehood or that it 
gives one true beliefs only by chance; all these are obstacles for knowing those 
propositions in the present case, but we have seen that one can lack that knowledge 
without lacking the understanding. The reason why one lacks understanding in the 
present case must be different. I submit that the reason is that one believes the 
propositions that articulate the explanatory relations despite one’s having reason to 
doubt the trustworthiness of one’s source, for one knows that capriciously stitching 
together various memorized facts is not a good way of coming to understand how 
those fact relate to each other. In such a case one believes in various explanatory 
relations for bad reasons; one fails to believe with adequate justification. This 
suggests that the doxastic states that articulate the explanatory relations must be 
adequately justified if they are going to yield understanding. But then understanding 
becomes a species of justified true belief and once the nature of understanding has 
come to this veritism can explain it as a special case of justified true belief. At this 
point, of course, there could be non-veritistic accounts of the justification component 
of that special case of justified true belief, as there can be non-veritistic accounts of 
justification in general, but the point that matters is that veritism could give an 
account of the doxastic states that on the present suggestion would constitute states 
of understanding. Understanding wouldn't be intractable for veritism. This would 
vindicate veritism against the charge that it cannot explain the nature of that 
epistemic goal called ‘understanding’. That is probably why Kvanvig wishes to avoid 
interpreting the states of grasping and appreciating as doxastic as well. The basis of 
his rejection of the doxastic reading is that:
...when understanding is achieved, the object of understanding is an
“informational chunk” rather than a number of single propositions.....
Though one might know a number of propositions, even together with other 
propositions concerning the explanatory and other coherence-making
relationships between the information in question, this propositional 
knowledge would not constitute understanding... until a change in the object 
of such cognitive achievement occurs.38
Since the object of belief is also propositional, these remarks entail that states of 
appreciating explanatory relations between pieces of information cannot be a species 
of belief. But then Kvanvig leaves us completely in the dark as to how to interpret 
the involved states of appreciation. Given his argumentative goal (i.e. that 
understanding isn’t a species of knowledge) he cannot coherently adopt the natural, 
factive, reading of the relevant states, but he doesn’t want to adopt the doxastic 
reading either, which would anyway make the problem tractable for veritism. 
Kvanvig does not provide a clear characterisation of the allegedly sui generis states
•  39implicated in understanding which makes it problematic for veritism.
Kvanvig is interested in making a different objection to veritism which shifts 
the focus of attention from the attitudinal nature of the states implicated in 
understanding to their value, and then claims that veritism cannot account for some 
distinctive ways in which understanding is epistemically valuable. He writes:
...to have mastered such explanatory relationships [constitutive of 
understanding] is not valuable only because it involves the finding of new 
truths but also because finding such relationships organizes and systematizes 
our thinking on a subject matter in a way beyond the mere addition of more 
true beliefs or even justified true beliefs.40
This is certainly true. The value of understanding a subject matter goes beyond the 
value of merely having unrelated true beliefs about that topic; in Kvanvig’s view the 
excess of value consists in some sort of organization and systematization. We can 
grant this but then we have to ask if the nature of that value is epistemic. Some value 
attached to those virtues is undoubtedly epistemic. For example, inasmuch as they 
are conducive to truth-involving goals, like prediction and explanation, the value of
J8 Kvanvig 2003: 192.
j9 Kvanvig’s view becomes only more obscure given his final statement that “understanding.... is 
constituted by subjectively ju stified  true belief  across an appropriately individuated body o f  
information that is systematized and organized in the process o f  achieving understanding” (2003: 202. 
My emphasis). He must not mean that the states o f  appreciating explanatory relations between pieces 
o f  information distinctive o f  understanding are justified true beliefs, for then the object o f  such states 
would be propositional, contrary to what he wishes to hold. He must rather mean that the pieces o f  
information among which one appreciates certain explanatory relations when one understands are 
‘subjectively justified true beliefs’, leaving still unexplained what the appreciation itself consists in.
40 Kvanvig 2003: 202. My emphasis.
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systematization and organization is epistemic. Here veritism can explain their value 
as epistemic in terms of their connection to the truth-involving goals that define 
successful prediction and explanation. The opponent to veritism can repeat his 
objection at this new level, alleging that prediction and explanation are not 
epistemically good only because of the truth-involving goals they contain. As a 
response to this we must note two points. First, whether or not this new complaint is 
correct, what matters at this stage is that veritism can give an explanation of the 
epistemic value held to be problematic for it (i.e. the value of systematization and 
organization) by identifying a connecting path between that value and some goals, 
like prediction and explanation, which are at least truth-involving. Secondly, if 
prediction and explanation are thought to have some epistemic value unaccountable 
in veritistic terms it is the burden of the objector to prove that that is so.
But as a matter of fact the opponent of veritism fails to discharge his burdens. 
For example, in explaining why the initially cited virtues of organization and 
systematization are problematic for veritism, Kvanvig mentions aspects in which 
they are valuable and which are unaccountable in veritistic terms:
Such organization is pragmatically useful because it allows us to reason from 
one bit of information to other related information that is useful as a basis for 
action.... Moreover, such organized elements of thought provide intrinsically 
satisfying closure to the process of inquiry, yielding a sense or feeling o f  
completeness to our grasp of a particular subject matter.41
It is true that understanding a subject matter is valuable for those reasons: for being 
pragmatically useful and for producing a satisfying feeling of completeness and 
achievement in our comprehension of things; but we have not been given a reason to 
conceptualise such value as epistemic; on the contrary, we have prima facie reason 
not to conceptualise it that way, for standard evaluative practice is already equipped 
with non-epistemic taxonomies to classify those types of value as, for example, 
practically useful and psychologically pleasant. Deviation from such classifications 
needs a rationale that Kvanvig does not provide. He fails to discharge the burden he 
holds in the presence of his criticism to veritism.
No cogent reason has emerged so far for thinking that either the nature of 
states of understanding or their epistemic value is problematic for veritism
41 Kvanvig 2003: 202. My emphasis.
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1.4.2. Non-propositional vehicles and cognitive abilities
We suggested above that if states of understanding are interpreted as doxastic, 
veritism could treat them as a species of justified true belief. Some opponents of 
veritism challenge this attempt of making understanding tractable for veritism by 
arguing that states of understanding are not necessarily propositional, and hence a 
fortiori cannot be explained as a species of true belief, for all belief is propositional. 
Zagzebski, for example, believes that “understanding involves seeing how the parts 
of [a] body of knowledge fit together, where the fitting together is not itself 
propositional in form”.42 And in the same spirit W. Riggs claims that
...there are good reasons for doubting that understanding is always 
propositional. That is, the actual content of one’s understanding might not be 
fully explicable in terms of beliefs plausibly attributable to the agent. This 
amounts to a denial that the phenomenon of understanding can be reduced 
simply to a collection of true beliefs.43
As Kvanvig, the kind of understanding they target is the appreciation of a pattern of 
relations, explanatory and otherwise, that hold within a whole. Riggs is explicit about 
this. He writes: “The kind of understanding I have in mind is the appreciation or 
grasp of order, pattern, and how things ‘hang together’. Understanding has a 
multitude of appropriate objects, among them complicated machines, people, subject
•  d . ldisciplines, mathematical proofs, and so on.” They do not deny that having 
understanding of, say, a subject discipline or a machine, involves having various 
propositional states, for example those beliefs that one would express in verbally 
demonstrating that one understands. What they deny is that understanding consists o f  
or is fully explicable as having those propositional states. To support their claim they 
first discuss cases in which the appreciation or grasp of order is achieved through a 
non-propositional form that cannot be plausibly reduced to propositions believed by 
the person who gains understanding. Riggs mentions understanding gained through 
graphs and charts45 and Zagzebski mentions the role of a metaphorical image:
42 Zagzebski 2001: 244.
43 Riggs 2003:218.
44 Ibid.: 217.
45 Ibid.: 218.
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The American mathematical geneticist, Sewall Wright, used the metaphor of 
a landscape with hills and valleys as a way of explaining adaptive genetic 
mechanisms. Selection drives populations up the slopes, he argued. Scientists 
who think that populations seek the closest lowest level have suggested 
turning the image upside down. Either way, people find that the image gives 
them an understanding they would not have had otherwise.. .46
The idea is that the understanding gained through the chart, the graph or the 
metaphorical image has epistemic value, yet it doesn’t have propositional form and 
then cannot be equivalent to nor explicable as true beliefs attributable to the subjects. 
Thus, the epistemic value of those states of understanding cannot be explained as 
deriving from a fundamental relation they bear to truth, for they can bear no such 
relation to truth, which necessarily is propositional.
Section (I. 3) above explained that truth’s role as the ultimate epistemic goal 
stems from its status as the representational goal of psychological systems capable of 
forming beliefs. This makes truth a standard of correctness for belief, i.e. we can 
evaluate beliefs with respect to whether they are true or not. Now, when the 
representational states are not propositional truth cannot be a standard of correctness 
for them because truth is not the type of representational success that conceptually 
corresponds to them. However, an analogous standard of correctness will apply to 
such representational states as long as they have the mind-to-world direction of fit. 
For example, a graph or a map can be more or less accurate and a metaphor can be 
more or less misleading. Accuracy and non-misleadingness are standards of 
correctness for those states; i.e. we can evaluate them with respect to those standards. 
From a veritistic point of view those standards play a role analogous to the role that 
the standard of truth plays with respect to the propositional representational states of 
belief: they are types of representational success that conceptually correspond to 
those states and in virtue of this status achievement of those types of representational 
success endows the corresponding states with epistemic value.
We can test by example this veritistic response to the above problem. 
Understanding through an accurate map how to get somewhere is a state with high 
epistemic marks precisely because based on an accurate representation of a 
geographical region. If the map had been inaccurate our understanding would have
46 Zagzebski 2001:241-42.
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been epistemically impoverished. Understanding through metaphors figures in 
scientific discovery, as in Faraday’s use of lines of magnetized iron filings to reason 
about electric fields or as in Zagzebski’s example of the geneticist; it also figures 
prominently in teaching, as when we are told to think of electricity as analogous to 
water flowing through pipes.47 Understanding would not be gained in these instances 
if the metaphors used were misleading; understanding gained in those ways is 
epistemically good to the extent that the metaphors are not misleading and thus can 
be seen as promoting the acquisition and transmission of truths.
Riggs and Zagzebski might reply that the value of understanding gained 
through non-propositional vehicles or states exceeds that of merely fulfilling the 
standard of correctness corresponding apriori to the vehicle or state, and then that 
that excess of value would still be unaccountable in veritistic terms. A graph can 
organise at once information that in propositional form would be tedious and 
cumbersome to convey, in that way the graph can facilitate the use of that 
information. This is valuable and this value goes beyond simply representing data 
accurately. Similarly, a metaphorical image can be inspiring and motivating for a 
whole tradition of research. This is valuable and this value again goes beyond merely 
being non-misleading and promoting veridical representation. These values 
effectively exceed the value of understanding that veritism can account for but as 
pointed out above, standard practice gives us a prima facie reason not to 
conceptualise those dimensions of value as epistemic and the opponent of veritism 
does not provide a reason to defeat standard practice. Without extra-argument the 
fact that understanding is valuable in those ways poses no problem to veritism.
But Riggs and Zagzebski have a more powerful case to support their 
opposition to veritism. They highlight the fact that understanding is constitutively 
associated with a range of abilities which cannot be explained merely by the 
attribution of true beliefs or other representational states to the agent. What is held to 
be specifically problematic for veritism is not the nature of the states of 
understanding nor the vehicles through which we gain understanding, but some 
abilities associated with those. The subject may have many true beliefs, even
47 See Geritner & Jeziorski 1993 for discussion o f  different uses o f  metaphor in scientific research. As 
their discussion illustrates, the overall value o f  metaphorical thinking can be factored o ff into 
epistemic (i.e. truth-linked) value and other types o f  value that we conceptualise in different ways.
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knowledge of facts about which she has understanding, but it is argued that her 
understanding is not reducible to her having those true beliefs or that knowledge, for 
possession of the abilities constitutively associated with understanding is not 
equivalent to any set of such states.48 Let us look at some examples to flesh out the 
new objection. Riggs asks us to consider someone who understands cars. He believes 
that the understanding of that person is best “captured” by her abilities to predict and 
diagnose problems in a car from a meager base of clues. Alternatively, consider 
someone who understands a certain period in history. This person will display her 
understanding in the abilities of imagining and discussing what would have happened 
if certain things had been slightly different. Riggs thinks that this ability for 
counterfactual thought, as well as the abilities of the car expert for prediction and 
diagnosis, go beyond the mere grasp of various facts concerning those subject 
matters: “these sorts of abilities are indicative of a high degree of understanding, and 
often cannot be acquired or explained in terms of propositional knowledge”.49 The 
idea behind this reasoning is that understanding involves some sort of knowing how 
and that this cannot be reduced to attribution of propositional knowledge nor any 
other representational states. Zagzebski is more explicit on this point:
...one does not understand a part of a field without the ability to explain its 
place within a much larger theoretical framework, and one acquires the ability
to do that by mastering a skill understanding is a state gained by learning
an art or a skill, a techne. One gains understanding by knowing how to do 
something well, and this makes one a reliable person to consult in matters 
pertaining to the skill in question.50
The implicit claim here is not that knowing how does not bring with it a bunch of 
propositional knowledge; they acknowledge that it may and in fact typically does. 
The claim is rather that having that propositional knowledge doesn’t bring by itself 
alone the relevant ability; one can have that propositional knowledge without having 
the ability. Whether this claim is correct or not is a matter of hot debate. But for the 
sake of argument we will assume that the claim is correct and argue that it poses no 
insurmountable obstacle to veritism.
48 The terminology o f  ‘constitutive association', ‘equivalence’ and ‘reducibility’, is not the explicit 
terminology o f  Riggs nor Zagzebski. But I take it that it captures the spirit o f  their objection.
49 Riggs 2003:220.
50 Zagzebski 2001: 241. Her emphasis.
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The abilities that are thought to be constitutively associated with states of 
understanding are abilities to predict, diagnose, imagine and explain. The successful 
exercise of any of these abilities results in the canonical outcomes of such abilities, 
namely good predictions, diagnoses, counterfactual descriptions and explanations. 
We must ask, good with respect to what? The obvious answer is: “With respect to 
how things are, will be or would be”. And this is just a notational variance of truth- 
talk. What makes a prediction epistemically good is (at least) that the likelihood of it 
turning out to be true is high, what makes a counterfactual description epistemically 
good is that the likelihood of its consequent being true is high on the hypothesis of 
its antecedent. We can conjecture that the outcomes of the abilities in question have 
epistemic value because of a relation they bear to truth. Now, since an ability that 
systematically fails to achieve its canonical outcome is thereby malfunctioning, i.e. is 
disvalued, it is reasonable to suppose that we attribute epistemic value to those 
abilities only insofar as they have outcomes that we deem as epistemically valuable; 
the abilities possess epistemic value because their outcomes do.
For the sake of argument we have conceded to the objector that the epistemic 
value of the abilities constitutively associated with states of understanding cannot be 
explained in terms of their being equivalent to or explicable as states of propositional 
knowledge, or other representational states, attributable to the subject of the abilities. 
But the epistemic value of such abilities can still be explained in veritistic terms as 
deriving from a relation that their canonical outcomes have with a representational 
goal.
This response to the apparent problem posed by the epistemic value of the 
abilities associated with states of understanding assumes that the epistemic value of 
the abilities is instrumental, that they have value in virtue of the value of their 
canonical consequences. The opponents of veritism might dispute this instrumentalist 
assumption. Some of them argue that one can bring about the outcomes without 
genuinely having the ability, but achieving the outcomes through the ability is 
epistemically more valuable than achieving them in some other way; therefore 
possessing the ability is valuable for more than delivering its canonical outcomes. 
The alleged extra-value stemming from possession of the ability consist in its making 
its outcomes creditable to the agent, or attributable to her as her own 
accomplishment, which is lacking when the outcomes are achieved other than by 
exercise of the genuine ability; call that extra-value attributability value. In (I. 5. 2)
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below we suggests that attributability value is not distinctively epistemic and then its 
presence poses no explanatory demand on veritism. Therefore, the instrumentalist 
assumption implicit in the above veritistic response is not undermined by the fact that 
genuine exercises of cognitive abilities brings with them some (attributability) value, 
which is not exhausted by their instrumental relation with their canonical outcomes.
I. 5. Explanatory Deficits II? The Value of Knowing
A line of objection against veritism that came up in our previous discussion of the 
nature of understanding was that states of understanding possess some epistemic 
value which is held to be unaccountable within a veritistic framework. It was argued 
that one flaw in this objection is that those who pose it fail to provide a principled 
reason to suppose that the value held to be problematic for veritism is epistemic in 
nature, while we do have prima facie principled reason to suppose it is not. There is, 
however, a parallel objection to veritism which attempts to identify some 
problematic epistemic value in states of knowing. The problematic value at issue is 
that which makes knowing epistemically better than mere true believing. Since it is 
obvious that what makes knowing better than true believing is epistemic in nature, 
the kind of response used with respect to the value of understanding cannot apply 
here. The new challenge to veritism, based on the excess of value of knowledge over 
mere true belief, is an argument with the following form:
I. According to Veritism the only ultimate epistemic goal/value is truth 
(Def. of Veritism)
II. Knowledge is epistemically better than mere true belief. (Obvious)
III. If truth is the only ultimate epistemic goal/value, knowledge is not 
epistemically better than mere true belief.
IV. Truth is not the only ultimate epistemic goal/value. (From II, III)
V. Veritism is false. (From IV,I)51
The problem of explaining the excess value of knowledge over mere true belief is 
called the ‘value problem’. We’ll call the argument I-V the “value argument”. It
21 An underlying argument o f  this form is discussed in De Paul 2001, Kvanvig 2004, Percival 2003, 
Sosa 2003, Riggs 2002 and Zagzebski 2003b.
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purports to establish veritism’s inability to solve the value problem. We will argue 
that the value argument is unsound, for premise (III) is false; but first we’ll expound 
the reasons why the proponents of the argument believe in premise (III).
I. 5. 1. The “Value Problem”
M. De Paul calls the idea that truth is the only epistemic good ‘Value Monism’ and 
takes it to be pretty obvious that if value monism is true then knowledge cannot be 
epistemically better than true belief:
.... knowledge cannot be epistemically better than mere true belief IF true 
belief is the only epistemic good. The point seems so simple and clear that 
I’m not sure how to go about arguing for it, yet it does not seem to have been
recognized a central, and I would think nonnegotiable, element of our
concept of knowledge is that it is of great epistemic value, and, more 
specifically, that it is more valuable than mere true belief. But it simply 
cannot be if truth is the only epistemic good. When one has a true belief, one 
has already attained the only thing of epistemic value -one’s belief is as 
epistemically good as beliefs can get. No matter what other characteristics 
one’s true belief might have, these characteristics cannot add any additional 
epistemic value, for we are supposing that truth is the only epistemic good, 
and the belief in question is a belief that is true! The belief cannot be true two 
times or three times over; it is true and that is that.52
It is not plausible that anyone has ever held that truth is the only epistemic goal; 
veritistic philosophers normally allow for epistemic goods distinct from truth but 
believe that their epistemic value is to be explained by their connection with truth. In 
this sense they take truth to be the only ultimate epistemic goal, which is what 
minimal veritism asserts. In any case it is more fruitful to interpret De Paul as 
criticising minimal veritism; as we will see, his discussion squares well with this 
interpretation.
One natural reaction to the above quotation could be to suggest explaining the 
extra-value of knowledge as pertaining to the way o f attaining the state of true belief 
rather than to the state itself. Reliability is necessary for knowledge, even if it is not a 
conjunct in a non-circular analysis of knowledge;53 reliably acquired belief is
32 De Paul 2001: 175-176, his emphasis.
33 See Williamson 2000: Ch. 1 & 4.
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epistemically better than mere true belief; so why not say that the epistemic 
superiority of knowledge over mere true belief derives from its reliably component? 
De Paul considers this position but alleges that if we really adhere to minimal 
veritism then we would have to hold that reliability is epistemically good merely as a 
means to truth and therefore, he thinks, it could not add any value to a belief which is 
in fact true. He believes that in order for reliability to add epistemic value to true 
belief it would have to be epistemically valuable independently from any connection 
with truth, and that would amount to giving up minimal veritism:
... [If we accept that reliability is good merely as a means to truth] then one 
just cannot maintain that a justified true belief is better, in terms of the good 
of believing the truth, than a true belief plain and simple. To the extent that 
we really consider attaining the truth by reliable means to be better than 
attaining the truth by other means, we value forming beliefs reliably for its 
own sake, apart from any connection with the truth.34
He describes several analogies sharing the same basic structure, which he thinks 
bring out the obviousness of why reliability cannot be invoked by veritism to solve 
the value problem. Let’s examine one of the analogies in detail. We value attaining a 
fortune, but i f  money is everything we care about, i.e. the only thing we value, it 
makes no sense to value more attaining a fortune honestly than dishonestly. As a 
matter of fact we value attaining the money honestly more than attaining it 
dishonestly, but De Paul thinks this is so only because in addition to valuing money 
we value honesty independently: “it makes sense to value attaining the goal in one 
way more than attaining it in another, but only because more than one value is in 
play”.33 Similarly, the thought is supposed to be that in order for it to make sense that 
reliably acquired true belief is epistemically superior to mere true belief, there must 
be a second value in place distinct from truth. We must note that the intended 
analogy exploits a crucial dissimilarity. The fact that we value earning money 
honestly more than earning money dishonestly explanatorily demands positing a 
value distinct from money, because we already acknowledge that honesty is valuable 
independently of money. But no analogous prior acknowledgment exists with respect 
to reliable methods of belief acquisition and truth, for we do not conceive of such 
methods as epistemically valuable independently of their being good routes to truth.
54 De Paul 2001: 179.
55 Ibidem.
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To say that a method of belief acquisition is reliable is to say that it is instrumentally 
good as a means of reaching true beliefs; truth is value, for that reason reliability is 
valuable; so it is not the case that reliability is valuable independently of truth. The 
analogy should not have the effect of pushing our intuitions where De Paul’s already
56are.
Zagzebski also thinks that if we endorse minimal veritism then we lack the 
resources to solve the value problem. She also sees as obviously incorrect the 
suggestion that the excess value of knowledge over true belief can be explained as 
deriving from the reliability of a source of true belief, which is valuable in turn only 
in virtue of its being a good route to truth. She accepts that the value of a reliable 
source derives from the value of truth but, as DePaul, she holds that then being the 
product of a reliable source cannot confer any extra value on a true belief that it 
produces:
The good of the product makes the reliability of the source that produces it 
good, but the reliability of the source does not then give the product an
additional boost of value being the product of a reliable faculty or agent
does not add value to the product.37
She also thinks that an analogy can clearly bring out the wrongness of the view she is 
attacking: a reliable espresso maker is good because espresso is good, but being the 
product of a reliable espresso maker does not make a cup of espresso any better than 
it would be if it had been the product of an unreliable espresso maker; if the cup of 
espresso tastes good it makes no difference to its goodness if it’s the product of a 
reliable or unreliable espresso maker. Similarly, we are supposed to conclude that if a 
belief is true, and truth is the only ultimate epistemic value, then it makes no 
difference that it is the product of a reliable or unreliable faculty. Having been 
reliably arrived at cannot help in explaining the epistemic superiority of knowing 
over merely truly believing, for reliable formation adds no value to true belief.
This analogy is also unsound. The analogy presents a case where there’s one 
dimension of value of the product of a machine, i.e. its taste, which is not affected by 
the reliability of the machine. An epistemic case analogous to this presents no
56 In fact De Paul him self seems to acknowledge that behind his rejection o f  the view under discussion 
there are only his brute intuitions: "‘The suggestion that the combination o f  attaining a good (truth) and 
attaining it by way o f  something good only as a means to that good (justification) has more value than 
the good itself does not strike any intuitive cord with me” (De Paul 2001: 181).
57 Zagzebski 2003b: 13.
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problem for minimal veritism, for, as we have explained in (1.3), minimal veritism 
allows that there are dimensions of value of a true belief that are not affected by the 
truth-conducivity of its source. For all Zagzebski says the dimension of value of 
coffee that she chooses, i.e. its taste, could be analogous to any of the dimensions of 
value of true belief that veritism allows are not affected by truth-conducivity. 
Without further argument her analogy fails to illustrate the point that in the same way 
that the reliability of the machine does not improve the taste of the coffee, the truth- 
conducivity of its source does not improve the epistemic value of a true belief. If we 
want to asses whether and how the reliability of a machine affects the value of its 
outcomes it seems foolish to look at properties we antecedently know are not 
affected by reliability, like their taste; it seems more sensible to examine other 
properties.
The analogies used by the opponents of veritism to illustrate its alleged 
inability to solve the value problem fail. Their analogical reasoning leaves open 
whether premise (III) of the value argument is true or false. But in fact some of those 
philosophers seem to be more interested in presenting their own non-veritistic 
solutions to the value problem than in providing a sound argument that shows that 
veritism cannot solve it. That is the case of Zagzebski. Few philosophers have tried 
to respect veritism in attempting to solve the value problem; one of them is E. Sosa. 
Before we sketch a minimal veritistic solution to the problem we will examine and 
criticise Zagzebski’s and Sosa’s solutions; doing so will enable us to appreciate the 
kind of difficulties that the minimal veritistic solution we will sketch helps us to 
avoid.
1.5. 2. Shortcomings of non-minimal views
In Zagzebski’s view the source of the value of knowledge over mere true belief lies 
in the value of the motives that cause those of an agent’s cognitive performances that 
yield states of knowing:
The properties of knowing that make it better than mere true believing are 
properties that it obtains from the agent in the same way good acts obtain 
evaluative properties from the agent. In particular, a belief can acquire value 
from its motive, in addition to the value it may have in being true love of
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true belief is plausibly the primary motive underlying a wide range of 
intellectual virtues. If love of truth is a good motive, it would add value to the
58intellectual acts it motivates.
She accepts that the motive o f the love of truth is valuable partially because true 
belief is valuable. However, if  that motive is going to play a substantive role in 
explaining the superiority in value of knowing over mere true belief, it has to be 
valuable other than just by being love o f true belief for otherwise her account would 
fall pray of the same explanatory deficiency that she thinks affects veritism. 
Zagzebski believes that the needed extra-value in the motive of love of true belief 
derives from “distinctively moral motives”.59 Let’s look at a couple of ways in which 
according to her the value of the motive of love of truth derives from its connection 
with moral motives:
(1) When something of moral importance is at stake when we act, and that act 
depends on the truth o f a particular belief, then it is morally important that 
that belief be true. Then, “the motive for true belief in such cases is motivated 
by the higher-order motive to be moral or live a good life”.60
(2) True belief is typically a prerequisite for successful practical action; so, the 
motive to value truth is motivated by the motive to value those practical ends 
we pursue in acting, and this motive in turn is motivated by the desire to have 
a good life.
Such a hierarchy of motives attempts to explain (partially) the source of the epistemic 
value of a cognitive performance by tracing it back to a motive which possesses a 
kind of value conceptualised as non-epistemic even by Zagzebski herself:
I propose that the higher-order motive to have a good life includes the motive 
to have certain other motives, including the motive to value truth in certain
domains If knowledge is true belief credited to the agent because of its
place in her motivational structure, it gets value not only from the truth 
motive but also from the higher-order motive that motivates the agent to 
value truth in some domain or on some occasion. And that motive has nothing
58 Zagzebski 2003b: 17-18.
59 Ibid.: 18.
60 Ibid.: 24.
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to do with epistemic value in particular, it is a component of the motive to
live a good life.61
We can concede that the hierarchy of motives displayed by Zagzebski constitutes a 
plausible explanation of some value of the cognitive performances at the end of the 
motivational chain. But the value in those performances that she aims to account for 
is what makes for the epistemic difference between the value of performances that 
result in knowing and the value of those that result in merely believing truly, and so 
her recognition that the value of the motives at the beginning of the motivational 
chain she displays is a non-epistemic value makes it hard to understand how her 
explanation can succeed. For, why should we suppose then that the value her 
explanation accounts for is the value that she aims to explain? We have reason to 
suppose otherwise, since the kind of value in her explanans admittedly mismatches 
the kind of value in her explanandum.
We can clearly appreciate here a clash between Zagzebski’s explanation and 
standard evaluative practice. Ordinary practice classifies the motives that Zagzebski 
appeals to as deprived from epistemic import. It’s easy to describe examples. One 
may desire to lead a good life and this desire may motivate one to pursue certain 
courses of action and value certain traits of character, for example to be generous and 
donate money to charities. This motive may in turn motivate one to learn the truth 
about certain subject matters, for example, whether some apparent charity 
representatives are honest. Now, imagine two scenarios. In the first one comes to 
believe that the representatives are honest out of gullibility and ignoring rather 
obvious clues to the contrary; in the second one comes to believe that they are not 
honest on the bases of a phone call one makes to confirm their identity. Standard 
practice classifies the belief in the first scenario as epistemically deficient and the 
belief in the second as epistemically good, even though the motivational chain 
leading to belief is identical in both. Therefore, standard practice treats the motives 
exhibited in those chains as epistemically irrelevant. The presence of those motives 
might add some value to the performances that they motivate, but such value isn’t 
epistemic.
We must emphasise that in articulating this criticism we are not begging any 
question against Zagzebski. We are not presupposing a veritistic conception of
61 Zagzebski 2003b: 24, my emphasis.
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epistemic evaluation and then pointing out that Zagzebski’s explanation violates that 
conception. We are appealing to standard practice prior to giving any explanation of 
its structure and then pointing out that Zagzebski’s explanation conflicts with the 
structure it should prima facie respect. Thus, the effect of standard evaluative 
practice here is to offer a prima facie reason against her explanation (which classifies 
certain motives as source of epistemic value) and to put the burden onto her to show
fO *that those motives do have epistemic import. But she fails to discharge her burden, 
for as we’ve seen even she describes the relevant motives as devoid of epistemic 
import.
Let us now look at a type of (purportedly) veritistic solution to the value 
problem that has been developed by several virtue epistemologists. We will focus on 
the version of the solution advanced by Ernest Sosa. The first step in Sosa’s 
strategy is to distinguish two types of value: intrinsic and instrumental. Something 
has intrinsic value if its value doesn’t depend on or derive from its relation to 
anything else valuable, whereas the instrumental value of an event derives from the 
fact that it brings about something else that is valuable. Sosa is particularly interested 
in a sub-type of instrumental value he calls ‘praxical value’, the sort of value that an 
action has in virtue o f  causing something valuable to happen:
An agent may bring about an event E. The bringing about of E by A may then 
itself be assessed. This event, call it E', may not have any intrinsic value 
beyond the intrinsic value contained already in E, but it will have 
instrumental value proper to the special relation involved in E’s happening 
because of E'. Call this special sort of instrumental value praxical value, the 
sort of instrumental value in actions of bringing about something valuable.64
Being a sub-type of instrumental value praxical value is derivative from some 
intrinsic value, that is to say, an event which possesses praxical value does so only 
because and to the extent that it brings about something which is intrinsically 
valuable. In Sosa’s terminology, praxical value is “logically constituted by causation 
plus intrinsic value”.65
62 We obtain this effect here by applying what we called the Principle o f  Authority o f  Standard 
Practice, see (1.3) above.
6j See Greco 2003 and Riggs 2002 for other versions o f  the same type o f  view.
64 Sosa 2003: 162.
65 Ibidem.
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Sosa would agree with De Paul and Zagzebski that if truth is the only 
intrinsic epistemic value, then there's no hope of explaining the superiority of 
knowledge over mere true belief in terms of some excess o f  intrinsic epistemic value 
possessed by the former over the later, for knowing and mere believing truly are on a 
par in point of intrinsic epistemic value. Yet, he would argue, there’s a difference in 
praxical value between the two states. A state of mere believing truly might be 
caused in you by an external force or event, for example an evil scientist 
manipulating your brain. Even though that state is a state of yours it is not a state that 
you brought about through the exercise of what Sosa calls your ‘excellences’ or 
‘competencies; therefore such a state is attributable to you but only in a very weak 
sense, similar to our attribution of movements to a marionette when the puppeteer 
makes it dance. A state of believing truly of that sort possesses intrinsic epistemic 
value: because the belief is true, but it lacks praxical value: because it wasn’t you 
who brought it about. By contrast, a state of knowing involves a state of believing 
truly attributable to the agent in the strong sense of being something that he 
accomplishes through the exercise of his competencies. In addition to the intrinsic 
value of true belief such a state possesses the praxical value attendant on its having 
been you who brought it about. Sosa’s initial conjecture is that this praxical value 
accounts for the excess value of knowing over merely believing with truth:
Consider ... a case where a true belief, a true believing is attributable to you 
as your doing. We may now say that, besides the epistemic good in that true 
belief, there is further the praxical good in your action of bringing it about. 
And this arguably involves your exercise of excellences constitutive of your 
cognitive character.
That is a way in which truth can have a distinctively important and 
fundamental place in explaining epistemic normativity, compatibly with 
knowledge having epistemic worth over and above the worth of mere true 
belief. We can see the good that attaches to an epistemic action creditable to 
the agent, who brings about that good for himself, and is more than just the 
recipient of blind epistemic luck.66
A problem with this explanation is that the praxical value that purportedly accounts 
for the superiority of a state of knowing over one of mere true believing is a type of
67value of events or actions, not of states. To make his explanation work Sosa would 
have to add the premise that the praxical value of the action that brings about the
66 Sosa 2003:173.
67 See the quotation from Sosa at page 48 o f  this thesis.
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state of knowing somehow gets transferred from the action to the state it produces. 
For the sake of argument let’s suppose that such a premise is available to Sosa. He 
thinks that the explanation he has proposed does not fully resolve the value problem, 
his reason is that:
...this praxical value does not explain the fact that we would prefer a life of
knowing, where we gain truth through our own intellectual performance, to a
life where we are visited with just as much truth but through mere external 
68agency.
Our preference is not just the presence of truth, then, however it may have 
arrived there. We prefer truth whose presence is the work of our intellect, 
truth that derives from our own virtuous performance. We do not want just 
truth that is given to us by happenstance, or by some alien agency, where we 
are given a belief that hits the mark of truth not through our own performance, 
not through any accomplishment creditable to us.69
Sosa’s dissatisfaction with his initial solution to the value problem seems to be this: 
The praxical value of a true belief is grounded on its attributability to one as the 
result of the exercise of one’s competencies, but Sosa seems to think that a true belief 
can be so rooted in one’s competencies and still be true “by happenstance or some 
alien agency”. Why does this show an inadequacy in his previous explanation in 
terms of praxical value? The phenomenon Sosa is envisaging is that one could end 
up believing a proposition which is true, but where the explanation of why one 
believes this truth (rather than some false alternative) doesn’t mention the exercise of 
one’s cognitive excellences. This will occur, for example, when a (mildly) Evil 
Demon changes the world to make some of one’s beliefs come out true. In such a 
case one’s believings are the result of exercising one’s cognitive excellences, 
because the Demon didn't interfere with them; yet that virtuous exercise plays no 
role in explaining why one’s believings are true. In Sosa’s terminology this means 
that a true belief can be attributable to one, and so have praxical value, even if our 
believing being true is not the joint outcome of the way the world is and the exercise 
of our competencies alone. But clearly, he thinks, we value a true belief in which 
both the believing and its being true are attributable to one more than one of which
68 Sosa 2003:173.
69 Ibid.: 174.
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only the believing is attributable to us, and that’s because the former true believing is 
knowledge while the latter is not. But then the value of knowledge over true belief 
cannot be accounted for only in terms of praxical value, for a true belief can have 
praxical value and yet still be epistemically less valuable than a genuine state of 
knowing in virtue of its being true not being attributable to the agent.
Sosa is convinced that the value attendant on a true belief when its being true 
and not only the believing is attributable to the agent cannot be praxical value and 
must be some intrinsic value:
Truth-connected epistemology might grant the value of truth, of true 
believing, might grant its intrinsic value, while allowing also the praxical 
extrinsic value of one’s attributably hitting the mark of truth. This praxical 
extrinsic value would reside in such attributable intellectual deeds. But in 
addition to the extrinsic praxical value, we seem plausibly committed to the
intrinsic value of such intellectual deeds  We want to attain truth by
our own performance, which seems a reflectively defensible desire for a good 
preferable not just extrinsically but intrinsically. What we prefer is the deed o f  
true believing, where not only the believing but also its truth is attributable to 
the agent as his or her own doing.10
For the sake of argument let us grant that we need to posit some intrinsic value as the 
value attendant on the attributability to the agent of the truth of his believing. This 
would mean that we need to posit some intrinsic epistemic value in addition to the 
praxical value of a true believing being attributable to the agent, in order to account 
for the epistemic superiority of knowing over mere true belief. But what could that 
intrinsic epistemic value be? Since the status of true belief as an intrinsic epistemic 
value is not challenged throughout Sosa’s discussion (see the beginning of the last 
quotation), then Sosa’s solution of the value problem involves positing two intrinsic 
epistemic goods: true belief and the good of having the truth of one’s believing 
attributed to one. Since the latter good is intrinsic it cannot derive nor depend for its 
value on anything else we value, in particular, it cannot derive nor depend on the 
value of true belief. But this creates a problem for Sosa. Can we really make sense of 
the idea that ‘‘hitting the mark of truth as one's own deed” is something epistemically 
valuable independently of the value of truth? There’s a sense in which in general it is 
a good thing to accomplish something through the exercise of one’s own skill and 
competence, quite independently of what it is that one accomplishes. For example,
70 Sosa 2003: 174-175. His emphasis.
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dropping nuclear bombs with precision and competence is a good that (obviously) 
doesn’t derive from any value in what it brings about; its good is a type of intrinsic 
good, it is the good that attends to any success achieved through an agent’s own skill. 
Maybe Sosa has this kind of good in mind as the supplementary intrinsic good he 
introduces to solve the value problem; if so his explanation is defective, for that kind 
of intrinsic good is not distinctively epistemic, as it is a good inherent to any success 
achieved through one’s own competence. It may be present in the event of “hitting 
the mark of truth as one’s own deed” but it would not add anything of distinctively 
epistemic value to it and therefore it could not play the role that Sosa needs it to play 
in his solution to the value problem.
I. 5. 3. A minimal veritistic solution
Minimal veritism holds that truth is the only ultimate epistemic goal and 
consequently that any property of cognitive performances that has epistemic value 
derives it from its relation to truth. Let’s call a property of this sort, i.e. that is 
epistemically valuable only because of its relation to truth, a T-property. A minimal 
veritistic solution to the value problem must explain the epistemic superiority of 
knowing over mere true belief in terms of a T-property. As we saw, De Paul and 
Zagzebski think that a T-property cannot play such explanatory role, hence their 
belief that premise (III) of the value argument, i.e. that if truth is the only ultimate 
epistemic goal knowledge cannot be epistemically better than mere true belief, is true. 
The reason why they think that a T-property cannot play the explanatory role that 
veritism needs it to play is that they find it obvious that a T-property, like reliability, 
cannot confer additional value on a true belief precisely because it is conceived as 
epistemically valuable only as a means to truth. As discussed above the alleged 
obviousness here stems from ill-constructed analogies. Whether or not a T-property 
can play the intended explanatory role is not obvious, the remaining of this section 
argues that it can.
We will understand the T-property of reliability or truth-conducivity as the 
property of being the outcome o f a reliable process or method o f beliefformation. In 
order to solve the value problem we need to explain how a true belief having such a 
property has more epistemic value than a mere true belief.
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Reliability is a notion that can naturally be understood as supporting 
counterfactuals. We will work with the following understanding of reliability:
(RELIABILITY) One’s true belief that p  is the outcome of a reliable process 
or method M  of belief formation if and only if, were p  to hold in slightly 
different circumstances, if one were to use M  to determine whether p  one
71would still believe that p.
Accordingly, one’s true belief that p  is the outcome of an unreliable process or 
method M  of belief formation if and only if, were p  to hold in slightly different 
circumstances, if one were to use M  to determine whether p  one would not believe 
that p. This means that, if one’s true belief p  has the T-property of reliability, one’s 
true belief persist across a close range of possible circumstantial changes, it is robust; 
and if it lacks that T-property it does not persist even within that close range of 
possible circumstantial changes, it is fragile.
Intuitively, a robust true belief is epistemically better than its fragile 
counterpart. Consider the following scenarios.
First scenario: A couple visit a doctor to find out the gender of their future 
child through the technology of ultrasound. The couple comes to believe that 
their child will be a boy, which is true. Because their true believing is reliable 
if things had been slightly different, say if their appointment had been a 
different day, they would still have (correctly) believed that their child will be 
a boy.
Second scenario: The couple consult a charlatan to find out the gender of 
their child. The couple comes to believe that their child will be a boy, which 
is true. However, because their believing is unreliable, if things had been 
slightly different, say if they had consulted the charlatan a different day when 
he had the hunch that their child will be a girl, they would not have believed 
that their child will be a boy.
The couple’s true belief is epistemically better in the first scenario than in the second 
because their true belief in the first scenario has counter/actual properties that it 
lacks in the second: the former true belief would subsist in circumstances in which 
the latter true belief would not, and this is a consequence of the former having the T- 
property of reliability, which the latter lacks.
71 Although (RELIABILITY) is related to an ordinary notion o f  reliability we don’t pretend that it is 
an analysis o f  any ordinary notion.
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De Paul and Zagzebski ignore that the T-property of reliability endows a true 
belief with counterfactual properties which enhance its epistemic value. They might 
still want to press and ask why should we suppose that any counterfactual properties 
of true belief add any epistemic value to the actual value of true belief? The kind of 
explanatory role that minimal veritism makes counterfactual properties play here is 
not peculiar to epistemic evaluation. Many kinds of items are actually valuable 
because of the counterfactual properties they have, and they are more valuable if they 
have them than if they don’t. For example, a fire extinguisher is actually valuable not 
only because it works well against this fire, but because it would have worked well 
against other fires, and a fire extinguisher that works well against fires in different 
situations is actually more valuable than one that only works well against this fire. In 
using a counterfactual understanding of the T-property of reliability to solve the 
value problem minimal veritism is not exploiting an ad hoc or suspiciously 
uncommon explanatory role of counterfactual properties; on the contrary, it appeals 
to a pervasive metaphysical structure of value found not only in the epistemic 
domain.
There are other T-properties of belief that are defined in counterfactual terms 
and that have been discussed in the context of the value problem, most notably truth- 
tracking and safety.
(TRUTH-CONDUCIVITY) S’s belief that p  tracks the truth if and only if, if 
p  were false S  would not believe p , and if p  were true S would believe p.
(SAFTY) S' s belief that p  is safely true if and only if, if S  were to believe p, 
p  would be true.
A true belief that tracks the truth or that is safely true is epistemically better than a 
mere true belief, for a true belief with any of those properties is guaranteed to be true 
in a close range of possible circumstances, whereas a true belief that lacks them 
might easily be false within that same range. Therefore, if we suppose that either 
truth-tracking or safety is necessary conditions for knowledge, they would appear to 
be T-properties candidates to solve the value problem.72 However, that supposition
72 Nozick 1981 argues that truth-tracking is necessary for knowledge; Sosa 1999 argues that safety is. 
They do not discuss those properties in the context o f  the value problem.
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has problematic consequences, the most important of which is that it would produce 
violations of the Closure Principle about knowledge. For truth-tracking and safety 
are not closed under known logical entailment, whereas there’s a strong case for the 
view that knowledge is. Consider the following Closure Principle:
(CP) [If K(p) & K(p=> q)] =>K (q)
One’s belief that p  might track the truth whereas one’s belief that q might not. One’s 
belief that one has hands tracks the truth, one knows that that belief entails that one is 
not a BIV, yet one’s belief that one is not a BIV doesn’t track the truth.
Similarly, one’s belief that p  might be safely true whereas one’s belief that q 
might not. In a supermarket there are only red apples, half of them are now randomly 
replaced by green wax models of apples. One is looking at the only red apple to the 
right of the scale and is asked what it is. One believes that it is a red apple and this is 
a safely true belief, for if one were to believe that in slightly different circumstances 
it would still be true, for all red apples are real apples. One also knows that from the 
fact that the only red apple to the right of the scale is a red apple it follows that it is 
an apple, yet one’s true belief that it is an apple is not safely true; for if one were to 
believe that in slightly different circumstances (say when the only object to the right 
of the scale is a green wax apple) it would have been false.
Violations of closure are problematic, a solution to the value problem should 
avoid accepting such violations, otherwise it will be exchanging one problem for 
another. Since the T-properties of truth-tracking and safety commit one to violations 
of closure we should reject them as candidates to solve the value problem, especially 
given that we have a better candidate.
The T-property of reliability or truth-conducivity used above does not 
produce violations of closure. One’s true belief that p  through M  is reliable if and 
only if, were p  to hold in slightly different circumstances, if one were to use M  to 
determine whether p  one would still believe p. When this is the case and one knows 
that q is entailed by p , one ipso facto reliably believes q, for deduction from truths is 
a reliable method of belief formation: if one were to use it in slightly different 
circumstances one would still believe q. Therefore, whenever one reliably believes a 
truth p  and knows that p  entails g, one also reliably believes q. The T-property of
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reliability used to solve the value problem is not incompatible with closure, to this 
extent and in the present context it is preferable to truth-tracking and safety.
The solution to the value problem defended here assumes that the T-property 
of reliability is necessary for knowledge and then explains that knowing is 
epistemically better than mere true belief in terms of the epistemic value contributed 
by reliability to states of knowing.74 This is a minimal veritistic explanation because 
the counterfactual properties that define reliability are epistemically valuable only 
because of a connection to the ultimate epistemic goal of truth, i.e. because they 
amount to subsistence of true belief across different close possible circumstances. 
Unlike Zagzebski’s solution, the present one doesn’t posit sources of epistemic value 
that contravene the structure of standard evaluative practice; and unlike Sosa’s it 
doesn’t posit an intrinsic epistemic value distinct from truth which, because of its 
generic nature, cannot be seen to play the explanatory role demanded from it. The 
present solution sticks to the idea that truth is the only ultimate epistemic goal and 
that all epistemic value is to be explained in terms of a connection with that goal.
In this chapter we have articulated minimal veritism and argued that it does 
not succumb to some recent objections of its opponents. It seems to be deeply 
entrenched in a proper understanding of epistemic evaluation. But minimal veritism 
imposes severe constraints on the philosophical explanation of any epistemic good. 
Next chapter expounds the problematic consequences of those constraints upon the 
kind of philosophical explanation in question
7j See Kvanvig 2004: 205-216 for further discussion o f  truth-tracking and safety in the context o f  the 
value problem. He is sceptical that any T-property could be used to solve the value problem, but he 
does not consider the T-property o f  reliability utilized here.
74 In assuming that reliability is necessary for knowledge, we are not assuming that it is part o f  an 
analysis o f  knowledge.
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Chapter II
Circles
II. 1. Epistemic Principles and Truth-Conducive Constraints
The minimal veritism articulated in the previous chapter constitutes the essential 
commitments of a philosophical project that attempts to show that certain basic 
‘epistemic principles’ are correct. Those principles have conditional form, in their 
antecedent they mention conditions sufficient for the epistemic good mentioned in 
their consequent. Here are some elementary and widely discussed exemplars of such 
principles:
If S  has a clear seeming memory that p  and has no defeating reasons against 
believing that p , then S is justified in believing that p.
If a person has a clear sensory impression that x is F  (or of x's being F) and 
on that basis believes that x is F, then this belief is prima facie justified.73
If one believes that p  on the basis of its sensorily appearing to one that p, and 
one has no overriding reasons to the contrary, one is justified in believing that 
P
Having a percept at time t with the content p  is a defeasible reason for the
77cognizer to believe p-at-t.
The last exemplar is not formulated in conditional form, and some other formulations 
in the literature aren’t either, but it is obvious how they can be recast to fit the 
standard conditional model. We can present this model in schematic form thus:
(O) If S is in mental states po....pn and S forms doxastic attitude 8 on those 
basis, 8 has epistemic quality e for S.
75 Audi 1988: 308.
76 Alston 1986: 12
77 Pollock & Cruz 1999:201.
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Being in mental states po----Pnengenders the epistemic quality s for doxastic attitude 
3 of S. From the examples above we see that mental states that are deemed sufficient 
to engender epistemic qualities include states of ‘being perceptually appeared that p ’ 
‘seeming to remember that /?’ and so on. In the literature we will be discussing the 
engendered epistemic quality is typically some form of prima facie justification and 
the doxastic attitude is belief For simplicity we will omit the qualification prima 
facie most of the time.
When the antecedent of an epistemic principle mentions the basing of one’s 
belief on the mental states there mentioned, the principle gives sufficient conditions 
for being justified in believing that p. When the principle does not mention that one 
bases one’s belief on the mentioned mental states, the principle gives sufficient 
conditions for having justification for believing that p. The second type of principle 
defines an epistemic quality that can be true of one even if one doesn’t believe that p , 
or believes it for bad reasons; in contrast the first type of principle defines a quality 
that is true of one only if one believes p  on the right grounds. This difference 
corresponds to the distinction between what is sometimes called doxastic 
justification and propositional justification. For the sake of uniformity with the 
literature to be discussed we will focus on epistemic principles that specify 
conditions for being justified in believing p.
Epistemic principles, as we will understand them here, are not intended to be 
something like a norm that one needs to follow to attain a justified belief. This shows 
up in the fact that our schema (O) does not have an imperatival consequent; it 
doesn’t say that given the conditions mentioned in the antecedent you ought to 
believe p. Maybe this kind of norms of belief fixation can be constructed from 
principles with (O) structure but it is important to emphasis that within the project 
we will be investigating epistemic principles will not be understood as norms or rules 
of belief fixation, but merely as generalizations of the conditions where an epistemic 
good is achieved. The explananda of that project are those generalizations, not any 
possible corresponding norms. This difference is important because the explanation 
of norms is burdened with issues that do not burden the explanation of 
generalizations. For example, concerning the explanation of the correctness of norms 
one of the immediate questions that arise is in what sense they can guide or govern 
belief fixation. No such question arises in explaining the correctness of
58
generalizations with (O) structure. On the prototypical case these generalizations 
state conditions for justification and the explanation of their correctness explains why 
such conditions are indeed sufficient for justification. This is an explanation of our 
justification. What we ought to do to achieve justified beliefs is a further question.
As the thematic unbalance of the above exemplars shows there is a biased 
preference in the literature for epistemic principles about perception. Since we want 
to study the project of a philosophical explication of epistemic principles as it has 
been in fact predominantly developed, we will also focus on principles about 
perception. We will not attempt to generalise the results we obtain with respect to 
this sub-class of epistemic principles to all of them, but our discussion will disclose 
some general problems that the philosophical project would face in other areas.
Conditional statements of the form (<t>) are not the only generalizations that 
philosophers call ‘epistemic principles’. Some epistemic principles do not state 
conditions for the achievement of an epistemic good or quality but conditions for its 
successful transmission. For example, a principle about transmission of justification 
across entailment says that if one is justified in believing some premises and one 
competently deduces a proposition from them, one thereby obtains justification to 
believe that proposition. In symbols:
(TJ) If S JB[pi — pn], and S CD[(pi....pn)=>q], then S jB[q] 78
Some philosophers call the principles that conform to the (O) schema ‘generating 
principles’, because they state the conditions under which an epistemic good or 
quality is generated; whereas principles like (TJ) are called ‘transmission principles’
79  •for the already observed reason. The project we will be discussing arises with 
respect to generating epistemic principles only; therefore whenever we talk of
78 Where ‘JET stands for 'justification to believe’ and ‘CD’ for ‘competently deduces’. A  transmission 
principle about deduction like (TJ) should not be mistaken for a closure principle about deduction. 
Unlike a transmission principle a closure principle does not say that one gains a justification through 
competent deduction, it only says that whenever one is justified in believing certain propositions one 
is also justified in believing their known entailments, without implying that the justification is 
acquired  through the deduction. Thus a closure principle can hold in cases where a corresponding 
transmission principle fails. See Wright 2003: 57-58 and Hale 2000, for more on the difference 
between transmission and closure principles.
79 The terminology o f  'generating’ and 'transmission’ principles is used by Audi 1988; see also 
Boghossian 2001: 38.
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epistemic principles, unless otherwise indicated, we will be referring to generating 
epistemic principles.
In the context of a veritistic understanding of epistemic goods and qualities 
there is a constraint on the adequacy of any epistemic principle. Since according to 
veritism all epistemic goods are such in virtue of a fundamental relation to truth, the 
claim that the transition form mental conditions p i o . . . . /L i n , mentioned in the antecedent 
of a principle, to belief is sufficient for an epistemic good carries the veritistic 
implication that the transition from iuo....pin to belief exemplifies a fundamental 
relation to truth. As pointed out in (I. 3) that fundamental relation is truth- 
conducivity. Given minimal veritism in order for an epistemic principle to be correct 
the transitions from the conditions mentioned in its antecedent to belief have to be 
truth-conducive, in order to be correct the principle has to fulfill a truth-conducive 
constraint. In our practice we tacitly assume that standard transitions from conditions 
mentioned in the antecedents of epistemic principles to belief are truth-conducive, 
and we take it that this is necessary for such transitions to be epistemically 
acceptable. In this sense our practice embodies tacit acceptance that epistemic 
principles are subject to truth-conducive constraints. If in constructing a 
philosophical explanation of epistemic principles we don’t assume that they are 
subject to a truth-conducive constraint we would have to be some sort of error 
theorists with respect to that aspect of our practice, which takes them to fall under 
such constraints.
If epistemic principles are subject to truth-conducive constraints, then 
showing that an epistemic principle is correct involves showing that the principle 
satisfies a truth-conducive constraint. Different versions of this general conception of 
the philosophical explanation of epistemic principles is manifested in the literature. 
Some Rationalists want to explain the truth-conducivity of the relevant transitions
OA
purely in terms of the nature of their intentional contents and some Naturalists 
believe that the explanation should only appeal to what we know about the evolution 
and functioning of the cognitive capacities that deliver the mental conditions 
involved in those transitions. Still others, from a less theoretically-loaded perspective, 
focus on the prospects of showing the truth-conducivity of the transitions through
80 For example, Peacocke 2004: Ch. 4-6.
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more casual inductive means. Whatever the specific direction the project takes, 
they all share the ambition of showing that the transitions mentioned in an epistemic 
principle meet a truth-conducive constraint. In the context of veritism the thought of 
providing a philosophical explanation of the facts underlying the correctness of 
epistemic principles, the facts that make the principles be correct ones, involves the 
task of showing that the targeted epistemic principles meet a truth-conducive 
constraint; nothing more than minimal veritistic commitments is necessary to 
motivate that task.
However, some veritistic philosophers report different motivations for 
embarking on the task. Audi and Chisholm, for example, say that their interest in 
pursuing the task is driven by the wish to refute a sceptic who argues that nobody’s 
doxastic states instantiate the epistemic good mentioned in the consequent of a given 
epistemic principle. The desired refutation of such a sceptic would proceed by 
establishing that the relevant epistemic principle EPj meets a truth-conducive 
constraint and then using EPj as the major premise in a Modus Ponens argument, 
which has as a minor premise a claim to the effect that an arbitrary subject S forms a 
belief on the basis of mental states of the kind mentioned in the antecedent of EPj and 
as conclusion the claim that S’s belief instantiate the epistemic quality denied by the 
sceptic. But it is not necessary to have the ambition of refuting scepticism in this 
manner to be committed to show that epistemic principles meet a truth-conducive 
constraint, for even in the absence of a sceptical doubt about the possibility of the 
relevant epistemic quality one would still face the demand to show truth-conducivity 
so long as one wants to explain the facts that account for the correctness of the 
principles and one understands this correctness within the framework of minimal 
veritism. Veritism entails that epistemic principles are correct only if transitions 
from their antecedent conditions to belief are truth-conducive, and thus issues the 
corresponding task for the theorist wishing to establish the facts of such correctness.
Some philosophers do not unnecessarily overload with an anti-sceptical 
aspiration the motivations for the task of explaining and establishing truth- 
conducivity, instead they find the very idea of motivating and pursuing that task as 
preposterous. Thomas Reid, for example, held that it is a 'first principle of common
81 For example, Alston 1986. Each o f  these approaches to the task will be amply discussed in due 
course.
82 See Audi 1988 and 1993a, and Chisholm 1989: Ch. 1, 7.
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sense’ that ‘the natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not 
fallacious’,83 he thought this to be ‘self-evident’ and held that the ‘things that are 
self-evident are the sole province of common sense’.84 This means that for him it is 
‘self-evident’ that standard epistemic principles fulfil a truth-conducive constraint, 
for the mental conditions mentioned in them are the outputs of the ‘natural faculties’ 
that Reid talks about. Given that it is obvious that he intends ‘self-evident’ to entail 
known and not in need o f inquiry, he is effectively saying that through ‘common 
sense’ we know, without having to do any explaining or proving, that epistemic 
principles satisfy a truth-conducive constraint. Therefore, he would regard as ill- 
motivated the task of explaining and establishing what evidently is in no need of that.
or
I think Reid and other philosophers inspired by him overlook the real role that 
veritistic commitments play in motivating the task they want to dismiss and 
simultaneously overestimate the potential role of scepticism. The common sense 
philosopher thinks that only a ruthless sceptic would doubt and demand proof of the 
‘self-evidently’ correct epistemic principles. He notes that opposing the idea that
well-entrenched epistemic principles, i.e. principles that describe well-entrenched
86epistemic practice, are correct does not only appear to be false but absurd. The 
common sense philosopher thinks one doesn’t have to argue against the resulting 
absurdity, he doesn’t take responding to such scepticism to be philosophically 
binding; therefore he concludes that the task of arguing for  truth-conducivity in 
epistemic principles lacks cogent motivation. Even assuming that the envisaged sort 
of scepticism is absurd and that one is not bound to respond to absurd-sounding 
views, it still doesn’t follow that the task of establishing truth-conducivity is ill- 
motivated. That’s because the common sense dismissal of the task assumes that such 
motivation can only come from the ambition to refute a from of scepticism that 
contradicts well-entrenched practice. The common sense philosopher agrees with 
Audi and Chisholm in that this ambition is the driving force behind the task of 
establishing truth-conducivity, but contrary to them he takes this to be precisely the 
reason to dismiss the task. But as already explained above the veritistic motivation 
for that task is independent of that anti-sceptical ambition. Therefore, the 
commonsensical dismissal of scepticism, even if correct, has no bearing on the well-
83 Reid 1785:630.
84 Ibid.: 567.
85 For example, Bergmann 2004: 722-726.
86 Reid 1785:606.
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groundedness of the rationale for the task of establishing truth-conducivity in
87epistemic principles.
Regardless of what the relative entrenchment of the epistemic principles is 
and whether or not one thinks a sceptical doubt needs to be addressed, there is a 
minimal rationale to establish truth-conducivity which derives from the simple 
structure of the veritistic commitments already expounded: Veritism entails a truth- 
conducive constraint on the correctness of epistemic principles, thus such principles 
correctly define our actual justification only if transitions from their antecedent 
conditions to belief are truth-conducive. In the context of veritism, in order to satisfy 
ourselves in showing that our acceptance of epistemic principles is justified we have 
to show that we are justified in taking it that they fulfil a truth-conducive constraint.
II. 2. Evidence for Truth-Conducivity and the Threat of Circularity
Given that truth-conducivity is necessary for the correctness of an epistemic principle 
the project we are examining needs an understanding of the property of truth- 
conducivity and of what can be evidence for it. In (1.5.3) we characterised a notion of 
reliability or truth-conducivity in counterfactual terms according to which:
(RELIABILITY) One’s true belief that p  is the outcome of a reliable process 
or method M  of belief formation if and only if, were p  to hold in slightly 
different circumstances, if one were to use M  to determine whether p  one 
would still believe that p.
But a counterfactual understanding of truth-conducivity hasn’t been the preferred one 
of the philosophers working within the project that occupies us; the majority of them 
assume a statistical notion of truth-conducivity according to which a way of belief 
formation W is truth-conducive if and only if on average it produces sufficiently 
more true than false beliefs. The counterfactual and the statistical notions are not 
equivalent. A way of belief formation W may have perfect record delivering true 
beliefs because it has always been exercised in artificially controlled circumstances;
87 In this interpretation o f  Reid he dism isses the task o f  establishing truth-conducivity in epistemic 
principles. On an alternative interpretation he does not dismiss the task but actually indicates a 
specific conception o f  how to carry it out successfully. See Van Cleve 2003: 50-52 for discussion o f  
this interpretation o f  Reid.
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yet it might be counterfactually very fragile, for in slightly different circumstances it 
would easily yield a false belief. Because of the non-equivalence of the two notions 
evidence for the statistical truth-conducivity of a way of belief formation does not 
necessarily count as evidence for its counterfactual truth-conducivity. Again, a very 
high ratio of positive trials in the performance of a way of belief formation doesn’t 
establish that it would yield positive trials in a close range of different circumstances, 
if the averaged sample is insufficiently diverse. In order to make evidence for the 
statistical truth-conducivity of a way of belief formation count as evidence for its 
counterfactual truth-conducivity the former must be collected from a relevantly 
varied sample. Most philosophers who discuss how we can establish the truth- 
conducivity of a way of belief formation implicitly assume that the relevant evidence 
comes form a sufficiently rich sample. We will make the same assumption and then
o o
take statistical evidence to be evidence for the counterfactual property.
Both notions of truth-conducivity apply primarily to cognitive capacities, 
what Goldman (1986) calls ‘methods’ and ‘processes’, ultimately leading to the 
formation of beliefs. Because the exercise of those capacities involves a transition to 
a belief, we will frequently call the cognitive capacities ‘belief-sources’ or ‘ways of 
belief formation’, and accordingly apply the term ‘truth-conducivity’ to belief- 
sources and to the transitions to belief that they involve. So, for instance, the claim 
that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source will be treated as equivalent to the 
claim that transitions from perceptual states involved in forming perceptual belief are 
generally truth-conducive.
As already indicated we will focus our discussion on epistemic principles 
about perception. It will be helpful to have the basic specimen before us:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that p , one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
How can it be shown that (EP) meets a truth-conducive constraint? The central and 
immediate problem for this task is that any evidence one can gather in support of the 
claim that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source would seem to rely on 
perceptual evidence at some point or another, i.e. seems to rely on deliverances of the
88 Goldman 1979: 346, makes a different assumption with the same effect. He assumes that the 
observed frequency o f  true belief in a cognitive capacity will be approximately replicated both in the 
actual lung-run and  in close counterfactual circumstances.
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very same belief-source whose truth-conducivity one is attempting to establish. And 
this suggests that such evidence is bound to involve some sort of vicious circularity.
There are arguments for the truth-conducivity of perception in which the 
reliance on perception is obvious and simple: collecting a record of past 
performances of a perceptual system and checking perceptually that the outcomes of 
those performances have been veridical, is one of such simple arguments. Following 
W. Alston we’ll refer to this type of arguments as ‘simple track-record arguments’, 
their standard structure is this:
(TRA):
1. At ti, Si formed the perceptual belief that pi, and pi.
2. At t2 , S2 formed the perceptual belief that P2, and P2 .
(R) Therefore, sense perception is a reliable source of belief.89
But there can be more complex arguments to the same effect. For example, some 
theorists have argued that perceptual systems wouldn’t exist now if they weren’t 
generally reliable. Traits possessed by organisms in the present are to be explained in 
part by their having been selected for increasing the organism’s fitness; 
representational systems, e.g. perceptual ones, contribute to fitness only if they 
reliably represent the organism’s environment. Therefore, the fact that perceptual
systems have been in fact selected is evidence that they are reliable. An ‘evolutionary
explanation’ of this sort also relies on perception in supporting the claim that 
perception is reliable. The theory says that the prevalence of a trait within a group of 
organisms is to be explained (in part) by that trait’s contributing to the biological 
fitness of organisms within the group. This theory has been arrived at by observing 
how changes of traits are correlated with survival success and by making hypothesis 
about those correlations.
There can be complex arguments for the truth-conducivity of perception 
which do not utilise evolutionary considerations but still rely on perceptual evidence. 
For example, the empirical study of perceptual systems identifies and describes the 
features of the human visual system that enable it to yield veridical representations in
89 Alston 1986: 9.
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a normal environment; that involves a detailed physiological explanation of the 
functions of the different parts of the system, as it is now, and how their assemblage 
results in representing veridically some salient aspects of the environment. But the 
study of human vision involves experimental settings where observable results about, 
for example, the reactions of various cone and rod cells and neurons under controlled 
conditions are registered and compared. Therefore, the physiological explanation 
also relies in complex ways on perception in supporting the claim that perception is 
reliable. The dependence of both the evolutionary and the physiological evidence for 
the truth-conducivity of perception on perceptual appearings is much more mediated 
than the evidence of a simple track-record evidence, but the dependence is there 
nonetheless.
The attitude of philosophers that want to study the prospects of establishing 
that perception is a truth-conducive belief source has largely been to set the complex 
arguments on the side and focus entirely on the simple track-record ones.90 This 
attitude might understandably awake some suspicion. The complex arguments seem 
clearly a better, more robust support for the claim that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source, they give us some insight into the how and why of the 
reliability of perceptual systems which a simple track-record argument doesn’t. To 
this extent the complex arguments seem to supply much better reasons than the 
simple ones. Why not focus then on the stronger rather than on the weaker candidate? 
The underlying justification for the choice of the weaker, simpler case seems to be 
that those philosophers assume that i f  the circularity involved disqualifies the simple 
arguments, it would also disqualify the complex ones. It is then reasonable to 
examine the disease in the simpler specimens since the result, given the previous 
conditional, can be safely generalised to the complex ones. Is the conditional 
statement on which this generalisation is based, justified? We will discuss this issue 
in (III. 1.1). Before we need to get a better understanding of the kind of circularity 
that infects the simpler type of argument and determine in which way it is 
epistemically damaging for the project of explaining an epistemic principle about 
perception. Those are the tasks of the rest of this chapter.
90 Most o f  them do not even mention the complex arguments; see for example Alston 1986 and Van 
Cleve 2003. Alston 1989b and 1993a sympathetically discusses the value o f  the complex arguments, 
and thus departs from the assumption that if  the simple type collapses, so does the complex type. See 
(III. 1.1) below for discussion o f  Alston’s view on this matter.
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Each of the premises of a track-record argument consists of a conjunction; the 
first conjunct ascribes the formation through perceptual means of a belief p  to a 
subject S , the second asserts the content p  of that belief. If the argument is run in the 
first-person then we will assume that the justification for the first conjunct of each 
premise is a piece of authoritative self-knowledge, if the argument is not run in the 
first-person then we will assume that the justification for the first conjunct is some 
kind of behavioural evidence of the subject of the ascription. On the first assumption 
the justification for the first conjunct is not essentially perceptual, on the second 
assumption it is; but regardless of whether the argument is run in the first-person or 
not the justification for the second conjunct of each premise is bound to be 
perceptual. It is the essentially perceptual nature of this justification that makes track- 
record arguments look somehow circular. We need an initial characterisation of this 
felt circularity.
The simple fact that seems to account for the impression that (TRA) is 
somehow circular is that the justification for its premises91 depends on the actual 
truth-conducivity of the capacity which its conclusion affirms to be truth-conducive. 
This form of dependence of the justification for the premises of (TRA) on its 
conclusion is a joint consequence of the basicness of perception and of a truth- 
conducive constraint on perceptual justification. Say that a belief-source is basic if 
checking its truth-conducivity necessarily involves the use of that very same source. 
We can construct track-record arguments for non-basic belief-sources that do not 
exhibit the epistemic dependence exhibited by (TRA). For example, a track-record 
argument for the reliability of a newspaper need not use a newspaper to justify its 
premises. In contrast, a track-record argument for the reliability of perception 
necessarily justifies its premises on perception. But the basicness of perception is not 
enough to yield the epistemic dependence that we are attributing to (TRA); a truth- 
conducive constraint needs to be in place as well. For suppose there's no truth- 
conducive constraint on perceptual justification, then even if perception is 
necessarily used in justifying (TRA)'s premises it would not be the case that such 
justification depends specifically on what (TRA)'s conclusion asserts, i.e. the truth- 
conducivity of perception; for it could be argued that it depends on some other aspect 
of perception, e.g. its phenomenology. It is the basicness of perception together with
91 For brevity’s sake and unless otherwise indicated, we will use ‘the premises o f  (TRA)’ for ‘the 
second conjunct o f  each o f  the premises o f  (TRA)’.
67
a standing truth-conducive constraint on perceptual justification that makes (TRA) 
exhibit the suspicious epistemic dependence. We will work with the following 
formulation of that dependence:
(DT) The justification for the premises of the argument depends on what its
conclusion asserts, i.e. that perception is a truth-conducive belief source.
(DT) describes a specific way in which the justification for the premises of an 
argument may depend on its conclusion. It is natural to phrase an epistemic 
dependence of that sort by saying that the justification for the premises ‘presupposes’, 
‘relies on’ or ‘takes for granted’ its conclusion. However, we will avoid this 
terminology because it encourages the idea that there is a doxastic attitude mediating 
the dependence in question, as if one could obtain perceptual justification for the 
premises only if one believed, and in that sense presupposed, the general claim that 
perception is reliable. But this is obviously incorrect, for even subjects that lack the 
conceptual sophistication to articulate and believe the proposition that perception is 
reliable can still have perceptually justified beliefs. Yet, some philosophers think that 
the relevant dependence of justification for premises on conclusion is indeed 
mediated by some form of doxastic attitude, more precisely by what they call an 
entitlement to some form of acceptance of the conclusion, so that one cannot have 
perceptual justification for the premises without having an entitlement to some form 
of acceptance of the conclusion. In (II.4) we discuss this form of dependence and 
whether it could be charged against track-record arguments. Here we only want to 
distinguish (DT) as a form of epistemic dependence of justification for premises on 
conclusion that is not mediated by any form of doxastic attitude. Because the 
terminology of presupposing and assuming carries doxastic suggestions we will 
instead use the term ‘epistemic dependence’, which is neutral between dependences 
that involve a doxastic component and those that don’t. Whether an argument 
exhibits an epistemic dependence that involves a doxastic component or not is 
crucial for determining what kind of epistemic shortcoming afflicts the argument. It 
is therefore important to contrast (DT) with other possible epistemic dependences 
and their attendant epistemic shortcomings, that’s the task of next section.
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II. 3. Some Epistemic Dependences and Some Epistemic Vices
We have offered (DT) as the initial diagnosis of the type of epistemic dependence 
exhibited by (TRA):
An argument exhibits (DT) if and only if the justification for its premises 
depends on what its conclusion asserts.
The notion of dependence used here is simply the notion of a necessary condition, so 
(DT) merely says that the truth of (TRA)’s conclusion is necessary for a subject’s 
beliefs in their premises to be warranted. As already indicated, given a truth- 
conducive constraint for perceptual justification it is obvious that (TRA) exhibits 
(DT). The substantial question here is how vicious (DT) is for (TRA), i.e. what kind 
of epistemic shortcoming (DT) engenders, if any. Before addressing that question we 
will contrast (DT) with other forms of epistemic dependence and the shortcomings 
they engender, and discuss whether they can be charged against (TRA) as well. That 
will determine whether (TRA) is infected by any other forms of epistemic 
dependence beyond (DT).
An argument that exhibits (DT) will also exhibit a further type of dependence 
we will term (DD):
An argument exhibits (DD) if and only if the justification for its premises 
depends on the absence of evidence against what its conclusion asserts.
If C is a necessary condition for having justification for p , a reason for thinking that 
C does not obtain will ipso facto be a reason that undermines the warranting force of 
the purported justification for p. This is to say that the evidence against C acts as an 
undermining defeater of the justification for believing p , in the sense that in the 
context of such evidence the purported justification does not in fact justify the belief 
that p. Clearly, (TRA) exhibits (DD). Suppose you have been running a track-record 
argument for your visual perception for the last three days, writing down in a 
notebook the results of various trials of you vision, which have been carried out in a 
variety of circumstances, etc. On the fourth day you are given strong evidence that 
for the last week you have been the subject of an experiment where an amnesic and 
hallucinogenic drug has been administered to you. That evidence certainly is
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evidence against the truth-conducive functioning of your visual system during the 
days you compile its track-record, and therefore it would undermine the justification 
you purported to have for the premises of the corresponding track-record argument, 
in the sense that in the context of such evidence the purported perceptual justification 
doesn’t justify the premises of the track-record argument any more.
(DD) contrast sharply with a type of dependence we will term (DW):
An argument exhibits (DW) if and only if the justification for its premises 
depends on having and antecedent and independent warrant for its 
conclusion.92
(DD) only implies that evidence against the conclusion C undermines the purported 
justification for the premises of the argument; (DW) says more, it says that having a 
positive warrant for C, independent of the argument that has C as its conclusion, is a 
necessary condition for having the purported justification for the premises of that 
argument. The demand for an independent warrant for C doesn’t follow from the fact 
about the potential defeating effects of evidence against C captured in (DD). Of 
course, when an argument exhibits (DD) and one happens to have evidence against 
its conclusion C then, in order for one to restore the justificatory status of the 
purported justification for the premises of the argument one will need some evidence, 
independent of the argument, which defeats the evidence against C. But such 
restoring evidence need not constitute independent warrant fo r  C. Consider this 
example. You have what you think is a proof of C. Then someone you take to be an 
expert tells you that he knows a counterexample to C; later on you find out that the 
informant is no expert at all, but a fantasist. That defeats the evidence against C 
constituted by the informant’s testimony, but evidently it is not any sort of warrant 
for  C! But even in circumstances in which one doesn’t have evidence against C 
(DW) requires independent warrant for C as a necessary condition for the purported 
justification for the premises to have the status of justification.
In what follows we will distinguish the question whether an argument 
exhibits a given epistemic dependence from the question whether that dependence
92 Pryor 2004: 359- 362 discusses both (DD) and (DW).
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engenders an epistemic vice, and what it is. One question is what kind of epistemic 
circularity we are dealing with, a further question is whether it is vicious and how.
(DT), (DD) and (DW) characterise dependences of the epistemic justification 
for the premises of an argument on its conclusion, in that sense they are different 
varieties of epistemic circularity. As characterised those dependences are not relative 
to discursive contexts or audiences, in the sense that whether an argument exhibits 
one of them is not meant to depend on features of the conversational contexts where 
the argument can be used. However, some philosophers think that the epistemic vices 
some of those dependences engender do depend on features of the conversational 
contexts where the arguments are used. For example, Bergmann (2004: 717-19) 
argues that in a context where the conclusion of a track-record argument is doubted 
the circularity exhibited by the argument, i.e. (DT), “is a bad thing”; in the sense that
• « • O'}it prevents the argument from conferring justification on its conclusion because the 
doubt acts as a defeater of any justification supplied by the belief-source mentioned 
in the conclusion. He takes as a further crippling effect of such context of doubt that 
the argument will fail to convince doubters, in the sense of moving them to rational 
conviction, of the relevant conclusion.94 But he believes that in a context free of 
doubt about its conclusion the argument will not be afflicted by any of those 
disabilities. Bergmann ignores important questions about how those disabling vices, 
i.e. failure to rationally persuade an audience and failure to confer justification, in 
fact belong to different kinds and how the epistemic status of the background doubts 
determine the kind of vice afflicting the argument, but what we want to highlight at 
this stage is that he thinks that whether an argument that exhibits (DT) engenders an 
epistemic vice is a matter sensitive to the presence of background doubts in a given 
conversational context. Taken by itself the epistemic dependence is not judged to be 
harmful.
Very often the term "question-begging’ is used to refer to some of the vices 
engendered by epistemic dependences. Jackson (1987) for instance claims that an 
argument is question-begging if anyone who sanely doubted the conclusion would 
not regard the evidence implicitly offered for the premises as evidence, so that the 
justification for the premises would be compromised by doubting the conclusion and 
then the argument would fail to confer any justification for its conclusion. By
% Bergmann 2004: 711.
94 Ibid.: 721.
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contrast Walton (1994) takes question-beggingness to be a “pragmatic fallacy” in the 
sense that it consists of the failure to achieve the conversational purpose of 
convincing a targeted audience that p  in a context where it is doubted that p.95 The 
vice that Jackson singles out is a failure to confer justification whereas the vice 
Walton talks about is the failure to persuade an audience. As noted these are different 
kinds of vices and we will discuss their difference later in this chapter.96 At this stage 
it is enough to realise that they constitute different ways in which an argument that 
exhibits a certain type of epistemic dependence can be ‘question-begging’.
In such a usage an argument’s being question-begging is some vice 
engendered by an epistemic dependence, not to the dependence itself, which may 
naturally be termed ‘circularity’, for in response to why an argument suffers from 
one of those vices one is prone to reply that it is circular in some way. Yet, the use of 
‘circular’ with this sense in the present context would need to involve some 
stipulation, for some philosophers in fact use it to refer to some of the ways in which 
an argument can be question-begging, i.e. some of the vices that a certain epistemic 
dependence may engender relative to certain contexts, and not to the epistemic 
dependence itself. For example, discussing the inductive justification of induction P. 
Lipton writes:
.. .the notion of circularity is audience relative. The same argument may beg 
for one audience, yet be cogent for another. So while the inductive 
justification of induction has no force for an inductive sceptic, it may yet
97have some value for us.
Circularity is relative to audience, and the inductive justification of induction 
is circular for an audience of sceptics, yet not among those who already
• 98accept that induction is better than guessing.
The epistemic dependence exhibited by an inductive argument for the reliability of 
inductive methods is neither (DT) nor (DW). But the dependence it exhibits can also 
be given a context-independent formulation. On the simplest phrasing, the 
dependence it exhibits is that the justification for the rule of inference used to reason
95 Walton 1994: 127.
96 Bebee 2001: 356- 60 and Pryor 2004 recognise the difference between those kinds o f  vices; only 
Pryor distinguishes carefully between such vices and the epistemic dependences that engender them.
97 Lipton 2004: 189.
98 Ibid.: 191.
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the conclusion from the premises depends on what the conclusion asserts." So 
understood the epistemic dependence exhibited by the inductive ‘justification’ of 
induction is not relative to the doubts of an audience. What is relative to the doxastic 
background of such an audience is whether that circular argument fails to achieve 
any of the epistemic and dialectical goals mentioned above, i.e. whether it is 
question-begging in any of the ways we have mentioned. Maybe Lipton, and others, 
use ‘circularity’ to refer to question-begging vices, but then they need a different 
concept for the epistemic dependence whose presence (partially) explains such vices.
We will opt to avoid altogether the terminology of ‘circularity’ and ‘question- 
begging’. We will continue to use ‘epistemic dependence’ for the various forms of 
dependence of the justification for premises on the conclusion, or dependence of the 
justification for accepting one of the inferential steps on the conclusion, and 
‘epistemic vice’ for the various epistemic shortcomings that afflict an argument in 
virtue of its exhibiting an epistemic dependence. The epistemic vices engendered by 
an epistemic dependence may be related to dialectical vices of the sort mentioned 
above, but the two kinds of vices are distinct and need not go hand in hand.100 As 
noted above some of those vices are produced relative to given backgrounds of doubt 
of targeted audiences, but some are non-relative to such backgrounds. For instance, 
the standard treatment of (DW) takes it to produce the single epistemic vice called 
‘transmission-failure’, regardless of the context where a thinker uses the argument 
exhibiting (DW^ ).
We have diagnosed (TRA) as exhibiting (DT); it also exhibits (DD). Does it 
also exhibit (DW)? We will argue that the best cases available for charging an 
argument with (DW) do not succeed, and so, in particular that there’s no good reason 
to charge (TRA) with (DW). Before going into the arguments for the charge we will 
give the characterisation of the epistemic vice engendered by (DW).
Most philosophers who discuss (DW) agree that it engenders a vice fatal for 
an argument, for intuitively if one’s justification for the premises depends on an 
antecedent warrant for the conclusion, then the argument is sterile as a way of
99 See Salmon 1957: 47 and Achinstein 1962: 140.
100 Section (II.4.2) discusses the differences between such vices and how they are related to the 
doxastic background against which they are produced by an epistemic dependence.
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gaining warrant for its conclusion.101 Following the mainstream literature we will 
call the vice engendered by (DW) ‘transmission-failure’ and we will work with the 
following formulation of it:
(TRANSMISSION-FAILURE): An inference or chain of inferences to C 
from premises pi...pn fails to transmit justification to C for S if and only if S 
has justification for pi...pn but S cannot acquire a warrant for C by competent 
reasoning from p i... .pn to C.
If an argument suffers from transmission-failure it is sterile vis-a-vis gaining warrant 
for its conclusion, which is compatible with one having some warrant for the 
conclusion, for it may accrue form a source different from the argument. This 
compatibility is essential for the formulation of the views to be discussed in the next 
section, which charge certain arguments with (DW), and hence transmission-failure, 
but at the same time affirm the possession of some warrant for their conclusions.
(DW) is assumed to be sufficient for transmission-failure. Our discussion will 
make the same assumption and enquire what the grounds are for attributing (DW), 
and hence transmission-failure, to particular arguments. The most elaborate accounts 
of the reasons for attributing (DW) are due to Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. 
Next section examines their reasons and argues that they are insufficient to justify the 
charge.
II. 4. (DW) and Transmission-Failure
II. 4. 1. Subjective Indiscriminability and Confusions of Epistemic Levels.
Recall what (DW) asserts:
An argument exhibits (DW) if and only if the justification for its premises 
depends on having and antecedent and independent warrant for its conclusion.
101 See for example Alson 1986: 17, Davis 2003: 29, 35; Pryor 2004: 360, Wright 2003: 57.
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Wright takes some specific arguments as his motivating cases for charging (DW). 
Here are a couple of them:
(ZEBRA)
(ZEBRA I) That animal is a zebra.
(ZEBRA II) If that animal is a zebra, it is not a mule cleverly disguised to look like 
a zebra.
(ZEBRA III) That animal is not a mule cleverly disguised to look like a 
zebra.
(RED)
(RED I) That wall is red
(RED II) If that wall is red, it is not white and illuminated by trick red light to make 
it appear red.
(RED III) That wall is not white and illuminated by trick red light to make
1O ')it appears red.
These arguments have been widely discussed in the contexts of apparent failures of 
epistemic closure principles. Wright and Davies think that the issue of failures of 
closure is independent of the issue of failures of transmission of warrant. They 
believe that even though (ZEBRA) and (RED) are no counterexamples to closure
i m •they are cases of transmission-failure. In their discussion they set closure aside, so 
we will.
Wright’s argument for charging (DW) against (ZEBRA) and (RED) runs as 
follows.104 According to him, in order for one’s perceptual evidence for the first 
premise of the arguments to be justification for it some conditions for the proper 
operation of the cognitive capacities that deliver that evidence must be satisfied; 
among such conditions there are the conditions for their reliable operation.105 Let us 
call such conditions ‘justification-enabling conditions’. The possible situations 
denied in the conclusions of (ZEBRA) and (RED), i.e. disguised mules and tricky 
lighting, are related in two interesting ways to the justification-enabling conditions
102 Wright 2003:60-61
103 See Wright: 2003: 57-58.
104 As it will be clear from what follows Wright uses ‘warrant’ as the genus o f  which ‘justification’ 
and ‘entitlement’ are the sub-species. So when w e talk about justification he talks about a special kind 
o f warrant, keep this in mind in reading several o f  the quotations we take from Wright below. We 
stick to the term ‘justification’ because this is the term we use throughout the whole thesis.
105 Wright 2003:61.
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for the first premise of those arguments; (i) they are situations incompatible with the 
genuine possession of justification for the first premise because they block the 
conditions for the reliable operation of the relevant cognitive capacities. Trivially, 
when one is deceived in the envisaged manners the capacities involved in the 
identification of animals through their appearance or in the simple recognition of an 
object’s colour by casual observation are bound not to reliably deliver correct 
information.106 And the possibilities are (ii) subjectively indistinguishable from those 
where the relevant cognitive capacities do operate reliably and one genuinely has
•  107justification for the first premise.
Let us use the following conventions, ‘p’ will stand for the first premise of the 
arguments, ‘H’ for the envisaged deceptive hypotheses and ‘C’ for the negation of 
such hypothesis, which happens to be the conclusions of the arguments.
Wright thinks that from the fact that the envisaged possibilities have features
(i) and (ii) it follows that by itself the evidence ordinarily taken to justify p  strictly
only justifies a tentative disjunction of the form: p  or H. He seems to take it as 
obvious that features (i) and (ii) entail that only the reserved judgment is justified by 
one’s ordinary evidence. He writes:
The key question is what, in the circumstances, can justify me in accepting p i  
Should I just not reserve judgment and stay with the more tentative 
disjunction, either (I have warrant for) p  or HI For it is all the same which 
alternative is true as far as what is subjectively apparent to me is concerned. 
The answer has to be, it would seem, that the more tentative claim would 
indeed be appropriate unless I am somehow additionally entitled to discount 
alternative H.m
And that’s exactly what he thinks is needed in order to be justified in believing p. 
Wright is supposing that merely because a situation in which one genuinely has 
justification for p  and a corresponding deceptive situation H  in which one doesn’t 
genuinely have justification for p  would be indiscriminable for one, one’s putative 
evidence never justifies p  for one but only the disjunction p  or H, unless one is 
independently warranted in ruling H  out. But ruling out or discarding H  is equivalent 
to denying that H  is the case, and this is precisely what the conclusions of (RED) and 
(ZEBRA) do; so the requirement of being independently warranted in ruling H  out in
106 Wright 2003 : 63 and 2002: 342.
107 Wright 2002: 343 and 2003: 62.
108 Wright 2003: 62. His emphasis. I’ve replaced ‘p’ f ° r his ‘A' and ‘H’ for his ‘C \
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order to be justified in believing p  is equivalent to the requirement of being 
independently warranted in believing the conclusion of those arguments in order to 
be justified in believing p .m  Thus the charge of (DW) against (RED) and (ZEBRA) 
is established.
Clearly, the central contention in Wright’s argument is that the subjective 
indiscriminability of situations, where we have perceptual justification for p  with 
respect to other deceptive situations Hs, where we fail to have perceptual justification 
for p , requires that in order to have perceptual justification for p  we be antecedently 
warranted in discarding those other uncongenial situations. How can Wright argue 
for this thesis?
Before tackling this question we have to make three clarifications. The first 
concerns the kind o f warrant for the conclusion that Wright thinks is necessary for 
the justification of the premises; the second concerns the kind o f doxastic attitude 
that the special kind of warrant attaches to; and the third concerns the kind o f 
propositions that the special kind of doxastic attitude ranges over.
For Wright the needed independent warrant for the conclusion is default in 
the sense that it is “a warrant that does not need to be earned by investigation.”110 He 
calls this special kind of unearned warrant ‘entitlement’.111 The unearned nature of 
an entitlement to assume X  may suggest that we should interpret it as merely lacking 
reasons to suppose not-X. Sometimes Wright himself suggests that reading, he says:
...absent reason to suppose the contrary, we may take it that we have a
standing (though defeasible) entitlement to the suppositions that all is in order
with... our vision... that appearances of objects around us are not
systematically misleading. In general all non-inferential warrants are
112conferred subject to such background entitlements.
But Wright’s entitlements to assume X  cannot consist merely in lacking reasons to 
suppose not-X, for then the claim that the justification for the premise depends on an 
antecedent entitlement to assume C would be tantamount to the claim that it depends
109 Wright 2003: 62-63.
1,0 Ibid.: 69.
111 Other authors develop and use notions o f  entitlement that are related to but substantially differ 
from Wright’s notion in various ways. Contrast for example with the notions o f  entitlement developed 
by Peacocke 2004: Ch. 3 and Burge 2004. The criticisms that follow are intended to apply only to 
Wright’s notion and the use he makes o f  it.
1,2 Wright 2003:70.
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on the absence of reasons to suppose not-C; and this epistemic dependence is (DD), 
not the intended (DW). And, as indicated in (II.3), (DW) is distinct from (DD).
Wright’s default and apriori entitlement has to be something stronger, a 
positive epistemic right over and above the mere lack of reasons to suppose not-X. 
What could that be? He tries to convey the essence of his notion in this paragraph:
Such an apriori presumption -o r entitlement (now to propose a specialized 
use of this term) -may be counted as a subspecies of warrant. But it is 
conferred not by positive evidence for the proposition in question but by the 
operational necessity, so to speak, of proceeding on the basis of such so far 
untested assumptions if one is to proceed at all.113
According to Wright the desired entitlement to assume p  is conferred on us by what 
he calls the ‘operational necessity of proceeding on the basis of such so far untested 
assumptions if one is to proceed at all’. This means for him that engaging in any 
project or task that aims at gaining evidence requires us to leave at least the 
proposition concerning the general reliability of one’s cognitive capacities outside 
the scope of that task, if the task is to be carried out at all. Wright is extracting an 
entitlement from a need. He says that we have this need:
(N) To proceed in gathering evidence for certain propositions on untested 
assumption X if one is to proceed at all.
And he thinks that the mere fact that we have need (N) gives us the epistemic 
entitlement:
(E) To assume that X is true, or to proceed as if X is the case.
Do we have a positive epistemic entitlement for (E), merely because we have a need 
like (N)? For the sake of argument let us assume that we do.114 The question remains 
if it plays the epistemic role that Wright thinks it does: Is an entitlement of that sort 
necessary for the achievement of ordinary perceptual justification? Maybe we do 
have a default entitlement to assume the general reliability of our cognitive capacities,
113 Wright 2003:68.
114 Wright 2004a and 2004b address in some detail questions concerning the nature o f  entitlements 
and o f  the doxastic attitudes they attach to that his previous work had left unanswered. Wright’s more 
recent views deserve separate scrutiny; we w ill discuss them in chapter IV, for the moment we will 
only be taking into account his pre-2004 views.
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which goes over and above merely lacking reasons against that general reliability, 
and is grounded on a procedural need like (N). But granting this it still needs to be 
argued that our ordinary justification for the premises of the targeted arguments 
depends on that entitlement, for it is not obvious that it does. Firstly, the hypothesis 
that that justification depends merely on the reliable operation of the relevant 
cognitive capacities and the absence of reasons for supposing that such reliability is 
frustrated, is not just a rival to Wright’s but one into which Wright himself 
sometimes slips (see below). And secondly, the fact that the entitlement in question 
is conferred by a procedural need suggests that its role might not be epistemic but 
rather prudential: it wouldn’t condition any epistemic justification, even if it would 
condition the execution of activities wherein justification are obtained. It is not 
obvious that entitlements, as Wright understands them, play the role that he assigns 
to them; we need an argument that they do.
The second preliminary point of clarification concerns the kind of doxastic 
attitude that entitlements attach to. Wright talks about assuming, but this is not 
believing, for then his view would hyperintellectualise perceptual justification by 
making a condition for them that the individual is entitled to believe that certain facts 
concerning the reliability of his faculties obtain, a condition that could not be 
fulfilled by someone who lacks the concept ‘reliability’. Wright’s view would imply 
that only conceptually sophisticated subjects could have perceptual justification, 
which is extremely implausible. ‘Assuming’ has to mean something different that 
believing. Wright gives a clue on an alternative reading of ‘assuming’ when he 
explains that because of its unearned nature an entitlement is an “apriori presumption 
that the relevant defeaters do not obtain”.115 This suggests that he takes ‘entitle to 
assume p ' as quite close to ‘entitled to ignore certain possibilities where not-p\ 
where such not-p possibilities could potentially act as defeaters for some perceptual 
justification. So for example, being entitled to assume the conclusion of (ZEBRA) 
would be being entitled to ignore the possibility of disguised mules.116 This reading 
avoids the charge of hyperintellectualisation, for conceptually unsophisticated
115 Wright 2003:69.
1,6 Compare with Davies’ remark (2003: 28) on how to understand his notion o f  assumption:
...the notion o f  making an assumption should be construed in a thin way so as to include the 
case where it simply does not occur to a thinker to doubt that something is the case. Being 
epistemically entitled to make an assumption thus include being epistemically entitled to 
ignore, or not to bother about, certain possibilities.
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subjects a fortiori ignore possibilities of error they cannot conceptualise. We will 
assume that Wright’s notion of ‘assuming’ includes at least ignoring possibilities of 
error; none of our criticisms of Wright’s view on the epistemic role of entitlements 
will depend on this assumption.
The third preliminary issue of clarification concerns the range of propositions 
which one may be entitled to assume. The fact that (ZEBRA) or (RED) exhibits (DW) 
is supposed to be a specific case of a more general phenomenon. According to 
Wright any process of enquiry or taking something as evidence in support of a 
proposition requires leaving some key propositions untested or outside the scope of 
that enquiry, for otherwise the process of enquiry could not be carried out at all; it 
would not be legitimate for us to take anything as evidence in support of any of the 
propositions we enquire about. Ordinary justification depends on our being entitled 
to assume such pivotal propositions; our entitlements attach to them. One problem in 
assessing Wright’s view is that it isn’t clear what falls within that category of special 
pivotal propositions. Initially Wright includes extremely general propositions to the 
effect that some overarching conditions for the reliable and proper operation of one’s 
cognitive capacities and methods, like “There is an external world”, “The Earth has a 
past of millions of years” and “My perceptual systems are generally reliable”. In 
Wright’s Wittgensteinian terminology our entitlements attach to that kind of “hinge 
proposition”. For a moment let’s accept that an entitlement to assume at least one 
hinge proposition is necessary for the justification for the first premises of (RED) and 
(ZEBRA); that would still fall short from his charge that those arguments exhibit 
(DW). For the conclusions of (RED) and (ZEBRA) are far too specific to count as 
hinge propositions. However, Wright thinks that other propositions that are more 
specific can and do play, relative to a given context, a similar role. He tells us for 
example that: “I have a similar entitlement, ceteris paribus, to assume the proper
117functioning of my perceptual apparatus on a particular occasion...” Although the 
propositions indicated here are specific to a time and place, they are still distinct 
from the conclusions of (RED) and (ZEBRA), for these rule out determinate ways in 
which a perceptual capacity could fail to work properly or reliably, whereas the time- 
place specific proposition is not determinate in that way, for it rules out failure to 
work properly tout court. So, even if we accept that perceptual justification depends
117 Wright 2003: 68. My emphasis.
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on an entitlement to assume the time-place specific proposition(s), that would fall 
short of the claim that (RED) and (ZEBRA) exhibit (DW).
One might think that the more specific hinge propositions entail, fixing the 
contexts, the conclusions of (RED) and (ZEBRA), for if a context-specific 
proposition rules out failure of reliability in general it rules out any determinate 
failure of reliability. Let us assume that the envisaged entailment holds. If this is 
going to be of use to Wright he would still have to show that ‘entitled to assume is 
closed under entailment, for only if it is he could argue from these two facts:
(a) in order to obtain perceptual justification we need an entitlement to assume a 
context-specific proposition, and
(b) such propositions entail the conclusions of (RED) and (ZEBRA),
that in order to obtain perceptual justification for the premises one needs an 
entitlement to assume the conclusions of (RED) and (ZEBRA), i.e. that these 
arguments exhibit (DW).
Is ‘entitled to assume closed under entailment? Suppose it is. It would then 
follow that on every occasion where we obtain an ordinary perceptual justification 
our doing so requires us to be entitled to assume a huge number of propositions 
which rule out a huge number of highly determinate ways in which the relevant 
perceptual capacity can fail to operate reliably, for such a huge number of 
propositions is entailed by any context-specific proposition of the envisaged sort. But 
it is exceedingly implausible that our achieving an ordinary perceptual justification 
requires entitlements for all those highly determinate propositions. There might be 
some plausibility in the idea that in treating a perceptual episode as evidence for p  we 
must somehow assume the conducivity for this practice of some general and 
indeterminate facts about the world and us, but that does not confer any plausibility 
to the different thought that each time we so treat a perceptual episode we must 
assume many highly determinate things about the world and us. But if ‘entitled to 
assume is not closed under entailment it is hard to see how Wright can 
accommodate his claim that particular arguments exhibit (DW) as a special case or as 
a consequence of the general phenomenon of dependence of ordinary justification on 
entitlements that he describes.
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In setting up his case for the charge of (DW) Wright is initially interested in 
distinguishing two types of justification, which he calls ‘inferential’ and ‘non- 
inferential’. The former consist of evidence E for p  such that E licenses a defeasible 
inference to p  only in the presence of some collateral information I. He gives as an 
example one’s observation of a kettle brought to boil on a camping stove. He claims 
that such observations justify an inference to the proposition that the liquid inside is 
100 Celsius only if one is assumes that the liquid is water and that the atmospheric 
pressure is around that of sea level. In contrast non-inferential justification do not 
consist of a piece of evidence that justifies a defeasible inference to p; rather they are 
acquired “directly, via the operation of some cognitive faculty -perception, or 
memory [etc.] -which we regard as directly responsive to the subject matter in
1 1 0
question...” The word ‘directly’ here is meant to exclude the involvement of a 
defeasible inference in the acquisition of the justification, but not the dependence of 
the justification on other warrants; for as it turns out Wright’s treatment of non- 
inferential justification makes it dependent on an antecedent warrant (entitlement) for 
discarding uncongenial possibilities. This is exemplified in his treatment of (RED) 
and (ZEBRA), where the involved justification for the premises is viewed by Wright 
as non-inferential. So the difference between inferential and non-inferential 
justification that Wright recognizes is overshadowed by the deeper similarity that he 
thinks unifies the two types of justification. It is very telling, however, that when he 
intends to give explicit formulation to that similarity he ends up with something 
different. He writes:
The unifying thought is that warrants -both inferential and non-inferential- 
are characteristically conditional: inferential empirical warrants are
characteristically conditional on collateral information and non-inferential
warrants, presumed acquired by the direct operation of some germane 
cognitive faculties, are conditional on such an operation genuinely taking 
place (contrast: the occurrence of some subjectively indistinguishable ersatz) 
and on the circumstances being conducive to the reliable operation of the 
faculties in question.119
But this unification is not the one Wright needs. Although he is saying here that both 
types of justification are conditional on something else, what they are conditional on
118 Wright 2003:60.
119 Wright 2002: 345. His emphasis.
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in fact marks a sharp contrast, rather than unification, between them. Whereas 
inferential justification is conditional on collateral information, non-inferential 
justification is conditional on the reliable operation of the cognitive capacities that 
produces them. To get the unification he needs he should say that non-inferential 
justification is also conditional on some other warrants, for this is in fact his view: 
non-inferential justification is conditional on having an antecedent warrant to assume 
that the relevant cognitive capacities work reliably. In his view this warrant is an 
entitlement, which in virtue of its default nature differs significantly from evidence 
and collateral information; but its classification as warrant in claiming that non- 
inferential justification is conditional on it is essential for the charge of (DW) against 
particular arguments. To say that non-inferential justification is conditional merely 
on the reliable operation of relevant cognitive capacities, doesn’t make them 
conditional on any warrant, and so the charge of (DW) against specific arguments 
will be waiting for an argument. In what follows we will see how Wright struggles 
and ultimately fails to work out his way to the charge of (DW) against particular 
arguments from the admitted fact that non-inferential justification are conditional on 
the reliable operation of relevant cognitive capacities.
We can now examine Wright’s argumentation for his view about the 
epistemic role of entitlements; we will argue that it slips on one kind of structural 
fallacy where different epistemic levels are mixed up. We will now spot and describe 
that fallacy.
The question Wright needs to answer is why we should accept that the 
subjective indiscriminability of a situation, where we have perceptual justification for 
the first premise of (RED) or (ZEBRA), from other situations where we fail to have 
perceptual justification for such propositions, requires that in order to have 
perceptual justification for p  we be antecedently entitled to assume that those 
uncongenial possibilities do not obtain. Wright answers this question by holding that 
without such antecedent entitlement our epistemic practice would be riddled with a 
pervasive fallacy. He writes:
So long as it is granted that perception and delusion can be subjectively 
indistinguishable, there is a weaker claim which is justified whenever, as one 
would ordinarily suppose, the corresponding perceptual claim is justified, viz. 
precisely the disjunction:
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Either I am perceiving thus-and-such or I am in some kind of 
delusional state.
 it is our practice to treat one in particular of the disjuncts as justified -the
left-hand one- whenever the disjunction as a whole is justified and there is, 
merely, no evidence for the other disjunct! That’s a manifest fallacy unless 
the case is one where we have a standing reason to regard the lack of any 
salient justification for a disjunct of the second type as reason to discount 
it.120
It is unclear what the fallacy is supposed to be. Whenever one has justification for 
believing p  one has justification for p  or q, regardless of considerations of the 
indiscriminability of q from p. Obviously, in insisting in treating p, and not merely its 
disjunction with anything else, as justified one is not guilty of any fallacy. Wright 
cannot be objecting to that simple logical point; he is rather objecting to our treating 
p  as justified by experience that does not rule out or disconfirm an alternative q that 
conflicts withp  but is subjectively indistinguishable from it. His point about this type 
of case is that if in the absence of evidence for q we insist in treating p, and not 
merely its disjunction with q, as justified we would be guilty of a fallacy unless we 
have reason to take ‘there’s no justification for q ’ as ‘justification for not-q\ But this 
is so only on the assumption that we need a justification or reason for not-q in order 
to be justified by our experience to believe /?; if we don’t need that justification for 
not-q our taking our experience to justify p  wouldn’t be fallacious. So Wright’s claim 
that our practice would be fallacious unless the role he assigns to entitlements is 
accepted already presupposes that we need such entitlements in order for our 
experience to justify p  and not merely p  or q. What Wright needs to argue for is his 
assumption that one’s evidence on its own only justifies the tentative claim that p  or 
q, and not p alone. If this assumption is correct, in order to get past the disjunction 
without fallacy one would indeed need a further reason to discount q , as Wright 
supposes. But he gives no reason for his needed assumption that one’s evidence on 
its own only justifies the disjunction and not its first disjunct alone. Such assumption 
not only is not obvious but is incongruous with ordinary epistemic practice, for 
ordinarily we take perceptual evidence to justify the first disjunct and not merely the 
disjunction with its indiscriminate twin. Of course, this is the bit of our practice that 
Wright says is fallacious unless his view about the epistemic role of entitlements is
120 Wright 2002: 346. His emphases.
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accepted; but it is precisely this claim of his that rests on the unwarranted assumption 
that our evidence on its own only warrants tentative disjunctions.
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument let us assume that an antecedent 
entitlement to discount the second disjunct is necessary for our perceptual evidence 
to genuinely justify the first disjunct alone. Surprisingly that still falls short of the 
claim that Wright needs to charge the arguments with (DW), namely, that an 
antecedent entitlement for their conclusions is necessary for having justification for 
the premises; for the premises of the arguments are propositions about the 
perceptible environment of a subject while the first disjunct is a proposition about a 
subject’s genuinely perceiving  his environment. For example, while the first disjunct 
is that: 1 am perceiving thus-and-such, the first premise of (RED) is: That wall is red. 
Even if it is correct that an antecedent entitlement to assume the reliability of 
perception is necessary to get past the disjunction and be justified in believing that I 
am genuinely perceiving that p , that leaves open whether that antecedent entitlement 
is also necessary for being justified in believing that p . For I  am genuinely perceiving  
that p  and p  are distinct propositions and so one should not expect the conditions for 
being justified in believing the former to be the same as the conditions for being 
justified in believing the latter. A piece of evidence can justify belief in p  but not 
belief in I  am genuinely perceiving that p , for one might have not done anything to 
check that the evidence is a genuine perceptual episode. The conditions for being 
justified in believing that I am genuinely perceiving that p  outbound the conditions 
for being justified in believing that p. Therefore, in implying that from the fact that 
one needs an antecedent entitlement to be justified in believing that one is genuinely 
perceiving that p  it follows that one needs that entitlement to be justified in believing 
that p , it is Wright who looks to be at risk of falling into a fallacy. We can see more 
clearly what the fallacy is by comparing different formulations he makes of the 
charge of (DW), which he seems to take to be equivalent but which are not. For 
example, he writes:
To recap. In no case can I rationally claim warrants fo r the premises of an 
argument unless I am entitled to take it that all the conditions necessary for 
the reliability of the cognitive functions involved in the acquisition of those 
warrants are met.121
121 Wright 2003: 75. My emphasis.
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Here he is talking about the conditions for rationally claiming that one possesses 
justification fo r p ,122 and claims that among those conditions one must be entitled to 
take it that the relevant cognitive capacities are working reliably. But the role he 
assigns to entitlements is not one as a condition for rationally claiming that one 
possesses justification fo r  p, but rather as a condition for possessing justification fo r  
p. This is explicit in the following passage:
Since the conditions fo r  the possession o f  warrant for a perceptual claim 
which apply in ordinary circumstances.... presuppose an entitlement to 
dismiss the skeptical possibility, there should be no question of a warrant
provided under their auspices being transmissible to the denial that the
• 121skeptical possibility obtains.
We have then two distinct claims, on the one hand that an antecedent entitlement is 
needed to rationally claim that one possesses justification fo r  p , and on the other the 
claim that an antecedent entitlement is needed to possess justification fo r  p . There 
might be some plausibility in the first claim, for it may be argued that in claiming 
that one possesses justification for p one somehow implies that the conditions for that 
possession are fulfilled, and so one is justified in claiming what one does only if one 
has an antecedent warrant for assuming that such conditions are indeed fulfilled. But 
from this it does not follow that the envisaged warrant (entitlement) is also needed 
for possessing the justification for p. For the conditions for rationally claiming that 
one possesses justification for p  outbound the conditions for having a justification for 
p , a subject can fulfill the latter without fulfilling the former. Thus, if Wright is 
implicitly inferring that the antecedent entitlement is necessary for possessing 
justification for p  from the claim that it is necessary for rationally claiming that one 
possesses justification for p , he is committing a special case of the fallacy: “W is
122 See also this passage:
...I  must have some sort o f  appreciable entitlement to affirm C already, independent and 
prior to my recognition o f  its entailment by [the premises], if  1 am to claim to be warranted  
in accepting \p\ in the first place. The inference from [the premises] to C is thus not at the 
service o f  cogently generating conviction that C, and my warrant does not transmit. (2002: 
343. Emphasis moved). Compare with 2003: 63.
Although the words ‘rationally’ or ‘justifiably’ don’t appear attached to ‘claim to be warranted’, it is 
obvious that here he is conceiving the antecedent entitlement as a condition for rationally claiming 
that, and not merely for uttering the words involved in the claim.
I2j Wright 2002: 345. Emphasis moved.
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necessary to justifiably claim that one has justification for p , therefore W is necessary 
for having justification for p ”.
In his argumentation for a first-level dependence of justification for the 
premises of an argument on an antecedent entitlement for its conclusion Wright 
switches to a second-level dependence of justification to claim that one has 
justification for the premises of the argument on an antecedent entitlement for its 
conclusion. The first-level dependence is just (DW) and inferring it from the second- 
level dependence would be fallacious. At the beginning of our discussion we 
indicated that in line with the relevant literature we assume that (DW) is sufficient 
for transmission-failure. Could it be that the second-level dependence into which 
Wright slips is also sufficient for transmission-failure? If that were so Wright’s 
failure to present a cogent case for charging the arguments with (DW) would be 
relatively inconsequential, for he could retreat to a charge of the second-level 
dependence which would engender the same epistemic vice.
Let us have a clear formulation of the second-level dependence that Wright 
ends up ascribing to the arguments, we will call it (DW2):
An argument exhibits (DW2) if and only if having independent warrant for its 
conclusion is necessary to justifiably claim that one has justification for its 
premises.
Sometimes Wright writes as if (DW2) does engender transmission-failure. Thus he 
says:
Very simply, a warrant, w, for a belief, p , cannot transmit to any of its 
consequences, C, if -in context- one would need an entitlement (earned or 
standing) to C in order to defend the claim that conditions for the acquisition 
of w were satisfied. That is the common pattern of all our examples.12
On a charitable interpretation we can take ‘defending the claim that /?’ as implying 
that one has a justification for the claim that p. Then, Wright is effectively saying 
here that an independent entitlement for the conclusion of the argument is needed to 
justify the claim that one has justification for the premises, and that this is sufficient 
for transmission-failure; in short, he is saying that (DW2) suffices for transmission-
124 Wright 2002: 345. My emphases.
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failure. Why should we accept this? Recall that the intuitive basis for the claim that 
(DW) suffices for transmission-failure is that when an argument exhibits (DW) the 
justification for its premises cannot become a warrant for the conclusion because the 
justification for the premises has been acquired only courtesy of an independent 
warrant for the conclusion. Nothing similar holds for the claim that (DW2) suffices 
for transmission-failure. When an argument exhibits (DW2) the independent warrant 
for the conclusion is at the service of a justification for the claim that one has 
justification for the premises, not at the service of having a justification for the 
premises. The independent warrant enables one to acquire a justification for the 
claim that one has a justification for the premises, not to acquire that justification for 
the premises. Then, whether or not that independent warrant obtains has, by itself, no 
implication on whether or not one has justification for the premises, and so if one 
does have justification for the premises and one reasons competently there’s no 
reason to think that one will not acquire warrant for the conclusion. Intuitively, 
(DW2) does not suffice for transmission-failure.
Wright’s attempts to support his charge of (DW) against the arguments he 
considers do not succeed. In arguing that an antecedent entitlement is needed to get 
past merely tentative disjunctions of the first premises of the arguments with 
deceptive states, he seems to infer fallaciously the claim that the arguments exhibit 
(DW), which concerns the conditions for having justification for the premises, from 
the claim that they exhibit (DW2), which concerns the conditions for having a 
justification for claiming that one has justification for the premises. He cannot retreat 
and claim that even if the arguments do not exhibit (DW), they do exhibit (DW2), for 
there’s no intuitive basis for accepting that (DW2) is sufficient for transmission- 
failure. We’ve assumed that (DW) does indeed suffice for transmission-failure, but 
Wright fails to show that the arguments exhibit it; even if (DW2) is exhibited by the 
arguments, there’s no reason to suppose that it produces transmission-failure. His 
attempts to justify charging the arguments with transmission-failure do not succeed.
(TRA) possesses the features that Wright exploits in his charge of (DW) 
against the arguments he discusses. First, the conclusion of (TRA) expresses a 
condition for the reliable operation of the cognitive capacities and thereby, given 
veritism, for the justification of the premises. Second, the situation in which (TRA)’s
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conclusion is true, and thus one genuinely possesses justification for its premises, is 
subjectively indistinguishable from a perfectly deceptive situation which is 
nonetheless incompatible with the truth of (TRA)’s conclusion; and thus 
incompatible with one genuinely possessing justification for its premises. Given that 
(TRA) has the relevant features, a charge of (DW) exactly parallel to the one Wright 
makes against (ZEBRA) and (RED) is constructible. The claim would be that an 
antecedent entitlement to discount possibilities H, which are subjectively 
indistinguishable from but incompatible with the situation where perceptual 
capacities are reliable, is necessary for the justification for the premises. As before, 
the argument for this claim would trade on a confusion between conditions necessary 
for rationally claiming that one possesses justification for p  and the conditions 
necessary for possessing a justification for p. The argument for the charge would 
then be fallacious. A retreat to (DW2) would be ineffectual here too, for with respect 
to (TRA) the hypothesis that (DW2) suffices for transmission-failure also lacks 
intuitive plausibility.
If Wright’s charge is successful against the arguments he discusses it would 
be successful against (TRA), for the elements grounding the charge are present in 
both. We have argued that his charge against the arguments he discusses fails, 
therefore a hypothetical parallel charge against (TRA) would also fail.
II. 4. 2. The Effects of Doubting and Their Explanation
Let’s move on to M. Davies’ reasons for charging an argument with (DW). Davies is 
not very explicit about his reasons for charging an argument with (DW); so in his 
case we will have to do some digging to extract his reasons.
Like Wright, Davies also thinks that (DW) suffices for transmission-failure, 
and like him he also conceives the independent warrant on which the justification for 
the premises of the targeted arguments depends as a default entitlement.125 He thinks 
that our ability to engage in ‘epistemic projects’ where we seek for and obtain 
evidence for certain propositions, depends on our being entitled to certain 
background assumptions. 126 Each ‘epistemic project’ may require different
125 Davis 2003:28-29.
126 On Davies’ notion o f ‘assumption’ see footnote 116 and the text it is attached to.
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background assumption. To take an example we’ve been discussing, a background 
assumption for the project of determining the color of objects through casual 
observation is that our color vision’s reliability is not frustrated in certain ways, for 
example by tricky lighting conditions. Our ability to obtain perceptual justification 
for propositions about the color of objects depends then on our being entitled to that 
background assumption.127 Davies calls the justification which depends on such 
entitlement ‘question-settling justifications’. Now, the conclusion of (RED) is 
precisely the claim that one of those backgrounds assumptions obtains, for this 
reason we cannot ‘redeploy’ the question-settling justifications, which we marshaled 
courtesy our entitlement to that assumption, as a question-settling justification to 
believe the assumption itself:
....because I am entitled to the background assumption, I do have an 
epistemically adequate question-settling justification for believing the
premise.... But even given my appreciation of the entailment [from premises 
to conclusion], I cannot redeploy that justification for believing the premise 
as a question-settling justification for believing the conclusion.
In other words, because the targeted argument exhibits (DW) the justification for its 
premises fails to transmit to its conclusion.
What reason does Davies offer to charge an argument with (DW)? Like
Wright, Davies is more interested in spelling out the consequences of that charge
rather than in arguing for it. That makes it hard to see if he is actually giving any 
reasons to support the charge. But I believe his views about the general conditions 
where transmission-failure occurs suggest that he assumes that doubting the
conclusion of a putative case of transmission-failure has certain effects because the 
targeted argument exhibits (DW). We will discuss what those effects are and whether 
explaining them supports charging the arguments with (DW), as Davies seems to 
suppose.
127 Davies faces similar problems to the ones we described for Wright in specifying the range o f  
propositions that one may be entitled to in their special sense. Does the practice o f  determining the 
colour o f  objects through casual observation require us to be entitled to assume anything as specific as 
that there’s not tricky red lighting or merely that our colour vision is generally reliable? And if  only 
the former, how to go from there to the demand for the more specific entitlement, as the (DW ) charge 
implies?
128 Davies 2003: 29-30, see also 35.
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According to Davies transmission-failure is the solipsistic counterpart of the
1
dialectical phenomenon of begging the question. In a dialectical scenario:
The speaker begs the question against the hearer if the hearer’s doubt 
rationally requires him to adopt background assumptions relative to which the 
considerations that are supposed to support the speaker’s premises no longer
130provide that support.
For example, suppose that I try to convince you that the wall behind you is red by 
bringing you to see it with a naked eye. In Davies’ view the method I’m suggesting 
will be effective in yielding justification and so in convincing you only given an 
entitlement to assume that our vision’s reliability is not frustrated in certain ways. So, 
if you have a standing doubt that our vision could be operating unreliably in some of 
those ways your doubt would ‘rationally require’ you to abandon the assumption that 
is necessary to obtain perceptual justification in the present case; for you cannot 
rationally both doubt and assume that our vision’s reliability is not frustrated in 
certain ways. By changing the background assumptions that you can and cannot 
make your doubt stops the method I suggest (i.e. casual observation) from delivering 
evidence that supports the claim that the wall is red. In these circumstances invoking 
the method to support the claim that the wall is red begs the question, in Davies sense.
In Davies’ view transmission-failure is the analogue of that dialectical 
phenomenon within the thought of one single subject. It is hard to see how this can 
be the case. As Davies understands it, begging the question occurs when a standing 
doubt reshapes the set of assumptions a hearer is entitled to make; relative to the 
reshaped set his perceptual experiences don’t provide him with justification to 
believe propositions about the color of objects, for the doubt has ruled out from that 
set an assumption which is a necessary condition for perceptual experiences to give 
any justification for such propositions. Therefore, an argument, whose premises are 
to be justified by perceptual experience, will not settle his doubt about whether the 
reliability of his visual perception is frustrated in certain ways, for his doubt rules out 
a necessary condition for his perceptual experience to give him any perceptual 
justification. The epistemic failure of a question-begging argument, as Davis 
understands it, is that there’s no justification for the premises to be transmitted to its
U9 Davies 2003:36.
lj0 Ibid.: 41. He adopts this conception o f  question beggingness as a dialectical phenomenon from 
Jackson 1987.
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conclusion, or as he puts it, that “the considerations that are supposed to support the 
speaker’s premises no longer provide that support”.131 But this is not the kind of 
epistemic vice labeled as ‘transmission-failure’. Transmission-failure occurs when 
one has justification for the premises and one competently reasons to a conclusion, 
but one fails to thereby acquire warrant for the conclusion. This cannot be analogous 
to a case of question-begging, for in this there is a doubt that robs the hearer from his 
perceptual justification to believe the premises, and so one has no justification to be 
transmitted to the conclusion via competent reasoning.
After mentioning a case where there are ‘question-settling justifications’ for 
the premises of an argument but they fail to transmit to its conclusion, Davies says:
The reason for this nontrasmission of question-settling warrant is that the 
thinker’s operative considerations amount to epistemically adequate 
justifications for believing the premises only against the background of 
certain assumptions that the thinker is entitled to make.132
Given that one of such background assumptions is the conclusion of the argument 
itself, this is tantamount to say that the failure of transmission of justification is due 
to the argument exhibiting (DW). But then he goes on to say:
... a doubt about the truth of the conclusion would rationally require the
thinker to adopt different background assumptions relative to which the
operative considerations would no longer amount to epistemically adequate
justifications for believing the premises. The proposal is that, in such a case,
the thinker cannot consistently make use of the original background
assumptions within the context of an epistemic project that begins with the • 1 thinker regarding the question of the truth of the conclusion as open.
This might be true, but again it is a different phenomenon from transmission-failure. 
It might be true that a doubt about the truth of (RED)’s conclusion would block our 
ability to obtain perceptual justification for its first premise, and so within the 
‘epistemic project’ where we are trying to settle that doubt we could not rationally 
rely on the background assumption that would otherwise enable us to obtain 
perceptual justification. But this is different from the case where we do have
ljl Davies 2003: 41 .
132 Ibid.: 42-43.
133 Ibid.: 43.
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justification for the premises of (RED) but we fail to obtain a warrant for its 
conclusion by reasoning from the premises.134
Nevertheless, there seems to be a connection between transmission-failure
and question-beggingness, as Davis understands it. It seems that when there is a
doubt about the conclusion of an argument that is a putative  case of transmission-
failure it becomes a case of begging the question. Such is the effect of doubting the
conclusion of a putative case of transmission-failure. We can now ask if explaining
this effect of doubting the conclusion of an argument requires us to charge it with
1(DW), as Davies seems to suppose. Here, there really are two questions. First, 
whether doubting the conclusion of the relevant arguments can have the effects that 
Davies supposes, and secondly, whether explaining those effects requires charging 
the arguments with (DW).
Recall that the alleged effects of doubting the conclusions of the targeted 
arguments are that perceptual experiences stop supplying justification  for the 
premises and that the argument is of no use to convince the doubter or to rationally 
settle his doubt. Can doubting the conclusion have these effects? This is a difficult 
question to answer because Davies does not seem to consider that doubts can 
themselves be justified or unjustified, and whether they are one or the other is crucial 
for assessing their epistemic effects. In order to answer our first question then we 
need first to distinguish the potential effects of doubts depending on their epistemic 
status. For this purpose we will use some recent work of J. Pryor’s. He distinguishes 
one being rational in believing that p  from one having justification  to believe that p. 
One is rational in believing that p  if “none of your other beliefs or doubts rationally 
oppose or rationally obstruct you from believing /?”.136 A belief q rationally opposes 
another belief p  if justification for q would be a reason against p \ and a belief q 
rationally obstructs another belief p  if justification for q would undermine your 
grounds for believing p. The point of defining these relations in the subjunctive mode 
(‘would be’) is to allow for them to hold even when one does not have justification to
1,4 Beebee 2001: 257 also notes that question-begging, as Davies understands it, is not the same 
phenomenon as transmission-failure.
Ij5 The two quotations from Davies at page 92, which split one single paragraph, suggest that this is 
how Davies views things. In the first one he says that the fact that an argument exhibits (DW) explains 
that it suffers from transmission-failure, since he assimilates transmission-failure to question- 
beggingness, the second quotation -which describes what happens when an argument begs the 
question- is meant to gloss over further facts that are also to be explained by the argument exhibiting 
(DW).
136 Pryor 2004: 364.
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believe q. So a belief q can rationally oppose or obstruct another belief p  even if one 
lacks justification to believe q. If unjustified beliefs and doubts can rationally oppose 
or obstruct belief in p  and thereby prevent one from being rational in believing p, 
then being rational is different from having a justification ; since one’s having a 
justification cannot be prevented by unjustified doubts one may have:
A subject can have some justification  to believe P, but be unable to rationally 
believe P on the basis of that justification, because of some (unjustified) 
beliefs and doubts he also has. Consider your belief that your color vision is 
defective. Suppose that this belief is unjustified (but you don’t realize it). 
Because you don’t have justification  to doubt your color vision, I don’t think 
the justification you get from your color experience will be undermined. 
You’ll still have justification  to believe the wall is red. But your actual doubt 
will rationally obstruct you from relying on your color experiences.
Unjustified beliefs and doubts can prevent one from being rational in believing that p, 
but do not prevent one from having justification  to believe that p; they do not have 
undermining effect upon whatever justification one has for believing p . But justified 
beliefs and doubts would prevent one not only from being rational in believing p  but 
also from having a justification for p , for in such a case the justifications for the 
beliefs and doubts would act as defeaters of one’s justification to believe p.
For our purposes it will be useful to bring in a further distinction that Pryor 
makes between having justification to believe p  and having a belief  that is justified. 
A condition for the later, but not for the former, is that one is rational in believing p, 
in the sense explained above:
Suppose you believe P on the basis of what are in fact good reasons for 
believing P. But you also have doubts that rationally oppose P, or rationally 
obstruct you from believing P for the reasons you do. Those doubts will 
render your belief in P irrational even if they don’t affect your justification to 
believe it. And if your belief in P is irrational, then it can’t be a justified or 
well-founded belief. In this way, then, even unjustified doubts can affect what
1 T&justified beliefs you’re able to have.
Since justified beliefs and doubts also make one irrational in believing p, it follows 
that both justified and unjustified beliefs and doubts prevent one from being rational 
in believing p  and thereby from being justified in believing p; but only justified
™ Pryor 2004:365. 
Ij8 Ibidem.
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beliefs and doubts prevent one from having a justification for p, because the 
justification for those beliefs and doubts would act as a defeater of one’s justification 
for p.
With these distinctions in hand let’s go back to our question. Can a doubt 
about the conclusion of a targeted argument have the effects that Davis assumes it 
has? We must note that the effects he points out are heterogeneous; on the one hand 
he says that the doubt prevents perceptual experiences from supplying justification 
for the premise of the argument; on the other that it renders the argument incapable 
from rationally settling the thinker’s doubts. Now we can see that these are different 
kinds of effects that need not go hand-in-hand. If doubting the conclusion is a mere 
unjustified whim of the thinker then it would not be able to operate as a defeater for 
whatever justification his perceptual experiences may be giving him to believe the 
premise of the argument, there’s no reason why we should suppose that such a doubt 
would prevent perceptual experiences from supplying any justification for the 
premise. Such unjustified doubt, however, could have the other type of effect that 
Davies mentions; it could rationally obstruct the thinker from believing the premise 
of the argument on the basis of his perceptual experiences and therefore impede him 
from using the argument to settle his doubt. Therefore, in the presence of (even an) 
unjustified doubt the argument would be unable to move him to rational conviction 
of its conclusion or to rationally settle his doubt. Unjustified doubts about the 
conclusion can have the second but not the first kind of effect that Davies describes.
Justified doubts, on the other hand, would not only rationally obstruct one 
from accepting the premise on the basis of one’s perceptual experiences and in that 
way render the argument incapable of rationally settling one’s doubt, but they would 
also act as defeaters of whatever justification one’s perceptual experiences give one 
for believing the premise of the argument. Justified doubts about the conclusion of 
the argument can have the two types of effects that Davies describes.
Let’s move now to our second question. Does explaining these effects of
doubting the conclusion of one of the targeted arguments require charging them with
1
(DW)? We think the answer to this is negative. Consider first the effects of 
justified doubts. They prevent one’s perceptual experiences from conferring
1,9 In the terminology o f  (II.3) those effects are different vices that infect an argument relative to a 
context o f  doubt. Those vices are what Davies calls question-beggingness. The question we will 
address now is whether explaining such question begging vices requires us to ascribe (DW) to the 
infected arguments.
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justification upon one’s belief in the first premise because the doubt, or more 
precisely the justification for those doubts, acts as a defeater of whatever justification 
perceptual experiences may provide for believing the first premise. But this defeating 
power of justified doubts is sufficiently explained by supposing that the argument in 
question exhibits (DT). For if the truth of the conclusion is necessary for having 
justification for the premise of the argument then it is an elementary fact of epistemic 
defeat that evidence that undermines the conclusion, i.e. that justifies a doubt about it, 
is ipso facto a defeater for the justification for the premise of the argument. The 
effects of justified doubts about the conclusion can be explained without charging the 
argument with (DW).
The same holds for the shared effect of unjustified and justified doubts. An 
unjustified doubt could rationally obstruct one from believing the premise of the 
argument on the basis of one’s perceptual experiences, and thereby render the 
argument incapable of moving one to rational conviction of its conclusion. This 
again can be explained by charging the argument with (DT). To say that an 
unjustified doubt rationally obstructs belief in the first premise on the basis of 
perceptual experience is to say that if the doubt were justified, its justification would 
undermine the perceptual grounds on the basis of which one believes the premise. As 
explained above, this undermining effect can be explained by ascribing (DT) to the 
argument; consequently the obstructing effect of unjustified doubts can also be 
explained by that ascription, since such effect is itself defined in terms of what the 
effects of the doubt would be were it justified. The effects of unjustified doubts about 
the conclusion can be explained without charging the argument with (DW).
Davies thinks that transmission-failure is the analogue within the thought of 
one single subject of the dialectical phenomenon of begging the question. Taken 
strictly this claim is false. Nevertheless, doubting the conclusion of a putative case of 
transmission-failure seems to render it into a case of begging the question, as Davies 
understands it. Since (DW) explains why an argument suffers from transmission- 
failure, Davies seems to suppose that (DW^ ) is also required to explain the effects of 
doubting the argument’s conclusion. It is not. Those effects are heterogeneous, they 
vary depending on the epistemic status of the doubts, but none of them requires 
charging the argument with (DW); they are sufficiently explained by the hypothesis 
that the arguments exhibit (DT). If Davies is putting forward the effects of doubting
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the conclusions of the targeted arguments as evidence for thinking that they exhibit 
(DW), his evidence is insufficient to warrant his charge.
(TRA) possesses the features that make an argument susceptible of Davies’ 
charge of (DW). Doubting (TRA)’s conclusion seems to render it into a case of 
begging the question, as Davies understands it. The doubts, even if unjustified, make 
(TRA) inefficient as a way of moving to rational conviction of the claim that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source; if the doubts are justified they do not 
merely have that dialectical effect but also act as defeaters of whatever perceptual 
justification there might be for the premises of (TRA). But these kinds of effects of 
doubting (TRA)’s conclusion can be sufficiently explained by the hypothesis that it 
exhibits (DT), therefore explaining such effects does not warrant charging (TRA) 
with (DW).
If Davies’ charge is successful against the arguments he discusses it would be 
successful against (TRA), for the elements grounding the charge are present in both. 
We have argued that his charge against the arguments he discusses fails, therefore a 
hypothetical parallel charge against (TRA) would also fail.
II. 5. (DT), Extemalism and Intemalism.
The previous section argued that the best available cases for charging (DW) against 
specific arguments fail to cogently argue for the charge. Then, we lack cogent reason 
to suppose that (TRA) exhibits (DW) and hence that it suffers from transmission- 
failure. This leaves us with the question whether there is any epistemic vice affecting 
(TRA) in virtue of the fact that it exhibits (DT). Recall (DT):
An argument exhibits (DT) if and only if the justification for its premises
depends on what its conclusion asserts.
If (TRA) does not suffer from transmission-failure, then it is difficult to see what 
epistemic vice could infect it in virtue of exhibiting (DT), for if one has justification 
for its premises and one reasons competently one obtains justification for its
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conclusion; (TRA) would seem to be in good order vis-a-vis gaining justification for
its conclusion. Indeed, some philosophers seem to think that the only way an
epistemic dependence of premises on conclusion can make an argument suffer from 
an epistemic vice is by making it suffer from transmission-failure. Alston seems to 
suggest this when he writes:
...the crucial requirement for S’s being justified by [the premises] in
accepting [the conclusion] is that justificatory status be transferred from the
belief in [the premises] to the belief in [the conclusion] 140
Epistemic dependence (DW) does interfere with that “crucial requirement”, for it 
implies that justificatory status is not transferred from premises to conclusion. But 
(DT) does not interfere with the transmission of justification from premises to 
conclusion. It is true, as we have seen, that in the presence of a suitable background 
of doubt an argument that exhibits (DT) could indeed suffer from various vices, 
some epistemic and some merely dialectical; but (DT) on its own is insufficient to 
bring them about.
If (TRA) is in good order vis-a-vis gaining justification for its conclusion, 
could (DT) make it suffer from any epistemic vice? It has been suggested that (DT) 
by itself doesn’t engender any epistemic vice, that an argument may exhibit it and be 
epistemically perfectly respectable. Here are some illustrations of the point:
(A)(AO) Whoever believes he exists is justified in so believing.
(Al) I believe I exist.
(A2) So I’m justified in believing I exist.
(A3) So there are at least some cases of people having justification.141 
(B)
(BO) I am conscious.
(Bl) So somebody is conscious.142
Alston 1986: 17. My emphasis.
141 Taken from Pryor 2004: 358-359, with a small modification on premise (AO).
142 Davis 1998: 352.
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(A) and (B) do exhibit (DT): one has justification for their premises only if what their 
conclusions assert is true, and (A) and (B) are epistemically in good order, for they 
are perfectly good ways to gain justification for their conclusions. We don’t see how 
(DT) could interfere with obtaining justification for the conclusion of an argument 
that exhibits it.
Could then the veritistic philosopher safely conclude that (TRA) confers 
justification to believe its conclusion? That we have justification to believe that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source? No, for it is one thing to say that the 
conditions for (TRA) to confer justification are indeed fulfilled and a different, 
weaker thing to say that (DT) does not interfere with those conditions. Even if one 
knows that (DT) does not interfere with those conditions, it’s still an open question 
whether the conditions are fulfilled. The problem we want to investigate concerns 
this latter question, whether the veritistic philosopher can know that (TRA) fulfils the 
conditions to confer justification on its conclusion. Section (II.6) argues that there’s 
an obstacle for the possibility of answering this question satisfactorily. But in order 
to explain what that obstacle is we first need to have clear in focus what are the 
conditions that (TRA) has to fulfil in order to confer justification on its conclusion.
We’ll call ‘self-support argument’ an argument, like (TRA), that relies on a 
given belief-source to show that it is truth-conducive. Veritism imposes restrictions 
on the conditions a self-support argument has to fulfil to confer justification on its 
conclusion, in particular it entails that the truth-conducivity of the belief-source 
mentioned in the conclusion is necessary for having justification for the premises. 
This is a consequence of a truth-conducive constraint on perceptual justification. But 
the presence of a truth-conducive constraint leaves open whether anything else is 
needed for the argument to confer justification. In our discussion of how one can 
answer the question whether (TRA) indeed satisfies the conditions to give 
justification for its conclusion we will divide up the possibilities concerning what 
those conditions could be according to the role that truth-conducivity can play in 
them. There are four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ways in which the 
truth-conducivity of a perceptual belief-source may be constitutively related to the 
justification for the beliefs it produces:
1. Truth-conducivity is necessary and sufficient for their prima facie justification
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2. Truth-conducivity is necessary but insufficient for their prima facie justification
3. Truth-conducivity is unnecessary but sufficient for their prima facie justification
4. Truth-conducivity is unnecessary and insufficient for their prima facie justification
Any proposal about the conditions for a self-support argument, like (TRA), to give 
justification for its conclusion will fall in one of these possibilities. We will enquire 
if answering the question whether (TRA) indeed satisfies the conditions for giving 
justification for its conclusion becomes more or less problematic depending on 
whether one conceives those conditions according to each of those abstract 
possibilities.
Option (1) corresponds to what we might call ‘crude extemalism’, whereas 
options (2)-(4) are typically uphold as part of views we might call ‘crude intemalism’. 
Such crude positions allow for refinement, but the core of the refined positions 
would still be determined by the attitude taken towards the role that the truth- 
conducivity of S’s sources can play in the constitution of epistemic justification for 
S”s beliefs. This usage of the terms ‘intemalism’ and ‘extemalism’ may not 
correspond to some current in the literature, but in the next chapter we will see that 
so drawn the distinction usefully classifies important current positions according to 
the role they assign to the veritistic condition of truth-conducivity in the constitution 
of justification. We will now briefly illustrate the kind of position that typically 
corresponds to each of the options (l)-(4).
Crude extemalism, option (1), regards truth-conducivity as necessary and 
sufficient for prima facie justification. A widely discussed feature of truth- 
conducivity as a condition deemed to be necessary and sufficient for prima facie 
justification is that the subject of the justification can fulfil it without knowing, or 
even believe, that he has fulfilled it. Conceptually undeveloped infants and 
unreflective subjects provide the clearest examples of how this is possible. A three 
year old child whose perceptual systems work in a perfectly reliable manner can 
fulfil the truth-conducivity condition for having prima facie justification for various 
perceptual beliefs, but he is incapable of knowing that those beliefs are the outcome 
of a truth-conducive belief-source simply because he lacks the concepts ‘belief- 
source’ and 'truth-conducive’. An unreflective adult under practical pressures could 
also fulfil the externalist condition for having justification for certain perceptual
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beliefs, even though he doesn’t do anything to check on the truth-conducivity of his 
perceptual sources and doesn’t even devote a thought to the matter. Conceptually 
sophisticated and reflective individuals would be able to wonder about the truth- 
conducivity of their belief-sources and enquire on the matter, but of them it’s still 
true that they can fulfil the truth-conducivity condition without knowing that they do, 
for they could not wonder, not enquire or not succeed in their enquiry. We could say 
that the truth-conducivity condition is one that can be fulfilled blindly, in the sense 
that one is able to fulfil it without knowing that one has. Crude extemalism does not 
deny that the justified individual could come to know that the truth-conducivity 
condition obtains in a particular case; it only denies that knowing that the condition 
obtains is a condition for the subject to be justified.
Views can oppose crude extemalism by denying the sufficiency, the necessity 
or both of a truth-conducivity condition for justification. These are the above 
possibilities (2), (3) and (4) respectively. Option (3), which denies the necessity but 
accepts the sufficiency of a truth-conducivity condition for justification, has no 
representatives in the literature; we will then leave it on the side. That leaves us with 
option (2), which accepts the necessity but denies the sufficiency of a truth- 
conducivity condition for justification, and option (4), which denies both the 
necessity and the sufficiency of a truth-conducivity condition. Because (2) and (4) 
coincide in denying the necessity of a truth-conducivity condition, when discussing 
option (4) we will concentrate on what is distinctive of it, i.e. its negation of the 
sufficiency of a truth-conducivity condition. In this way we are left with two broad 
types of views that oppose extemalism: those that deny the sufficiency of a truth- 
conducivity condition for justification and those that deny its necessity. Views of the 
former kind deny the sufficiency of a truth-conducivity condition by imposing a 
further condition on justification under the form of a second-level epistemic 
requirement (in a sense to be explained below); views of the latter kind deny the 
necessity of a truth-conducivity condition and replace it by a condition which 
supervenes on the intrinsic constitution of the subject of the justification. A view that 
opposes crude extemalism in either of these two ways will be labelled ‘crude 
intemalism’.
Forms of crude intemalism that deny the necessity of a truth-conducivity 
condition for justification attempt to replace it with a type of condition which
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allegedly supervenes on some aspect of the internal constitution of the justified 
individual, for example on those of his internal states to which he has a special kind 
of cognitive access.143 A truth-conducivity condition does not supervene on the 
internal constitution of the justified individual. For example, in an unfavourable 
environment the truth-conducivity of a belief-source can vary without there being 
any change in the intrinsic constitution of the subject. We noted that a truth- 
conducivity condition can be blindly fulfilled, in the sense that one can fulfil it 
without knowing that one has. Some of the internal conditions that the present kind 
of intemalism puts in place of truth-conducivity are thought to be different from it in 
this respect, for they are thought to be such that if one fulfils them then one knows 
one has or at least one is strongly positioned to know that one has. For example, if a 
condition necessary for one’s having justification for p is that one is in states Ei, E2 
and E3, which one has access to by introspection alone, then if one fulfils that 
condition one is in a position to know one does.144 A complication arises from the 
fact that one can know by introspection alone that one is in states Ej, E2 , E3 without 
knowing by introspection alone that being in those states constitutes the fulfilment of 
the condition necessary for justification, maybe because one lacks the relevant 
concepts to conceptualise one’s introspected states in that way. When this is the case 
it would seem that one could fulfil the internalist condition without knowing that one 
has. The internalist could reply that by fulfilling the condition one knows that one 
has at least under some description, say as the condition being in sates Ei, E2, 
even if not as fulfilling the conditions necessary fo r  justification. This is still 
controversial. Timothy Williamson has recently argued that there aren’t any non­
trivial conditions whose occurrence puts one in a position to know that they occur, let 
alone imply that one actually knows that they occur.145 According to Williamson 
even conditions such as feeling cold  are such that one can be in them without being 
in a position to know that one is them. If his arguments are correct they would imply 
that the internalist conditions for justification can be fulfilled blindly, in the present 
terminology; in that respect they would not be different from the truth-conducivity 
condition that they aim to replace.
14j Internalist views o f  this sort are discussed in (III. 1.2).
144 This phrase assumes a natural reading o f'a cc ess’ in which it entails knowing.
145 Williamson 2000: Ch. 4.
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Whether there’s a contrast between the truth-conducivity condition and its 
internalist replacements in terms of one’s being able to fulfil the former, but not the 
latter, blindly is not crucial for our purposes. The contrast that is crucial for us is 
uncontroversial. The externalist view constitutes a veritistic epistemology to the 
extent that it accepts a truth-conducive constraint on justification; the internalist who 
denies the necessity of a truth-conducivity condition for justification is effectively 
lifting any such constraint on justification; hence this form of intemalism constitutes 
a non-veritistic epistemology. In (III. 1) we examine whether non-veritistic 
approaches of this sort can help in overcoming the obstacle for the project of 
showing that we are justified in accepting epistemic principles that will be discussed 
in (II.6).
The other type of approach under the label ‘crude internalist’ does not deny 
the necessity but the sufficiency of truth-conducivity. Internalists of this sort argue 
that fulfilling a truth-conducivity condition is not enough by itself to make the 
individual justified; they argue that fulfilment of further conditions is also necessary. 
Those further conditions standardly consist of second-level epistemic states that have 
the fulfilment of a truth-conducivity condition as its object. An example of such a 
condition for having justification for p  would be that one knows that one’s belief inp  
is the outcome of a truth-conducive belief-source. This knowledge is knowledge 
about one’s belief fulfilling a condition of epistemic significance, in that sense it’s a 
second-level epistemic requirement.146
Among the internalists that deny the sufficiency of a truth-conducivity 
condition for justification, some do not couch the second-level requirement they 
want to impose in terms of knowledge but of some other positive epistemic status or 
quality. For instance, one such internalist could say that if the subject is to have 
justification for belief in p  he needs to have a justified belief that his belief in p is the 
outcome of a truth-conducive belief-source. The fact that a second-level requirement 
in the style that these internalists seek to impose can be couched in terms of different 
positive epistemic qualities makes it hard to classify some views. For example, the 
Wright-Davies view discussed in (II. 4) above can be seen as imposing a second- 
level requirement on epistemic justification in terms of the positive epistemic quality
146 Internalist views o f  this sort are discussed in (III.2).
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they call ‘entitlement’. In their view in order for a subject to have perceptual 
justification for believing p  it is not sufficient that his perceptual beliefs are the 
outcome of a truth-conducive belief-source, he also needs to be entitled to assume 
that his belief-source is truth-conducive. It is clear that for them this entitlement is a 
positive epistemic status and that what they mean by ‘assuming’ is some form of 
doxastic attitude. Thus his view imposes a second-level requirement on epistemic 
justification. However, the default nature of that entitlement contrasts with the 
prototypes of internalist second-level requirements we are considering here. For 
these typically are, to use Davies’ terminology, cognitive achievements, i.e. 
something achieved through a piece of enquiry (even if it is as simple as 
introspecting one’s own mental states) and not a default background presupposition 
of enquires.
But despite this difference the structural similarity between the Wright- 
Davies view and the sort of intemalism under discussion is striking: both make 
perceptual justification depend on the fulfilment of a second-level epistemic 
requirement. In particular, both their view and its internalist relative have the effect 
of rendering arguments that typify self-support, like (TRA), cases of transmission- 
failure. For if in order to have justification for the premises of (TRA) one needs to 
know or have justification to believe that one’s perceptual sources are truth- 
conducive, then one cannot gain justification for (TRA)’s conclusion by competently 
reasoning from its justified premises, for the justification for the premises is in place 
only if one already knows or has justification to believe (TRA)’s conclusion.
Given that the phenomenon of transmission-failure occurs when there is 
justification for the premises of the argument, the present kind of intemalism has the 
effect of rendering (TRA) a case of transmission-failure only if the relevant second- 
level requirement it imposes on perceptual justification is fulfilled. But recent 
discussion of this type of intemalism emphasises the difficulties in explaining how 
one could fulfil such a condition. If one needs to know or be justified in believing 
that one’s perceptual systems are truth-conducive in order to get any perceptual 
justification through their exercise, and if one can investigate the truth-conducivity of 
one’s perceptual systems only through their own exercise, how can one get started in 
getting the perceptual justification one needs to know or to be justified in believing 
that one’s perceptual systems are truth-conducive? The internalist seems to be 
demanding to be already there in order to get there. It looks as if that internalist
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condition cannot be fulfilled and that it then leads to a form of scepticism concerning 
perceptual justification and knowledge.147 In fact, the Wright-Davies view can be 
seen as an improvement on the kind of intemalism that appears to lead to such 
scepticism, for since the entitlement that Wright and Davies posit is a default 
position there’s no question of how to earn it through a perceptual enquiry, and then 
no intuitive problem of needing it as a fulfilled condition in order to attempt to fulfil 
it. This is a substantial difference between the Wright-Davies view and the 
intemalism that we are comparing it with.
The upshot of this comparison is that at best, i.e. assuming that the internalist 
second-level requirement can be fulfilled, the internalist view has the same effect 
upon self-support arguments, like (TRA), as the Wright-Davies view: it renders them 
cases of transmission-failure. And at worst, i.e. assuming that the second-level 
requirement cannot be fulfilled, the internalist view leads to wholesale scepticism. In 
any case the correctness of an internalist view of the sort in question has disastrous 
consequences for the validation of self-support arguments and so for the project of 
establishing epistemic principles which relies on them. Earlier we argued that Wright 
and Davies fail to soundly argue for the view about the dependence of ordinary 
justification on the fulfilment of their proposed second-level epistemic requirement. 
We will need to explore if their internalist relatives have better arguments for their 
own versions of that kind of view. If they do, the project we are examining will be 
doomed, for reasons different from the ones we elaborate in the next section. (III. 2) 
below examines the arguments those internalist offer for their view and how much 
they accomplish.
The previous paragraphs sketch very roughly the basis of a partition of types 
of views where we can locate possible proposals as to the conditions for a self- 
support argument to give justification for its conclusion. We have made the partition 
in terms of the attitude one can take towards the role that a veritistic condition of 
truth-conducivity can play in the constitution of justification. Crude extemalism 
treats fulfilment of a truth-conducivity condition as necessary and sufficient for 
justification, crude intemalism treats it either as unnecessary (and then replaces it for 
a surrogate that supervenes on the internal constitution of the subject) or as
147 See Van Cleve 2003 for discussion o f  what the problem exactly is concerning the fulfilment o f  the 
second-level internalist condition and o f  different ways the internalist could attempt to advert it.
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insufficient (and then imposes a second-level epistemic requirement) for justification. 
As pointed out above the partition we have made does not match distinctions that go 
under the same name in the literature, yet as the next chapter manifest there is 
substantial extensional overlapping between our distinction and others. We underline 
that our rationale for drawing the distinction as we have is that it puts the emphasis 
on the role one assigns to a veritistic condition of truth-conducivity in the 
constitution of justification. This will allow us to appreciate to what extent the 
problem to be described in the next section confronting the philosophical project 
about establishing epistemic principles becomes more or less tractable depending on 
how one treats that veritistic condition for epistemic goods.
II. 6. The Conditional Position Problem.
We have three kinds of approaches to the epistemology of justification in terms of 
how a veritistic condition of truth-conducivity is treated. The options are exhaustive: 
any epistemology of justification will either treat it as necessary and sufficient or as 
at least unnecessary or as at least insufficient. We will discuss how each approach 
fares in dealing with arguments that involve self-support, like (TRA), and the project 
they serve. We will begin with the externalist approach.
Let us recall the basic epistemic principle about perception:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that p , one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
As explained in (II. 1), the explanation of the justification defined by this principle 
requires showing that believing on the basis of perceptual conditions mentioned in 
the antecedent satisfy a truth-conducive constraint. Because showing that p  entails at 
the very least be justified in claiming that /?, in his explanatory task the veritistic 
philosopher seeks to be justified in claiming that
(P) perception is a truth-conducive belief-source.
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(P) is the explanans in the veritistic explanation of the correctness of (EP). The 
problem we want to consider emerges when one tries to answer the question whether 
one is justified in claiming (P). There is a simple reason why the veritistic 
philosopher must answer this question. He believes himself to be in possession of an 
explanation of why one is justified in forming beliefs on the basis of perception, i.e. 
an explanation of why (EP) is correct. The explanation he believes himself in 
possession of says that one is justified in forming beliefs on the basis of perception 
because perception is a truth-conducive belief-source, i.e. because (P). But a theorist 
cannot remain neutral regarding whether he is justified in the explanation he puts 
forward, for if he is putting it forward as an explanation at all he is taking it to be 
justified. In particular, the veritistic philosopher cannot remain neutral as to whether 
he is justified in claiming (P), for if he is putting it forward as an explanation of why 
one is justified in forming beliefs on the basis of perception, he is taking his 
believing (P) to be justified. So, he believes that
(WP) he is justified in claiming (P).
The veritistic philosopher is committed to believing (WP) as a particular case of a 
general commitment any theorist has of regarding his explanations as justified or 
supported by reasons. No theorist can remain neutral or agnostic as to the epistemic 
standing of his explanations, for it is self-defeating to affirm that the explanation of 
an actual phenomenon X  is that W, and then add that one doesn’t know whether one 
is justified in claiming that W. In particular, it is self-defeating to claim that the 
explanation of our actual perceptual justification is (P), and then add that one doesn’t 
know whether one is justified in claiming (P). The veritistic philosopher does believe 
(WP), for he believes that (TRA) gives him justified for (P). The question is whether 
he knows that this is so.
How can the veritistic philosopher know (WP), i.e. that his explanation of our 
perceptual justification is justified? Given that the source of his justification for (P) is 
(TRA), the question whether he knows he’s got justification for (P) is equivalent to 
the question whether he knows that his method, i.e. (TRA), gives him justification to 
believe (P). Because (TRA) does not exhibit (DW),148 it will give one justification 
for its conclusion if two conditions are met: first, that one is justified in believing its
148 As argued on (II. 4) above.
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premises and second, that one reasons competently to its conclusion. In order to 
know that (TRA) gives one justification to believe (P) one must know that one fulfils 
these two conditions. We can assume that one reasons competently from (TRA)’s 
premises to its conclusion, and let’s abbreviate this as ‘(TRA)c o m p ’ . We can assume 
that one knows (TRA) c o m p - This leaves us with the first condition. Given 
extemalism, in order for one to be justified in believing (TRA)’s premises it is 
necessary and sufficient that (P). Therefore, given extemalism, (P) is necessary and 
sufficient for (TRA) c o m p  to give one justification to believe (P). And then, given 
extemalism,
i f  (P) then (TRA)comp gives one justification to believe (P).
So, given that one is aware of one’s endorsement of extemalism one knows that in 
order to know that (TRA) com p gives one justification for (P) it is sufficient for one to 
know (P). Note that there’s no route to knowledge that (TRA) c om p  gives one 
justification to believe (P) that eschews (P), for extemalism entails that (P) is also 
necessary for ( T R A ) com p to give one justification to believe (P). So all routes to that 
knowledge have to go through knowledge of (P).
Does one know, or at least is justified in believing, (P)? One is if one reasons 
competently from (TRA)’s premises and one is justified in believing those premises, 
for (P) is the conclusion of (TRA); but given extemalism one is justified in believing 
the premises of (TRA) i f  (P), which makes the needed justification again conditional 
on (P). Because any evidence one can appeal to in order to try to, as it were, cancel 
out the above conditionalisation is bound to be perceptual, we will always find that 
the evidence does not advance one’s position beyond the merely conditional one that 
one began with: i f  (P) then (TRA)c o m p  gives one justification to believe (P). The 
efficacy of one’s methods to yield knowledge that (P) remains perpetually 
conditional on the truth of (P).
Note that the conditional position the veritistic philosopher cannot get past, 
i.e. if (P), then ( T R A ) com p gives one justification for (P), can be reached apriori, for 
the claim that (P) is sufficient for ( T R A ) c om p  to deliver justification for (P) is a 
consequence of endorsing extemalism with respect to perceptual justification, which 
is a philosophical analysis of justification, not an empirical claim. The veritistic 
philosopher is confined to that position, for any attempt to get past it towards
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knowledge of the unconditional claim that ( T R A ) com p gives one justification for (P) 
uses a method whose epistemic efficacy depends once again on perception’s being a 
truth-conducive belief-source, which only reiterates the conditionality of his position. 
We will call the impossibility of getting past this conditional position the 
“Conditional Position Problem” (CPP).
There’s something evidently unsatisfactory about an epistemic position which 
is conditional in the above way. For the theorist who finds himself in it cannot 
conclude that the explanans of his explanation is justified, but only that it is justified 
if the explanans is true. The conditionality of one’s position carries over from one’s 
explanans to what it is meant to explain, i.e. the correctness of the epistemic principle:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that p, one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
One cannot conclude that one is justified in thinking that (EP) is correct, but only 
that if perception is a truth-conducive belief source then one is justified in thinking 
that (EP) is correct. As a theorist one cannot claim to have explained one’s 
explanandum, but only to have explained it if one’s explanans is in fact the case. The 
position of such a theorist is explanatorily vacuous, if that kind of conditional is the 
most that one’s methods achieve one has not explained what one wanted to explain.
We can see that the conditional position of the externalist is indeed 
explanatorily vacuous by noting that assuming extemalism an exactly parallel 
conditional position can be reached with respect to any belief-source, regardless o f 
its truth-conducivity. For example, take crystal ball gazing as a belief-source and 
allow that the deliverances of particular readings can be used to check the general 
reliability of that belief-source. We can then constmct a track-record argument to 
show that crystal gazing is a truth-conducive belief-source. Let’s call it (TRA*), the 
premises of which are based on crystal gazing. Given extemalism ( T R A * ) comp 
succeeds in justifying that crystal gazing is a tmth-conducive belief-source if crystal 
gazing is in fact a tmth-conducive belief-source, which means that the externalist 
crystal gazer has arrived at the position:
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I f  crystal gazing is a truth-conducive belief-source, then (TRA*)comp gives 
one justification for believing that crystal gazing is a truth-conducive belief- 
source.
This conditional position is exactly parallel to the position reached by the externalist 
philosopher who relies on perception in constructing his philosophical explanation of 
epistemic principles. As with the externalist philosopher the conditionality of the 
position of the crystal gazer would carry over to the explanation of an epistemic 
principle concerning crystal gazing, so that he could only conclude that if crystal 
gazing is truth-conducive then one would be justified in thinking that the relevant 
epistemic principle is correct. Because crystal gazing is a disreputable belief-source 
we will say that unless the externalist philosopher gets past his conditional position 
he is in bad company.149
Some philosophers build into (CPP) elements that we think are inessential to 
the formulation of the problem. In the next paragraphs we try to detach those 
elements from (CPP).
(i) (CPP) arises with respect to knowing that (T R A )com p gives justification for 
believing (P); the problem arises for the veritistic philosopher who is after that 
knowledge. Some philosophers would see with suspicion the idea that the veritistic 
philosopher has a good motivation or rationale to pursue that knowledge as 
something he needs given his theoretical purposes. If he lacks any such rationale the 
impossibility of getting past a conditional position in seeking that knowledge would 
be inconsequential for his project. We think that suspicion regarding his motivation 
here arise primarily from misconceiving it by attaching it to dubious doctrines that in 
reality have nothing to do with his motivation. We will now clear up some of those 
possible misunderstandings.
In the first place, it must be emphasised that the veritistic philosopher’s 
seeking knowledge that (T R A )c o m p  gives justification for believing (P) in not
1491 borrow the term "bad company’ from Boghossian 2001: 11, who uses it to denote the problem 
faced by a philosopher who uses an argument to show that a fundamental rule o f  inference is truth- 
preserving, where such an argument proceeds by taking at least one step in accordance with that very 
rule. If such ‘rule-circular’ arguments are sanctioned as acceptable then parallel arguments can be 
constructed for the claim that disreputable rules o f  inference are truth-preserving. The philosopher 
who sanctions the use o f  such arguments, like the externalist in our discussion, is then in bad 
company. Analogously, because extemalism sanctions as acceptable arguments where a belief-source 
is used to establish it’s own reliability he finds him self in bad company. Alston 1989: 3 and 1993: 17 
regards bad company as a major problem for the externalist.
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motivated by the general assumption that a condition for a method to give 
justification to a subject is that the subject knows that the method gives him 
justification . From such an assumption it would follow as a special case that his own 
method (TRA) will give him justification only if he knows that it does. This would 
be tantamount to imposing an internalist second-level requirement on justification of 
the sort mentioned in (II. 5) above. But (CCP) does not arise out of any such 
internalist idea; it arises from the theoretical need of the veritistic philosopher to 
know that his explanation is justified, which involves knowing that (TRA)c o m p  gives 
justification for believing (P). We are assuming that the veritistic philosopher for 
whom (CPP) arises is an externalist; as such he does not conceptualise that second- 
level knowledge as a condition for (TRA)’s capacity to confer justification on the 
beliefs it leads to. His rationale for seeking that knowledge has nothing to do with 
that internalist view.130
Some philosophers do not see an internalist idea at the beginning of (CCP), as 
motivating the need to know that ( T R A ) com p  does give justification to believe (P), 
but rather, as it were, at the end of (CCP), as something one has to endorse in order 
to judge the position of the externalist philosopher as unsatisfactory. For example, in 
assessing the unsatisfactoriness of reapplying the externalist view at a second-level in 
an attempt to get past (CPP), Stroud draws a moral that encourages a superficial 
dismissal of the problem, he writes:
It is difficult to say precisely what is inadequate about that kind of response, 
especially in terms that would be acceptable to an “externalist”. Perhaps it is 
best to say that the theorist has to see himself as having good reason to 
believe his theory in some sense of “having good reason” that cannot be fully 
captured by an “externalist” account.151
150At some point Sosa 1994: 282 seems to make just this mistaken interpretation in discussing why the 
veritistic philosopher should know that his method affords him with justification, he asks: “Why need 
we see W as reliable in order for its reliability to lend us epistemic justification for using it?” But this 
question is irrelevant, for the veritistic philosopher does not seek knowledge that his method is truth- 
conducive and delivers justification because he takes it to be a condition for us to be justified in using 
it or for its ability to deliver justification. The internalist view Sosa’s question asks about could be 
mistaken and that would have no bearing on the soundness o f  the veritistic philosopher’s rationale for 
seeking knowledge that his method affords him with justification.
151 Stroud 1989: 47.
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Effectively, this invites the superficial response that the formulation of the problem 
begs the question against the externalist, for it relies on a non-extemalist analysis or
152understanding of justification , having reasons or knowledge.
But in describing the unsatisfactoriness of (CCP) we did not rely on any non- 
extemalist assumption. In (II.5) we explained that forms of intemalism divide into 
two broad categories, one that denies the necessity and other that denies the 
sufficiency of truth-conducivity for justification. We can see that neither of these 
types of views is surreptitiously involved in reaching the verdict that the position of 
the externalist is unsatisfactory. In judging (CPP) as an unsatisfactory position the 
key thought has been that it is explanatorily vacuous with respect to our perceptual 
justification; its vacuousness is illustrated by the ease with which it can be replicated 
with respect to the (putative) justification delivered by any other belief-source. But in 
judging that the conditional position of the externalist is explanatorily vacuous we 
have denied neither that truth-conducivity is necessary nor that it is sufficient for 
justification; on the contrary, in describing the bad company that illustrates the 
vacuousness we assumed that the truth-conducivity of the disreputable belief-source 
is necessary and sufficient for its delivering justification. So, we make no internalist 
assumption in judging the conditional position to be an unsatisfactory position.
An internalist premise is presupposed neither as a motivation for the task that 
eventually lands the philosopher in (CPP), nor as a requisite to appreciate the 
unsatisfactoriness of that position. (CPP) arises for an externalist who is consistent 
with his own commitments. Because the problem arises precisely out of a 
thoroughgoing externalist treatment of the kind of self-support typified by (TRA), 
forms of intemalism can indeed be seen as attempts to circumvent (CPP), for they are 
different ways of denying the externalist treatment at the base of the problem. Next 
chapter examines such internalist attempts.
(ii) For some it might look as if the rationale of the veritistic philosopher for 
seeking knowledge that (TRA) c o m p  gives justification fo r  believing (P) can only 
derive from a commitment to pursue the unrealistic goal of validating or justifying
152 Komblith 2004: 190, 198 offers this kind o f  response to (CPP). Compare with Fumerton 1995: 
179-180 who criticises Alston for basing his dissatisfaction with his own externalist treatment o f  
(TRA) also on apparently surreptitiously endorsing a non-extemalist notion o f  justification. See also 
Sosa 1994: 272-274 where he implies that the externalist is judged to be in an unsatisfactory position 
only from an internalist standpoint.
112
the methods he uses in reaching the conclusion (P) and then justifying every premise 
involved in that justification and so on. The result of this task would be that his 
beliefs to the effect that his methods are truth-conducive are what Alston calls “fully 
reflective justified”:
...in seeking “fully reflective assurance” with respect to his belief [that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source], S has committed himself to 
seeking the same for any belief employed in showing [his belief that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source] to be justified, any belief 
employed in showing any of those beliefs to be justified,. . . Let us say that 
when this enterprise has been completed the belief with which we started has 
been “fully reflective justified”.153
But fully reflective justification (FRJ) is an impossible ideal because justification has 
to stop at some point, on pain of infinite regress or vicious circularity:
It is clear that either this quest for FRJ generates an infinite regress and 
cannot succeed for that reason, or at some point it is vitiated by circularity, 
either because we encounter a basic source or because our reasons for a given 
source are obtained from a source we were relying on at an earlier stage. 
Whichever of these possibilities is realized we get the same conclusion that 
FRJ of any principle of reliability is impossible, and hence that FRJ of any 
belief is impossible.154
From this point of view the circularity we have encountered, which produces (CPP), 
emerges for someone in the quest of (FRJ) for the claim that a basic belief-source, 
like perception, is truth-conducive. The problem is a symptom of the impossible, and 
to that extent unreasonable, task we have embarked into. If the problem is impossible 
to overcome that o n ly  shows that (FRJ) is impossible to achieve:
The point is that the impossibility of FRJ is the o n ly  significant implication 
epistemic circularity has for the epistemic status of principles of reliability 
and of our beliefs generally.155
This suggests that nothing of epistemic value beyond (FRJ) is endangered by the 
circularity that produces (CPP), because that circularity becomes problematic only in
153 Alston 1986: 23.
154 Ibid.: 25.
155 Alston 1986: 27. My emphasis.
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the context of the quest for (FRJ). Giving up that impossible quest would be the 
obvious way of avoiding whatever problems it generates.
It must be granted that maybe someone who is engaged in the quest for (FRJ) 
will seek knowledge that (TRA) gives justification for the claim (P), for the first step 
in that quest is to justify by argument the claim that (TRA) meets the conditions for 
giving justification, and if other things are favourable such a justifying argument will 
yield knowledge that (TRA) gives justification to believe (P). But not everyone who 
seeks this knowledge is engaged in the quest for (FRJ). That’s the case of the 
externalist philosopher. After constructing the argument, call it (Ai), to show that 
(TRA) fulfils the conditions to yield justification, the philosopher in the quest for 
(FRJ) is, to use Alston’s words, “still driven by the thirst for reflective assurance., 
[and so]., he wants to know whether he is justified in accepting those premises”,156 
i.e. the premises of (Aj). So he attempts to accomplish that knowledge with a further 
argument, call it (A2), to show that he is justified in believing the premises of (Ai). 
This chain of justifying arguments would go on ad infinitum, but Alston argues that
1 r  7
in fact it quickly falls into logical circularity. What matters here is that the 
externalist philosopher is not committed to set off that chain of reflective arguments, 
because it constitutes an escalation in levels of knowledge, something he has no 
reason to pursue. If circumstances are favourable, argument (Ai) will yield 
knowledge that (TRA) fulfils the conditions to give justification for its conclusion. 
But since (A2) purports to justify the claim that (Ai)’s premises are justified, it will 
yield knowledge that (Ai) fulfils the conditions to yield knowledge that (TRA) fulfils 
the conditions to give justification for its conclusion; or in short, (A2) will yield 
knowledge that one knows, via (Ai), that (TRA) fulfils the conditions to give 
justification for its conclusion. Each justifying argument in the process of (FRJ) will 
add one iteration to one’s knowledge. The externalist philosopher is not after any of 
those iterations of the knowledge that ( T R A ) com p gives justification for (P ) . As we 
pointed out earlier he is interested in that knowledge simply because it is tantamount 
to knowing that his explanation of the relevant epistemic principle is justified. This is 
a special case of the motivation any theorist has to know that his explanation is 
justified and clearly one can have this motivation and lack one to know that one 
knows that one knows...etc... that one’s explanation is justified. The knowledge the
156 Alston 1986:21.
157 Ibid.: 22.
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externalist philosopher seeks is not embedded in the impossible enterprise of a fully 
or ideally reflective agent that attempts to make all his justifications argumentatively 
explicit.158
(iii) Some philosophers think that (CPP) arises only when one asks a question 
in the first-person, about one’s own justification, but parallel question about someone 
else’s justification would not lead one to that problem. Barry Stroud, for example, 
argues that endorsing an externalist theory obstructs one’s ability to understand how 
one’s own knowledge qua externalist theorist comes about. He writes:
Even if this [externalist story] were in fact true, if we didn’t know that it was, 
or if we didn’t have some reason to believe that it was, we would be no 
further along towards understanding our knowledge than we would be if the 
theory were false. So we need some reason to accept a theory of knowledge if 
we are going to rely on that theory to understand how our knowledge is 
possible. That is what I think no form of ‘extemalism’ can give a satisfactory
1 5 9
account of.
The obstacle Stroud sees here for the externalist is essentially (CPP): endorsing the 
externalist theory lands the veritistic philosopher in a merely conditional position 
with respect to whether he knows or is justified in believing the claim that perception 
is a tmth-conducive belief-source. He writes:
‘Extemalism’ implies that if such-and-such is tme in the world, then human 
beings do know things about what the world is like. Applying that conditional 
proposition to ourselves, to our own knowledge of the world, to our own 
knowledge of how that knowledge is acquired, and so on, even when the 
antecedent and so the consequent are in fact both tme, still leaves us always
in the disappointingly second-best position I have tried to illustrate  We
want to be in a position knowingly to detach that consequent about 
ourselves...160
158 Sometimes Alston writes o f  the process o f  fully reflectively justifying a truth-conducivity claim as 
something the philosopher is pushed to as an attempt to overcome (CPP). If Alston is right that the 
process o f  (FRJ) falls into logical circularity that would mean that it offers no successful way o f  
overcoming (CPP). The quest for (FRJ) is neither the motivation o f  the philosopher to seek the 
knowledge that a self-support argument like (TRA) gives justification for its conclusion, nor a 
successful route to overcome the Conditional Position Problem.
159 Stroud 1989:43.
160 Stroud 1994: 305. See also his 1989: 46:
It must be granted that if, in arriving at his theory, he did fulfil the conditions his theory says 
are sufficient for knowing things about the world, then if  that theory is correct, he does in 
fact know that it is. But still, I want to say, he him self has no reason to think that he does
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Stroud takes the explanandum of the externalist to be knowledge, whereas we have 
formulated (CPP) with respect to justification, but clearly he is describing a problem 
exactly parallel to (CPP). The ‘such-and-such’ in the antecedent of Stroud’s 
conditional is the claim that perception is truth-conducive and the consequent is the 
claim that the (perceptual) evidence the externalist uses in his explanation of our 
justification does give him justification. The problem he is referring to is that of 
getting past the conditional and, as he says, knowingly detach the consequent. This is 
(CPP). However, Stroud insists that the problem he is highlighting arises only for the 
externalist philosopher when he attempts to explain his own knowledge or 
justification of the claim that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source; he thinks 
he doesn’t face that problem when he attempts to explain someone else’s mundane 
knowledge:
The difficulty I have in mind does not show up in understanding the 
knowledge which other people, not myself, have about the world. I 
understand other’s knowledge by connecting their beliefs in the right way 
with what I know to be true in the world they live in. I can discover that 
others get their beliefs through the operation of belief-forming mechanisms
which I can see to be reliable But each of us as a theorist of knowledge is
also a human being to whom our theory of knowledge is meant to apply, so 
we must understand ourselves as knowers, just as we understand others.161
But in fact the externalist theory leads to the same conditional position regardless of 
whether one is explaining one’s own perceptual justification to believe that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source or someone else’s perceptual 
justification to believe anything else about the world. For in order to explain 
someone else’s justification the veritistic philosopher has to show that perception is 
truth-conducive; given extemalism that is necessary and sufficient for the targeted 
justification. But the claim that perception is a tmth-conducive belief-source is not 
available for use in the explanation unless the veritistic philosopher is justified in
have good reason to think that his theory is correct. He is at best in the position o f  someone 
who has good reason to believe his theory if  that theory is in fact true....He can see what he 
would  have good reason to believe if  the theory he believes were true, but he cannot see or 
understand him self as knowing or having good reason to believe what his theory says.
161 Stroud 1994: 300. See also 304 and Stroud 1989: 45, 48. Bonjour 2001: 53 also thinks that the 
externalist lands in an unsatisfactory conditional position only when he raises the question o f  the 
justification o f  his own beliefs.
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accepting it, and he knows that he is justified in accepting it i f  (and only if) 
perception is truth-conducive. Any evidence he could appeal to try to get past the 
conditional position he knows himself to be in only creates another instance of the 
same position. In this way his explanation of someone else’s justification reaches the 
same explanatory impasse that he faces in trying to explain his own justification to 
believe that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. Stroud thinks that in 
explaining someone else’s justification one can unproblematically ‘discover’ or ‘see’ 
that the belief-sources of that person are truth-conducive, but these claims are as 
problematic in this case as in one’s own case, for in both cases one discovers the 
truth-conducivity of perception through the use of perception; therefore, given 
extemalism, in both cases one’s position will be the vacuous one of having explained 
the individual’s justification //perception is tmth-conducive.
We have emphasised that the minimal motivation the externalist philosopher 
has to know that (TRA) gives justification for (P) is a special case of the general 
motivation a theorist has for knowing that his explanans is justified. Qua externalist 
he knows the effect that his commitments have upon ( T R A ) com p as a method for 
justifiably believing its conclusion: it gives justification for its conclusion i f  
perception is a tmth-conducive belief-source. Because perception will be used in 
every attempt to get past that conditional, the most that he can conclude is that for all 
he’s done in competently reasoning from (TRA)’s premises to its conclusion, he will 
have gained justification for the conclusion i f  perception is a tmth-conducive belief- 
source. The fact that the type of conditional position he’s left in can be reached by 
disreputable methods of belief formation brings out the vacuousness of his position 
relative to the goal of showing that we are justified in taking it that perception is 
tmth-conducive. No internalist or non-extemalist assumption is, incoherently, made 
in reaching (CPP) nor in judging the unsatisfactoriness of such a position. (CPP) is 
not motivated either by a commitment to an unrealistic ideal of perfectly reflective 
justifications, nor does the problem arise only for the egocentric task of explaining 
one’s own perceptual justifications.
(CPP) arises for a thoroughgoing externalist treatment of self-support, which 
is used in the task of explaining the correctness of an epistemic principle about 
perceptual justification. (CPP) makes the position of the minimal veritist 
explanatorily vacuous. If there is a route to a satisfactory demonstration that we are
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justified in accepting the basic epistemic principle about perception it has either to 
eschew self-support altogether or utilize a non-extemalist treatment of the conditions 
for a self-support argument to deliver justification for its conclusion. Next chapter 
examines whether there is any such explanatory route in reverse order.
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Chapter III
Routes
III.l. First Route: Freedom from Truth-Conducive Constraints
III. 1.1. The Price of Significant Self-Support
The merely conditional position that the externalist is stranded in is vicious because 
it is explanatorily vacuous. The vacuousness of his position is aggravated by the fact 
that he is in bad company: the same conditional position can be reached with respect 
to disreputable methods of belief formation. In order to shake off bad company the 
externalist has to overcome his merely conditional position and in that way break the 
epistemic parallelism that sets him along side the crystal gazer; he must get himself 
in a position to claim categorically that he is justified in believing that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source and not merely that he is justified in believing that it is 
if it is.
Reflection on how he can shake off bad company suggests that the externalist 
has resources available that the crystal gazer simply lacks. It is true that both have a 
track-record argument at their disposal, but the externalist seems to have much more. 
Apart from the evidence of a simple enumerative induction the externalist also has at 
his disposal complex evolutionary and physiological theories and supporting 
evidence that allow him to explain and gain a kind of rich insight into how and why 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. Nothing like that is at the disposal of 
the crystal ball gazer; he lacks the analogous support of complex theories and 
accompanying evidence for his claim that crystal gazing is truth-conducive. The 
availability of complex forms of evidence for the externalist seems to strengthen his 
epistemic position relative to the claim that perception is a truth-conducive belief- 
source; the lack of any such complex support for the crystal gazer seems to weaken 
his epistemic position relative to the claim that crystal gazing is truth-conducive.
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They do not seem to be in the same kind of epistemic position and it looks as if we 
could reach the conclusion that the two theorists are in a parallel, merely conditional 
epistemic position only because we perversely fixed on the availability to both of a 
simple track-record argument, in disregard of more complex form of support that in 
fact break the parallelism.
In (II.2) we anticipated this kind of response to our decision to fix on a simple 
track-record argument in assessing the attempt to establish the basic epistemic 
principle about perception. There we pointed out that the more complex forms of 
arguments still seem to exhibit the same kind of epistemic dependence that infects 
track-record arguments. The question we posed then was: If that kind of dependence 
ruins a track-record argument, does it also ruin the more complex arguments? In the 
context of the Conditional Position Problem (CPP) the question becomes whether the 
contribution of the complex arguments enables one to overcome (CCP), for that’s 
precisely where the evidence of a simple track-record fails.
W. Alston has argued that the contribution of the complex forms of 
arguments, which he calls 'significant self-support’, constitute an element that 
genuinely enables the externalist to shake off bad company, but despite that it 
exhibits the same kind of dependence that makes the evidence of a track-record 
useless for that purpose. As Alston puts it:
To be sure, an argument from these fruits [i.e. successful predictions and 
insight into its own operation] to the reliability of [perception] is still infected 
with epistemic circularity; apart from reliance on [perception] we have no 
way of knowing the outcome of our attempts at prediction and control, and no 
way of confirming our suppositions about the workings of perception. 
Nevertheless, this is not the trivial epistemically circular support that 
necessarily extends to every practice. Many practices cannot show anything 
analogous; crystal ball gazing and the reading of entrails cannot. Since 
[perception] supports itself in ways it conceivably might not, and in ways 
other practices do not, its prima facie claims to acceptance are thereby 
strengthened; and if crystal ball gazing lacks any non-trivial self-support, its 
claims suffer by comparison.162
Significant self-support for the reliability of perception comprises evolutionary and 
physiological discoveries about how our perceptual systems work, why they have
162 Alston 1989: 19.
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come to work that way and what enables them to represent reliably, while no similar 
discoveries support the claim that a disreputable method is truth-conducive. There's 
no doubt that significant self-support marks a difference between the externalist and 
the crystal ball gazer, but what we need to ask is if such a form of evidence has the 
epistemic significance needed to overcome (CPP). There are reasons to doubt that it 
does. For consider a specific piece of significant self-support, for example the results 
of an experiment designed to identify the reactions of cone and rod cells in response 
to certain changes in luminosity. As Alston notes, there's no way of ‘confirming’ or 
‘knowing’ the outcomes of such experiments other than by relying on perception; our 
epistemic justification for believing such results essentially depends on perception, 
specifically on perception being truth-conducive. But then it looks as if the 
contribution of significant self-support doesn't advance the position of the externalist 
in the desired way, for given that his justification to believe the complex results of 
the experiments depends on perception being truth-conducive, when he ask the 
question whether he is justified in believing his results he will not be able to 
conclude categorically that he is but only that he is if perception is truth-conducive. 
Because any attempt at getting passed this conditional position requires establishing 
that perception is truth-conducive, which is what significant self-support is meant to 
achieve, the attempt will just create another instance of that conditional position. As 
happened with appeal to the simple evidence of a track-record, the externalist who 
appeals to significant self-support is trapped in a conditional position. The difference 
marked by significant self-support between the externalist and its bad company 
doesn't have the effect of enabling one to overcome an explanatorily vacuous 
position.
The diagnosis of why significant self-support fails to have the desired effect 
is clear: as long as arguments from perceptual evidence exhibit the epistemic 
dependence already present in a track-record argument, the complexity of the 
perceptual evidence will make no difference with respect to overcoming (CPP). 
Because that dependence is a consequence of a truth-conducive constraint on 
perceptual justification, this means that as long as we insist in conceiving perceptual 
evidence as subject to a truth-conducive constraint the complexity of the evidence 
will make no difference with respect to (CPP). Given this diagnosis it would seem 
that in order for significant self-support to have the intended effect we must lift the 
truth-conducive constraint from perceptual justification. If significant self-support is
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not constrained by truth-conducivity then answering the question whether one is 
justified by significant self-support in believing that perception is truth-conducive 
will not take one to a positive answer conditional on perception being truth- 
conducive, for the epistemic justification supplied by significant self-support will no 
longer be conditional on the truth-conducivity of perception.
Perhaps Alston is aware that appeal to significant self-support needs to be 
supplemented by lifting truth-conducive constraints, for he remarks that one can 
possess the justification of significant self-support for the claim that perception is 
truth-conducive without perception being truth-conducive, he writes:
It is clear that all this could be the case [i.e. that we have significant self- 
support], and hence that we are rational in engaging in [the perceptual 
doxastic practice], even i f  it were in fact unreliable.163
The thesis that significant self-support constitutes a species of epistemic justification 
which isn't subject to truth-conducive constraints signifies a radical departure from 
the extemalism that we started with, for the externalist takes truth-conducivity to be 
necessary and sufficient for warrant. At the end of last chapter we pointed out that 
one way of attempting to overcome (CPP) would involve lifting tmth-conducive 
constraints on justification, for (CPP) arises out of treating truth-conducivity as 
necessary for justification acquired through self-support.
But lifting tmth-conducive constraints doesn't seem to be a palatable move 
for the theorist trapped in (CPP). for tmth-conducive constraints seem to be deeply 
entrenched in an adequate understanding of epistemic goods. Alston himself voices 
this point when he writes:
How can I support the thesis that it is....reasonable for me to believe [p] in the 
present situation? If I'm  unable to ascertain that it is formed in a reliable 
fashion, what other epistemically relevant recommendation can I give to this 
particular belief? I am at a loss to say.164
16~ Alston 1989: 20. My emphasis.
164 Ibid.: 23. See also his 1985: 111.
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Alston is not being rhetorical here. He fully endorses truth-conducive constraints on 
warrant in arguing against other views that purport to explain what our justification 
for the claim that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source consist in; he 
conceives those views as rival to his own which explains that justification in terms of 
significant self-support. One of the views that Alston criticises argues that we are 
justified in believing that perception is a truth-conducive belief source because such 
hypothesis is the best explanation of the patterns that our sensory experience exhibits. 
This view attempts to show that the truth-conducivity of perception is the best 
explanatory hypothesis arguing that it is favoured by criteria such as simplicity, 
economy and explanatory depth.165 Alston objects to this view that the criteria used 
to pick out the allegedly best explanation constitute no evidence for the truth of the 
favoured hypothesis; he objects that such criteria are not truth-conducive.166
The other view that Alston wishes to discard in favour of his own is 
coherentism. According to him:
From this stand point there’s nothing disturbing about the circle involved in 
using perceptual beliefs to support the principle that perception is reliable. 
Particular perceptual beliefs, on the one hand, and the belief in the reliability 
of sense perception, on the other, support each other, thereby increasing the 
coherence of the system that contains both.167
We need not go into the details of this kind of view, we only want to underline that 
Alston's objection to it is essentially the same that he swings against the abductive 
reasoning, he writes:
...if we are not already entitled to take sense perception to be mostly reliable, 
the fact that some of its outputs confirm others would seem to be of little 
epistemological significance. For all we would have reason to suppose, it 
might be one of those vast coherent systems of fancy that are regularly 
thrown up as an objection to the idea that the coherence of a system is a 
sufficient indication of its truth.168
165 Alston 1993: 90ff.
166 Ibid.: 97
167 Ibid.: 20.
168 Ibid.: 21.
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Alston believes that coherence does not in and by itself increases the likelihood of 
the coherent beliefs and that’s why he thinks it has ‘little epistemological 
significance’. In his view positive epistemic status is constituted precisely by what 
coherence does not guarantee: that beliefs have a truth-conducive provenance.
Alston fully endorses truth-conducive constraints in criticising rival views. 
That’s symptomatic of how entrenched truth-conducive constraints are in his 
understanding of epistemic goods. But as we have seen above if one maintains truth- 
conducive constraints throughout Alston’s own appeal to significant-self support 
does not succeed in enabling one to overcome (CPP); in order to achieve this 
significant self-support has to be conceived as not subject to truth-conducive 
constraints, as Alston himself does. But then we find here something incongruous in 
Alston’s position, for he cannot coherently suppose that significant self-support is 
not subject to truth-conducive constraints and then criticise other views, like 
inference to the best explanation and coherentism, on the grounds that the 
considerations they adduce as warrant for the claim that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source are not subject to truth-conducive constraints. A defender of 
any of such views has a ready tu quoque, he can simply point out that the 
considerations adduced by Alston, as he himself-recognises, are not subject to such 
constraints either (!)
If in order to overcome (CPP) we invoke a conception of justification not 
subject to truth-conducive constraints we cannot object to the views criticised by 
Alston that they are not subject to such constraints. This point raises a general 
question: if truth-conducive constraints are lifted what then should constrain the 
considerations adduced as justification for a proposition and why should we 
conceptualise those constraints as epistemic in nature. Chapter I articulated some 
reason to doubt that there is principled reason why we should conceive of 
considerations not constraint by a relation to truth as epistemic in nature. Here we 
will not return to this question, we will rather tackle the prior issue of why we should 
lift truth-conducive constraints at all. So far we have only seen that such a move will 
contribute to overcoming (CPP), but without further argument helping ourselves a 
notion of justification with that desired property looks like an ad hoc move. We must 
look at the independent arguments for freeing epistemic justification from truth- 
conducive constraints.
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III. 1.2. Freedom from Truth-Conducive Constraints
Let’s recall the basic epistemic principle about perception:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that p , one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
For the externalist establishing (EP) involves establishing the empirical truth that it 
falls under a truth-conducive constraint; but the claim that (EP) is under a truth- 
conducive constraint is not itself an empirical truth for the externalist; he treats it as a 
conceptual truth. Externalists are rarely explicit on this point,169 but the methodology 
they adopt in articulating their externalist theories revels that that is the status they 
attach to such constraints. For example, A. Goldman claims that he is analysing the 
ordinary concept of justification;170 thus his analysis, if correct, is a conceptual truth. 
Not only externalists treat truth-conducive constraints as conceptual truths, the 
methodology their opponents use to argue against them also reveals that they treat 
them as conceptual truths. The arguments of the externalist’s opponent consist of 
thought experiments that are supposed to falsify what the externalist takes to be a 
conceptual truth. We will now examine the master argument against the claim that 
(EP) is under a truth-conducive constraint.
Suppose that our perceptual systems are truth-conducive so that basing our 
beliefs on our perceptual experiences, memories, inferences, etc. constitutes truth- 
conducive ways of belief-formation. Now, imagine a Matrix-World where everybody 
has his/her brain artificially stimulated to have a totality of experiences, memories, 
etc. that is an exact phenomenal duplicate of the totality of our experiences, 
memories, etc. Most of their cognitive states are not veridical; the Matrix implants in 
its victims experiences, beliefs, etc. that are massively mistaken; the way the Matrix 
interferes with their cognitive mechanisms renders them systematically unreliable. 
However, all those Matrix-people have lives exactly like ours ‘from the inside’, for 
each of us there is an individual in the Matrix world, call it a 'counterpart’, whose 
mental life duplicates to the smallest detail the life of the corresponding person in
169 Cohen 1984: 281 is one o f  the few who note that truth-conducive constraints are normally treated 
as conceptual truths.
170 Goldman 1979:346.
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this world. Your counterpart seems to have exactly the same experiences and 
memories, seem to engage in the same reasonings and imaginings, seem to entertain 
the same intentions, desires, etc. that you do. ‘From the inside’ what it is like to be 
your counterpart is exactly what it is like to be you. Now, the allegation here is that 
there’s a powerful intuition that if your beliefs are justified so are those o f your 
Matrix counterpart, in spite of the fact that yours have been (ex hypothesi) reliably 
produced whereas those of your counterpart have not. But if that is so, truth- 
conducivity is not necessary for epistemic justification. Thus (EP) is not subject to a
• 171truth-conducive constraint.
What is exactly the intuition this thought experiment is supposed to awaken? 
What is called here an ‘intuition’ is just an inclination to judge that your counterpart 
is as justified as you are with respect to the beliefs you both hold. That inclination is 
our response to an apparent commonality in justificatory status between you and 
your counterpart that the thought experiment confronts us with. So, the thought 
experiment attempts to falsify the claim that (EP) is under a truth-conducive 
constraint by producing an inclination to judge which, if correct, entails that 
justificatory status is not constrained by truth-conducivity but by something else, i.e. 
whatever constitutes the apparent justificatory commonality that prompts our 
inclination to judge.
The internalists that use the thought experiment in the attempt to free 
epistemic principles from truth-conducive constraints take the appearance of 
justificatory commonality at face value, thus rendering one's inclination to judge 
correct and the claim that (EP) is under a truth-conducive constraint incorrect. But 
historically different internalists that have taken the appearance of justificatory 
commonality at face value have proceeded to conceptualise it in different, non­
equivalent ways. What I mean by this is that different internalists explain what that 
justificatory commonality consists in by means of different thesis about what it is 
that justificatory status supervenes on. The supervenience base of each of those 
different supervenience theses captures the constraints on justification that those 
internalists seek to put in place of truth-conducive constraints. Later we will look at
1/1 The use o f  this style o f  thought experiment against truth-conducive constraints dates back to Lehrer 
& Cohen 1983. Since then many philosophers have thought that the experiment constitutes a serious 
objection to extemalism, see for example Foley 1987, Goldman 1986, 1988, Fumerton 1995, 
Komblith 2004a.
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several of those internalist supervenience theses to see how they conceptualise in 
different ways the appearance of justificatory commonality prompted by the thought 
experiment. But before going into that we want to highlight an interesting fact about 
the controversy unleashed by the thought experiment in question.
It is remarkable that even externalists accept the crucial first step in the 
internalist argument against truth-conducive constraints, i.e. they also take the 
appearance of justificatory commonality between one and one’s counterpart at face 
value, even if they resist giving truth-conducive constraints up and try instead to 
modify their theory to accommodate within it the intuitions whose correctness they 
have accepted.172 But the very first question one should ask is why should one take 
the appearance of justificatory commonality at face value? There are reasons to 
distrust the appearance of justificatory commonality. First, those who accept the face 
value attitude rely on the deliverances of counterfactual thought, of what we would 
judge concerning the epistemic status of one’s counterpart’s doxastic attitudes; but 
they do not explaining the basis of such reliance. What could be an argument for 
such an attitude? Here is a natural suggestion: One may presume that one’s 
counterfactual inclination to judge in the Matrix scenario is prima facie justified; in 
the absence of overriding considerations one is justified in taking the judgement as 
correct and the corresponding apparent justificatory commonality as real. Since there 
are no overriding considerations one is justified in taking appearances at face value 
and one’s judgement as correct. But it is unclear if an argument like this would be 
available to the internalist. The argument uses as a premise an epistemic principle 
about counterfactual thought; it says that the judgements issued by this mental ability 
are prima facie justified in the relevant circumstances. But what does this epistemic 
justification consist in? The internalist cannot understand the justification in question 
in terms of truth-conducivity, for the aim of his overall strategy is to free epistemic 
principles from truth-conducive constraints. But he cannot understand that 
justification in terms of his preferred constraints either, for such constraints are 
motivated for the need to account for an apparent justificatory commonality that has 
been taken at face value, and the present issue concerns precisely if one is justified in 
taking such appearance at face value; before settling this issue the internalist
172 See for example Goldman 1988: 59-60, 62-66 and Fumerton 1995: 114-115 for discussion o f  
Goldman's attempts to accommodate the intuition uncongenial with truth-conducive constraints.
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constrains on justification lack motivation. Explaining the basis for the face value 
attitude turns out to be a hard task for the internalist.
Another reason to distrust that appearance of justificatory commonality 
comes from extemalism about intentional content. Given extemalism about content 
one and one’s counterpart cannot have the same beliefs, and then a fortiori cannot 
have the same justified beliefs. So the appearance of justificatory commonality must 
be a mere appearance. This reason to doubt the appearance of justificatory 
commonality doesn’t beg any question against the internalist about justification, 
because the reasons to accept extemalism about content are independent from the 
present debate.
Our treatment of the intuitions prompted by the Matrix thought experiment 
will be extremely concessive to the internalist. For the sake of argument we will 
ignore the previous reasons to distrust the correctness of the intuitions he takes at 
face value. We will explore what the internalist does with those intuitions, how he 
explains them by introducing supervenience theses, and whether these theses yield 
acceptable constraints on epistemic justification.
One of the theses that has been motivated by the Matrix-style thought 
experiment can be called ‘accessibilism*. Different philosophers state it in slightly 
different terms; Pryor states it as the claim that “whether one is justified in believing 
p  supervenes on facts one is in a position to know about by reflection alone”.173 
Komblith calls a similar thesis the “Internalist Credo: no difference in justificatory 
status without internally accessible differences”,174 which is equivalent to the claim 
that justificatory status supervenes on 'internally accessible differences*. We will 
work with the following formulation:
[ACCE] The justificatory status of S*s doxastic attitudes supervenes on facts
S is in a position to know about by reflection alone.
By the meaning o f ‘supervene’, [ACCE] entails:
''3 Pryor 2001: 109.
1 4 Komblith 2004a: 5
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[ACCE]* If SI and S2 differ in justificatory status of any of their doxastic 
attitudes, then SI and S2 differ in facts they are in a position to know by 
reflection alone.
And by contraposition [ACCE]* is equivalent to:
[ACCE]** If SI and S2 are identical in facts they are in a position to know 
by reflection alone, then their doxastic attitudes have identical justificatory 
status.
[ACCE]** explains the justificatory commonality between one and one’s counterpart 
by identifying a commonality which determines justificatory status; such 
supervenience commonality is given by facts one and one’s counterpart are in a 
position to know by reflection alone. Since facts about truth-conducivity are not the 
sort of thing one can know about by reflection alone, the supervenience commonality 
alluded to in [ACCE]** excludes truth-conducivity. Therefore, [ACCE]** excludes 
truth-conducivity from the supervenience commonality that is sufficient for 
commonality in justificatory status, and so it implies that truth-conducivity is 
unnecessary for justification. [ACCE]** implies the negation of negation of truth- 
conducive constraints.
[ACCE] appears to handle successfully our intuitions in the thought 
experiment. By description of the thought experiment one and one’s counterpart are 
identical as regards facts that the two are in a position to know by reflection alone, 
therefore [ACCE] entails that one and one's counterpart are identical in the 
justificatory status of all beliefs held by the two. In this way [ACCE] explains our 
intuitions in the thought experiment as a correct inclination to judge that one's 
counterpart is as justified as one is in believing everything the two believe. In light of 
[ACCE] the appearance of justificatory commonality is real, not a mere appearance. 
So [ACCE] fulfils the explanatory role it was designed to play.
But [ACCE] has rivals. Some internalists prefer not to impose any specific 
accessibility constraint on the supervenience base for justificatory status. Because the 
supervenience base has still to preserve the idea that one and one's counterpart are 
alike ‘from the inside’ these internalists suppose that one and one’s counterpart are
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mental duplicates, since perfectly matching mental lives would seem to guarantee 
likeness ‘from the inside’. This gives us a second internalist view we can call 
‘mentalism’:
[MENT] The justificatory status of S’s doxastic attitudes supervenes on S’s 
ocurrent and dispositional mental states, events and conditions.175
In order for [MENT] to play the explanatory role it is supposed to play the notion of 
the mental involved must be narrow. The nature of the mental must not itself 
supervene on relations between the subject and his environment, for if it did then the 
justificatory status of one’s and one’s counterpart’s doxastic attitudes would also 
supervene on the corresponding subject-environment relations, because 
supervenience is transitive. But since the subject-environment relations are different 
in one’s case and in one’s counterpart’s case, the justificatory status of doxastic 
attitudes would be different in each case too, contrary to one’s inclination to judge in 
the thought experiment, which is what [MENT] is supposed to explain. Therefore, in 
order to play its explanatory role [MENT] must assume a narrow conception of the 
mental; we can then reformulate it this way:
[MENT]-N The justificatory status of S’s doxastic attitudes supervenes on 
S’s ocurrent and dispositional narrow mental states, events and conditions.
By the meaning of'supervene' and contraposition [MENT]-N entails:
[MENT]-N** If SI and S2 are identical in narrow mental states, events and 
conditions, then their doxastic attitudes have identical justificatory status.
In this case the supervenience commonality which is held to determine justificatory 
status is given by the narrow mental states, events and conditions of one and one’s 
counterpart. Because the notion of the mental here is narrow the truth-conducivity of 
one's cognitive mechanisms by means of which one interacts with one’s environment
175 Conee & Feldman 2001: 234
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makes no difference to the nature of the mental conditions one is in. Therefore, 
[MENT]-N** excludes truth-conducivity from the factors that make a difference for 
the supervenience commonality that is sufficient for commonality in justificatory 
status, and so it implies that truth-conducivity is unnecessary for justification. 
[MENTJ-N** implies the negation of truth-conducive constraints.
[MENT]-N also appears to handle successfully our intuitions in the thought 
experiment. By description of the thought experiment the totality of the mental 
conditions of one and one’s counterpart are identical, and so [MENT]-N entails that 
one and one’s counterpart are identical in the justificatory status of doxastic attitudes. 
As [ACCE], [MENTJ-N explains our intuitions in the thought experiment as a 
correct inclination to judge that one’s counterpart’s doxastic attitudes are as justified 
as one’s. In light of [MENTJ-N the appearance of justificatory commonality is real, 
not a mere appearance. [MENTJ-N fulfils the explanatory role it was designed to 
play.
Some internalists who accept [ACCEJ have sought to support the issuing idea 
that one has to have the intended kind of access to the facts that determine one’s 
justificatory status by using an argument that has as a premise the claim that 
epistemic justification consists in fulfilment of epistemic duties. This is the
11 f \deontological conception of justification. Some externalists have argued that
1 77there's no sound argument from deontologism to [ACCEJ, and even some 
internalists do not believe there is any such argument; so they motivate their
178preferred internalist supervenience thesis on different grounds. However, we can 
agree that deontologism gives no good motivation for [ACCE] intemalism but note 
that deontologism itself can provide an independent supervenience thesis that 
explains our intuitions in the thought experiment.
Let's say an epistemic duty is a requirement to have whatever doxastic 
attitudes best fit one's evidence. Concrete epistemic duties can be fleshed out, but we 
need only work with the general idea. The thesis we can formulate is that
176 Internalists that argue from deontologism to some version o f  [ACCEJ include Chisholm 1989, 
Ginet 1975: 36-7 and Steup 1998: 375-6.
177 See for example Goldman 1999b: 222-3
178 Examples o f  internalists who do not rely on deontologism in motivating their view include: 
Fumerton 1995; Conee & Feldman 2001: 239-40; Pryor 2001: 114-115.
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justificatory status is determined by whether or not one best adjusts one’s doxastic 
attitudes to one’s evidence, i.e. by whether or not one fulfils one’s epistemic duties:
[DEON] The justificatory status of S’s doxastic attitudes supervenes on S’s 
fulfilment of her epistemic duties.
By the meaning o f ‘supervene’ and contraposition [DEON] is equivalent to
[DEON]** If SI and S2 are identical in fulfilment of their epistemic duties, 
then their doxastic attitudes have identical justificatory status.
Best adjusting one’s doxastic attitudes to one’s evidence is compatible with such 
adjusting not being truth-conducive, because one’s evidence can be spurious or 
otherwise itself truth-obstructive. Therefore, [DEON]** makes truth-conducivity 
unnecessary for the supervenience commonality that in this case is sufficient for 
commonality in justificatory status, and so it implies that truth-conducivity is 
unnecessary for justification. [DEON]** implies the negation of truth-conducive 
constraints.
[DEON] also opens a way of explaining our intuitions in the Matrix thought 
experiment. By description of it what it is like to be in one’s situation is exactly what 
it would be like to be in one’s counterpart’s; on this basis the advocate of [DEON] 
supposes that the evidence available to one and to one’s counterpart is the same. This 
would be true only given a purely phenomenal conception of evidence, i.e. only if 
evidence is conceived as itself supervening on the phenomenal aspects of one's 
mental life. Given this conception of evidence this internalist supposes that one and 
one’s counterpart adjust doxastic attitudes to evidence in exactly the same way, then 
one and one's counterpart are on a par in relation to fulfilment of epistemic duties. 
Therefore, if one is epistemically blameless, so is one’s counterpart; by [DEON] this 
entails that the doxastic attitudes of one and one’s counterpart have the same 
justificatory status. So, [DEON] explains our intuitions in the thought experiment as 
a correct inclination to judge that one’s counterpart’s doxastic attitudes are as 
justified as one’s. In light of [DEON] the appearance of justificatory commonality is
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real, not a mere appearance. [DEON] fulfils the explanatory role it was designed to 
play.
III. 1. 3. Failures of Freedom and the Ultimate Explanatory Role of Truth- 
Conducive Constraints
The three internalist theses we have reviewed appear to explain equally well our 
intuition in the Matrix thought experiment by rendering it a correct inclination to 
judge that one is as justified as one’s counterpart. However, we have to note that the 
theses are not equivalent, simply because the supervenience bases they postulate 
have different extensions. Facts about fulfilment of one’s epistemic duties may 
overlap, but do not coincide, with facts one is in a position to know by reflection 
alone; for one can know by reflection alone facts which are not facts about one’s 
fulfilment of any epistemic duty. Even more clearly, the set of such deontological 
facts is distinct from the set of one’s narrow mental conditions; for even if every 
fulfilment of one’s epistemic duties is a narrow mental condition, not all narrow 
mental conditions constitute the fulfilment of an epistemic duty of one. Similarly, the 
set of one’s narrow mental conditions may overlap, but do not coincide, with facts 
one is in a position to know by reflection alone; since, for example, obvious logical 
relations between propositions one believes can be known by reflection alone but 
they are not narrow mental conditions of one.
The non-equivalence of the supervenience theses should raise some suspicion 
on whether any of them is correct, for how can the same property, i.e. justificatory 
status, supervene on different sets of facts? A possible reaction to this is worry is to 
say that there's actually not one single property being explicated in different ways 
but several different properties; we should regard each supervenience thesis as
1 7 0providing a supervenience base for a different epistemic property. This pluralistic
1,9 Alston 1993b develops an approach along these lines. Compare it with Plantinga 1993: Chapter I. 
The idea that there are distinct epistemic properties whose differences can be misleadingly blurred by 
the uniform use o f  the term 'justification' is common nowadays. In (II.4) we discussed how Wright 
and Davies use a distinction between justification and entitlement. Burge 2004 also makes a 
distinction between justification and entitlement, arguing that both are sub-species o f  the genus 
warrant; but Burge’s notions o f  justification and entitlement do not exactly match the notions 
introduced by Wright and Davies. We cannot go into a comparison between the several distinct 
epistemic properties that have been introduced and that have been put to some theoretical use in recent
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position concedes that the various properties corresponding to the supervenience 
theses are epistemic properties, and hence that there are epistemic properties, namely 
those corresponding to the supervenience theses, that are indeed free from truth- 
conducive constraints. We think that there are reasons to question the concession of 
the pluralist.
Let us first note that each of the supervenience theses issues a constraint on 
justification, or whatever is the alleged epistemic property that corresponds to the 
supervenience thesis. For simplicity let’s work with the idea that the epistemic 
property in question is justification. Let’s call X-Int the conditions that constitute the 
different supervenience bases of each supervenience thesis; so that conditions that 
one is in a position to know by reflection alone and narrow mental conditions are two 
different types of X-lnt conditions. Our point is that the supervenience thesis that 
corresponds to justification issues an X-lnt constraint for justification: the conditions 
that constitute justification must be X-lnt. For suppose that there are conditions that 
constitute justification but are not X-lnt. That would mean that one’s justification 
doesn’t supervene on X-lnt conditions; since there could be a case where there’s no 
change in our X-lnt conditions and yet there is a change in justification, for by 
hypothesis there would be conditions that constitute justification and are not X-lnt. 
Therefore, if the property of justification supervenes on X-lnt conditions such 
property is under an X-lnt constraint.
Why should we accept that X-lnt constraints are epistemic constraints? Why 
should we accept that fulfilling them results in an epistemic good? A  central reason 
to think that such constraints by themselves fail to constitute epistemic constraints 
comes from reflection on the phenomenon of epistemic defeat. Consider the basic 
epistemic principle about perception:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that /?, one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
literature; we only want to indicate that we are not going to question the reality or the theoretical use 
o f  those properties. What we are going to question is that the supervenience theses reviewed in the 
text, which free  epistemic properties from  truth-conducive constraints, succeed in issuing adequate 
constraints for epistemic properties at all.
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The supposition that (EP) is under an X-lnt constraint, and not under a truth- 
conducive constraint, means that the perceptual conditions mentioned in its 
antecedent must fulfil that X-lnt constraint in order to be sufficient for the prima 
facie epistemic good mentioned in the consequent of (EP). So, for example, if (EP) is 
under the accessibilist constraint, and not under a truth-conducive constraint, the 
perceptual conditions mentioned in the antecedent of (EP) must be known to obtain 
by reflection alone in order to be sufficient for the prima facie epistemic good 
mentioned in the consequent of (EP).
However, we acknowledge that the prima facie epistemic good mentioned in 
the consequent of (EP) can be defeated by evidence that suggests that our perceptual 
grounds are not truth-conducive, for example evidence that suggests that we are 
hallucinating. The question then arises: if perceptual justification is constrained by 
accessibilism alone, why does evidence that suggests that one’s grounds are not 
truth-conducive have precisely this defeating effect upon one’s justification? If being 
knowable to obtain by reflection alone is the constraint that our grounds must fulfil 
in order to be sufficient for prima facie justification, it becomes obscure why 
evidence that suggests lack of truth-conducivity should have any undermining effect 
on our justification; such evidence should be irrelevant if our justification is truly 
under no truth-conducive constraint and only under an accessibilist constraint.
So we have reason to believe that the X-lnt constraints that purport to replace 
truth-conducive constraints fail to constitute epistemic constraints, i.e. constraints 
whose fulfilment results in prima facie epistemic goods, for they constrain epistemic 
goods in a way that fails to make their defeat by undermining evidence intelligible. 
But if X-lnt constraints fail to constitute adequate epistemic constraints for their 
inability to explain epistemic defeat, how should we conceive an adequate epistemic 
constraint on epistemic goods? If we reject X-lnt constraints and with them the 
corresponding supervenience theses, we are left with no explanation of the intuitions 
that the Matrix thought experiment generated. Since such intuitions are incompatible 
with truth-conducive constraints we cannot simply readopt these as the adequate 
constraints on epistemic goods. We still seem to be burdened with the demand of 
constructing a constraint on epistemic goods that respects those intuitions.
In view of our foregoing remarks concerning epistemic defeat there is a 
natural suggestion of a constraint on epistemic goods that is both suitable for the
135
explanation of epistemic defeat and respectful of the intuitions prompted by the 
Matrix thought experiment. If undermining evidence suggests that one’s grounds are 
not truth-conducive, and this suggestion defeats the justificatory force of such 
grounds, it seems that the justificatory force of the grounds must be essentially due at 
least to a standing conviction or presumption to the effect that such grounds are 
truth-conducive. The presumption need not be actually true in order for it to be 
undermined by the adverse evidence, therefore such presumption could still play the 
explanatory role we are envisaging for it in the Matrix-World, where it is false. The 
suggestion would then be that epistemic goods mentioned in the consequent of 
epistemic principles are constrained by a standing conviction or presumption that the 
conditions mentioned in the antecedent are truth-conducive.
We should not overlook that the only reason that pushes us to adopt this kind 
of ’subjecti vised’ truth-conducive constraint, instead of a straightforward truth- 
conducive constraint, as the adequate constraint on epistemic goods is the attempt to 
respect the intuitions prompted by the Matrix thought experiment. We should enquire 
if the subjectivised constraint is acceptable independently of those intuitions. In 
(III.3.1) below we argue that it is not; it will then be suggested that we should reject 
the intuitions that appear to motivate freedom from truth-conducive constraints.
III.2. Second Route: Access and Higher-Level Requirements
The Conditional Position Problem (CPP) is a consequence of a treatment of 
justification acquired through self-support that takes truth-conducivity to be 
necessary' and sufficient for justification. In the previous section we saw how 
denying the necessity clause in that treatment opens up a route for overcoming (CPP), 
but we argued that the independent reasons usually given for lifting truth-conducive 
constraints lead to inadequate constraints for epistemic goods. How promising would 
it be to deny the other clause in the treatment? Denying the sufficiency clause in the 
treatment of self-support does not even seem to open up a way of overcoming (CPP). 
For suppose that further conditions on justification were imposed and they could be 
fulfilled without relying on perception. Even if that is so it would still be true that 
truth-conducivity is deemed necessary for justification and so long as the way of 
ascertaining truth-conducivity is empirical the theorist will still land in a merely
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conditional position in trying to ascertain whether he’s justified in believing that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. But denying the sufficiency clause not 
only does not seem to help in overcoming (CPP), it actually seems to leave the 
veritistic theorist in a worse epistemic position, for it has been argued that the kind of 
further conditions typically imposed on justification seem to have unpalatable 
sceptical consequences. Given that our aim in this chapter is to examine ways of 
overcoming (CPP), it might look irrelevant to stop to assess the independent 
arguments for denying the sufficiency clause, given that this move only seem to have 
a worsening effect. But the issue is relevant for the feasibility of the overall veritistic 
project, for if there are good reasons to support that move then the veritistic project 
would be thwarted by the unpalatable sceptical consequences such move brings 
about and not only by (CPP).
In this section we will not be concerned with exploring the unpalatable 
sceptical consequences that the typical negations of the sufficiency clause allegedly 
bring about, nor with possible ways of making such consequences less unpalatable; 
we will rather be concerned with the prior issue of examining the reasons for denying 
the sufficiency clause at all, if such reasons are inadequate to support a move with 
such consequences we shouldn’t be worried about them.
Objections to the sufficiency clause in the treatment of epistemic goods have 
taken the form of counterexamples that are supposed to prompt intuitions adverse to 
the idea that the truth-conducivity of a belief-source is sufficient for it to yield 
justification. The counterexamples divide into two broad kinds, in both kinds of 
counterexample there's a subject who fulfils the truth-conducivity condition but one 
is inclined to judge that she is not thereby justified; in the first kind of case because 
she disrespects her evidence and in the second because she lacks anything that she 
could cite as her evidence for her belief. I’ll examine these kinds of counterexamples 
in that order.
Some of the well-known examples of clairvoyance described by L. Bonjour 
are counterexamples of the first kind.180 Bonjour describes three cases in which a 
subject S  does have the reliable power of clairvoyance but believes without any 
reason that she does. The cases differ as follows: In CASE I S  has rebutting defeaters
180 See Bonjour 1980: Sec. III.
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for her clairvoyance-formed belief that the US president is in Washington; i.e.
defeaters that are reasons to think that this belief is false. In CASE II S  has
undercutting defeaters, i.e. reasons to think that she doesn’t posses the clairvoyance
power or that her power is not a truth-conducive process of belief-formation. In
CASE III S  has undercutting defeaters but now in the form of reasons to think that
the clairvoyance power in general doesn’t exist or that it is not truth-conducive. In all
cases the defeaters are spurious since the US president is in fact in Washington,
• 181clairvoyance power does exist, it is truth-conducive and S possesses it.
The three cases serve to make the same point: despite that the subject’s belief 
is the outcome of a truth-conducive process of belief-formation it is not epistemically 
justified because the subject is irrational in disregarding evidence she possesses that 
appears to undermine in different ways the epistemic credentials of her belief. The 
evidence happens to be spurious, but this doesn’t save her from irrationality since 
what makes her irrational is that she disregards that evidence without a reason. What 
makes her irrational is that from her own point of view she is disrespecting her 
evidence; this is what makes her belief unjustified despite the underling truth- 
conducivity:
If the acceptance of a belief is seriously unreasonable or unwarranted from 
the believer’s own standpoint, then the mere fact that unbeknownst to the 
believer its existence in those circumstances lawfully guarantees its truth will
1 x9not suffice to render the belief epistemically justified.
Bonjour concludes that truth-conducivity is not sufficient for epistemic justification 
and that at least a no-defeater clause needs to be added to the account. Interestingly, 
some reliabilists contemplated cases structurally similar to Bonjour’s clairvoyance 
cases in articulating their analyses of epistemic justification, and they also concluded 
from those cases that a no-defeater clause needed to be added to the analysands. 
Goldman’s early reliabilist analysis of justification is an example.183 He describes a 
case about a man, Jones, who is presented with overwhelming evidence that his 
apparent memories of childhood are wholly misleading, that he suffered from a kind 
of amnesia that resulted in his memories from childhood been deleted and replaced
181 Bonjour doesn't use the terminology o f  'rebutting’ and 'undercutting’ defeaters; I take this 
terminology from Pollock & Cruz 1999, who use it to mark the kinds o f  undermining evidence that 
Bonjour employs in the construction o f  the examples.
182 Bonjour 1980:20.
183 See Goldman 1979:350.
138
by apparent memories that have nothing to do with what actually happened in his 
early years. However, that evidence, like the defeaters in Bonjour’s clairvoyance 
cases, is spurious: Jones episodic memory is pretty reliable; he never suffered from 
that kind of amnesia. Suppose that Jones has an apparent memory of his having his 
sixth birthday party, and he comes to believe that he had such a party. Goldman 
acknowledges that Jones is not justified and without hesitation amends the 
analysands of his theory by including a clause that rules out defeaters. Goldman 
construes this clause in purely reliabilist terms as the non-availability of a reliable 
process which, had it been used by the subject, would have lead him to not believing 
that p.184 Some internalists might object that this construal of the required no-defeater 
clause doesn’t in fact rule out all possible ways in which a subject can disrespect 
apparent defeaters, and the externalist can respond by patching again the analysands 
of his theory. I don’t want to look at the details of this potential debate but rather at 
the interesting fact that both, internalists and externalists, take the kind of 
counterexample at hand to be decisive against the sufficiency of truth-conducivity. 
They both agree that a no-defeater condition is also required, even if they might 
disagree again on how to construe it.
We can agree that a subject who irrationally disregards apparent defeaters of 
his justification cannot be justified in persisting in his belief, if he is to be justified 
such apparent defeaters must be absent. A clause ruling out defeaters is well taken. 
However, such a clause would be a clause for what it’s sometimes called ‘'ultima 
facie’ justification, justification that has not been defeated after ‘other things’ have 
been considered. But if we recall the basic epistemic principle about perception:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that /?, one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
It gives conditions for prima facie justification, justification that can be defeated 
after 'other things’ have been considered. The prima facie qualification of the 
justification in question absorbs the intuitive impact of the counterexamples 
described above. For we can grant that it is true that a subject who irrationally 
disregards apparent defeaters that undermine his perceptual justification for p  is not 
justified in believing that p. But truth-conducivity is not meant to be a sufficient
184 Goldman 1979: 351.
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condition for justification after ‘other things’ have been considered, but precisely for 
justification that can be defeated by consideration of things other than the perceptual 
state that represents p  as being the case. The first kind of counterexample against the 
sufficiency condition does not motivate a further condition for {prima facie) 
perceptual justification.
The second kind of counterexample to the sufficiency of truth-conducivity 
describes a subject who meets the sufficiency condition by having certain of her 
beliefs produced by a cognitive mechanism that is truth-conducive but that operates 
in such a way that doesn’t provide her with anything on which she could base her 
beliefs, the beliefs simply pop into the subject ’s mind. This kind of case, once again, 
is supposed to encourage the idea that there’s something irrational and unjustified in 
someone believing things in this way, regardless of the truth-conducivity of the 
underlying process of belief-formation. Bonjour modifies his clairvoyance cases to 
yield cases of this type. He describes a CASE IV in which S believes that the US 
president is in Washington as a result of her reliable clairvoyance power but this time 
she possesses no defeaters of any form for her belief, now she is simply ignorant of 
the power she has; her beliefs about the whereabouts of the US president and other 
matters just pop into her head. There is also an apparent real-life case of chicken- 
sexers who are unaware of the clues their discriminatory ability exploits; they also 
are reliable believers that do not base their beliefs on any identifiable evidence.186
Counterexamples of this second kind were taken to show that the advocate of 
the sufficiency condition was overlooking the significance of the ‘basing relation’ in 
our understanding of epistemic justification. One cannot be justified if one doesn’t 
base one's belief on something one can take as evidence or as a reason for it, or at 
least one must have some sort of access to something that can play such a role. As 
Alston puts it:
We find something incongruous, or conceptually impossible, in the notion of
my being justified in believing that p  while totally lacking any capacity to
determine what is responsible for that justification.187
In order to avoid the incongruousness that Alston mentions we should amend our 
conception of the conditions for justification and specify that the grounds that
185 Bonjour 1980: Sec. IV.
186 See Fumerton 1995: 117-118.
187 Alston 1988:235.
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• 188constitute our justification must be something on which we could base our beliefs. 
We can agree that this is indeed a clause for justification but point out that it is 
implicitly contemplated by the nature of the justifying conditions mentioned in the 
antecedent of (EP); for perceptual experiences are typically the sort of thing on 
which one can base one’s beliefs. Given that this is in the very nature of perceptual 
experiences it would be redundant, in spelling out the sufficient conditions for 
perceptual experiences to justify belief, to include a clause specifying that they must 
be the sort of thing on which typically one can base one’s beliefs. The point about the 
basing relation raised by the example is well taken, but it is already contemplated by 
the very nature of the kind of justification whose conditions we are trying to spell out. 
The second kind of counterexample to the sufficiency of truth-conducivity for 
justification does not motivate a further condition for perceptual justification.
But some philosophers think that the second kind of alleged counterexample 
to the sufficiency condition does not simply raise a point about the significance of 
the basing relation for justification, they think that such counterexample in fact 
motivate a quite drastic revision of the sufficiency condition. Bonjour, for example, 
makes the following remarks:
  [the subject’s] acceptance of the belief [that just pops into his head] is
epistemically irrational and irresponsible and thereby unjustified, whether or 
not he believes himself to have clairvoyant power so long as he has no 
justification for such a belief. Part of one’s epistemic duty is to reflect 
critically upon one’s beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing 
things to which one has, to one’s knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic
189access.
If one should not believe what one does not know one has reliable access to, that 
must be because one should believe only what one knows one has reliable access to. 
Effectively, Bonjour seems to be saying here that in order for the subject to be 
justified he must not only base his belief on what he can take as a ground for it, but 
he must also know that basing his belief on those grounds constitutes a truth- 
conducive process of belief-formation. Bonjour is imposing a higher-level epistemic 
requirement on justification, in the sense of demanding knowledge of the fulfilment 
of a condition that itself has epistemic import, namely that the process of belief
188 A s Alston 1989a: 5 says, a ground for b elief must be “the sort o f  thing that is typically fairly 
directly accessible on reflection to the subject” that possesses them. See also his 1988: 237-38.
189 Bonjour 1980: 22. My emphasis.
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formation is truth-conducive. Because the subject in the examples does not fulfil 
such higher-level requirement they are not justified in believing what they do.
Fulfilment of a higher-level requirement is Bonjour’s diagnosis of what the 
subjects in the examples lacks, but he gives no argument for such radical diagnosis. 
It might be obvious and intuitive that the subject in the example lack something of 
epistemic significance, but that doesn’t make obvious Bonjour’s account of what the 
subject needs to remedy her lack. In fact, other philosophers who would share the 
initial intuitive reaction that the subject lacks something of epistemic relevance 
would accuse Bonjour of hyperintellectualising what the subject lacks;190 for he 
demands that the subject fulfils a condition that can only be thought of by 
intellectually sophisticated subjects, and this would deprive infants and conceptually 
unsophisticated adults from something intuitively as simple as perceptual
• r* • 191justification,
Hyperintellectualisation is not the only unpalatable consequence typically 
charged against imposing higher-level requirements on justification; some opponents 
of such requirements argue that such requirements lead to infinite regresses of 
justified beliefs.192 If in order to be justified in believing that p  one must know that 
one believes p  through a truth-conducive belief process, and knowledge involves 
justified belief, then in order to fulfil the higher-level requirement one must also 
know that one’s belief that one believes p  through a truth-conducive belief process is 
itself the result of a truth-conducive belief-process. But for the same reason one must 
know that a third-level belief about fulfilling a truth-conducive constraint is the result 
of a truth-conducive belief-source, and so on ad infinitum.
Only very strong argument should compel us to accept a view that seems to 
have such unpalatable consequences. But that strong argument is precisely what is 
missing in someone’s position, like Bonjour’s, who takes the second kind of alleged 
counterexample described as sufficient motivation for the drastic move of imposing 
higher-level requirements on justification. Such examples raise a legitimate point 
about the importance of the basing relation, but the point is harmless and the very 
nature of perceptual justification makes justice to it. The first kind of alleged
190 For example Alston 1991: 10, who says that imposing such higher-level requirements on 
justification “gives us a distorted picture o f  human knowledge, representing it, even in its lesser 
manifestations, as much more intellectualized, sophisticated and systematic than it really is”. Audi 
1989: 337-38 also rejects higher-level requirements on justification for having that distorting effect.
191 See Alston 1988:241 and 1991: 14-15.
192 See for example Audi 1989: 340 and Alston 1988: 239, 1991: 19.
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counterexamples discussed also raise a legitimate point, this one about the prima 
facie status of the perceptual justification for which the truth-conducivity of one’s 
perceptual grounds can be held to be sufficient. But this point is also harmless and 
the prima facie qualification in the formulation of the basic epistemic principle about 
perception makes justice to it. The only harmful revision of the sufficiency condition 
would be the imposition of higher-level requirements, but such drastic move is 
insufficiently supported by the counterexamples described. If such counterexamples 
are the strongest case for revising the sufficiency condition, the veritistic philosopher 
should not fear that his project of establishing epistemic principles could be thwarted 
by such unpalatable consequences of that kind of requirement. He should only be 
worried about how to overcome the Conditional Position Problem; let’s then go back 
to that problem.
III.3. Third Route: The Apriority of Epistemic Principles
III.3.1. The Significance of Entrenchment
The last resort to try to avert the Conditional Position Problem is to eliminate 
reliance on self-support altogether in explaining the correctness of the basic 
epistemic principle about perception. Elimination of reliance on self-support here 
means that we should be able to establish the correctness of that epistemic principle 
without relying on perception; we will take this to be equivalent to being able to 
establish it apriori.
Is there an apriori route to show that we are justified in accepting the 
epistemic principle about perception? We will examine two attempts to develop a 
route of that kind. The first one exploits considerations closely related to the 
considerations that the argument for freedom form truth-conducive constraints led us 
to. At the end of (III. 1.3) we explained how strict freedom from truth-conducive 
constraints leads to inadequate epistemic constraints that seem incongruous with the 
defeating effect of evidence that undermines perceptual justification. We tentatively 
suggested that in order to account for such defeating effect it seemed that we needed
143
to suppose that perceptual justification is constrained at least for a presumption  or 
standing conviction that the conditions that confer justification are truth-conducive. 
The first route to attempt to establish apriori epistemic principles develops this idea 
that the principle is constrained by such a presumption or conviction; it is argued that 
so constrained the principle is establishable apriori. We will now expound and 
examine this position.
As we have pointed out earlier in (III. 1.1) the externalist treats truth- 
conducive constraints as conceptual truths establishable on the basis of an apriori 
analysis, but he thinks that showing that an epistemic principle fulfils any such 
constraint is an empirical matter. R. Audi agrees with the externalist that the basic 
epistemic principle about perception
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
• 1QTthat /?, one is prim a facie  justified in believing that p ,
can be shown to fulfil a truth-conducive constraint only empirically, but disagrees 
with him in thinking that the principle is not under a truth-conducive constraint; so 
showing that it is correct does not commit one to show that it fulfils any such 
constraint. He believes, however, that justification is not free from a  connection to 
truth, that the correctness of (EP) is constrained by a  connection to truth. He 
articulates such a connection that doesn’t amount to subsumption of (EP) under a 
truth-conducive constraint and argues that (EP) can be known apriori to fulfil the 
issuing constraint. The connection between (EP) and truth that Audi develops is that 
(EP) is partly constitutive of what he calls the practice of trying to show in a proper  
way that our beliefs are true, the practice of justifying in the right way  our beliefs. 
He writes:
... there is an a priori teleological relation between justification and truth.
Reflection alone shows that the process of justifying a belief has, as its
appropriate -even intrinsic- aim, showing or arguing for its truth (or at least
probable truth).194
I9j The exact wording o f  the principle that Audi discusses is ‘*P2: If S has an spontaneous perceptual
experience in which S has the impression that x is F  , and on this basis attentively believes that x
is F, then this belief is prima facie justified". (Audi 1988: 308).
194 Audi 1988: 319.
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While reliability is apparently not built into [epistemic principles] as a priori 
principles, they can be seen a priori to provide grounds for holding belief.
[Such principles]  are partly constitutive of epistemically permissible
attempts to show truth. Thus, justification does not necessarily imply truth or 
(objective) probability of truth; yet it is necessary that the process of 
justification “aims” at truth. Truth is the teleological aim of the practice to
which that process belongs  The sorts of generative factors figuring in
[the antecedent of epistemic principles] are intrinsically suited to this process: 
given a proper appeal to them, one aims right, in the sense of ‘properly’, 
whether or not one hits the target.195
In his view we cannot know apriori that basing one’s beliefs on the conditions 
mentioned in the antecedent of (EP) is truth-conducive, but Audi holds that we can 
know apriori that so basing one’s beliefs is constitutive of the practice of properly 
attempting to show that our beliefs are true.196 (EP) does not seem to say anything 
about what to do to show that a belief is justified; it rather only mentions conditions 
for the property of being justified. But Audi believes that the process of showing that 
a belief is justified and the property of being justified are intimately connected by the 
function played in both of the type of conditions mentioned in the antecedent of (EP). 
He thinks that we know apriori the function of those conditions through what he calls 
“conceptual reflection” applied to the concept ‘justification’.197 But he rejects the
suggestion that epistemic principles can be established and known simply by
108 * •reflecting on the linguistic meaning of ‘justification’. His view is rather that apriori
reflection on our concept of justification reveals that the property of a belief of being
justified is essentially constituted by conditions that an individual could cite in the
process of attempting to show that the belief is true, which is the practice of
justifying it. The property of being justified is then yielded by the same conditions
that can be cited in the process of justifying. Audi acknowledges that in order to
attain the property one need not go through the process, but the process is necessarily
a way of attaining the property. It is the role of the very same type of condition in
both constituting the property of being justified and in their usability in the practice
195 Audi 1988: 320
196 A s he puts it: “Those element apparently cannot be known a priori to be truth-conducive, but we 
can show a priori that justification has a teleological connection with truth” (1988: 330)
197 Audi 1993a: 367.
198 Ibid.: 368. “I do not think that [epistemic principles] could be known on the basis o f  empirical 
linguistic knowledge about 'justification’”.
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of justifying that can be known apriori.199 Although (EP) does not formulate what to 
do in the attempt to show that a belief is true, we know apriori that the conditions it 
mentions as sufficient for the property of justification are intrinsically suitable for 
citation in the practice of trying to show that a belief is true. This is why we know 
apriori that (EP) is constitutive of the practice of properly trying to show truth.
In Audi’s view the reason why the conditions mentioned in (EP) are 
conditions for justification is that citing such conditions is constitutive of the ‘proper’ 
or ‘right’ way of trying to show truth. But what makes that one the ‘right’ or ‘proper’ 
way of trying to show truth? Audi’s answer is that we conceive o f  the conditions 
mentioned in the epistemic principles as truth-conducive. This is not to say that such 
principle partially define justifiedness because the conditions it mentions have been 
empirically discovered  to be truth-conducive, that would make (EP) empirical, 
exactly what Audi wants to deny; it is rather that the conditions are merely conceived  
as truth-conducive. I’ll quote him at large:
Since the property of justification is, teleologically speaking, truth-conducive, 
the sorts of factors that we conceive as justifiers should also be factors that 
we think of as tending to produce true beliefs. This is not because we have 
discovered the (contingent) reliability of these factors and subsumed them 
under the principle that reliable belief-generators confer justification; it is 
more nearly because given the purposes of our justificatory practice, nothing 
could serve, in the basic way they do, as a justificatory element, unless we 
conceived  it as (at least contingently) truth conducive.200
...because our justificatory practice is based largely on a concern to grasp 
truths, it is to be expected that justification will supervene on properties of a 
belief (such as perceptual generation) in virtue of which we conceive it as 
likely to be true. 01
It must be emphasised that what makes a particular way of belief-formation the 
proper way of aiming at truth in Audi’s sense is not its factual truth-conducivity but 
just that we so conceive it; he explicitly indicates that the correctness of our 
conception about what conditions are truth-conducive is irrelevant:
199 Audi calls the thesis that postulates that the conditions that yield the property o f  justification must 
be capable o f  being cited in the process o f  justifying the belief, the “Integration Thesis5', for it 
integrates the property and the process without making the property dependant on the process.
200 Audi 1988: 323. Audi's emphasis
201 Ibid.: 324. My emphasis.
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If we are trying to show that a belief has a property which is truth-conducive,
the base properties we cite will clearly be ones we take to conduce to truth.
We may err about the reliability o f a given factor.; but as we come to believe
that a type of factor does reliably indicate truth, we tend to count citing it as 
• * •  202 providing (at least indirect) justification.
The fact that we conceive of certain conditions or belief-sources as truth-conducive 
presumably is knowable apriori; since it is our so conceiving perceptual conditions 
that makes (EP) constitutive of the proper way of trying to show truth and hence a 
correct epistemic principle, it follows that we can know (EP) to be correct apriori.
Audi’s view consists of two claims: first, that (EP) is constitutive of the 
practice of properly trying to show truth, and second, that what makes it constitutive 
of that practice is that we conceive of the justifying conditions it mentions as truth- 
conducive. These two claims together constitute a constraint on the correctness of an 
epistemic principle: in order to be adequate an epistemic principle must be partly 
constitutive of the proper way of trying to show truth, which means that we must 
conceive of the conditions it mentions in its antecedent as truth-conducive. We can 
take this constraint as Audi’s replacement for a straightforward truth-conducive 
constraint on epistemic principles. Audi thinks that we can know apriori if an 
epistemic principle fulfils his constraint, for he thinks that we can know apriori, 
through ‘conceptual reflection’, whether an epistemic principle is partly constitutive 
of the proper way of trying to show truth. We can then easily know apriori that we 
are justified in accepting (EP), for we know apriori that we conceive that conditions 
it mentions as partly constitutive of the proper way of trying to show truth. We will 
not dispute the apriori knowability of fulfilment of Audi’s constraint. What we will 
dispute is that his constraint is a constraint that corresponds to the epistemic good 
that (EP) is meant to define.
We should ask then if the mere fact that we conceive of a certain type of 
condition as truth-conducive explains why such conditions are conditions for an 
epistemic good. Certainly the crystal ball gazer’s beliefs do not acquire justification 
merely because he conceives of his method as truth-conducive. Audi seems to think 
that the conceiving he is invoking must reflect or be backed by an entrenched 
conviction that the conditions in question are truth-conducive, for he remarks that
202 Audi 1988: 323. My emphasis.
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refusing to ascribe justification in the presence of such conception of the justifying 
factors as truth-conducive will indicate conceptual deviance:
...we will justify beliefs in terms of properties we believe are truth-conducive; 
and when a property is so conceived denying its relevance to the justification 
of a belief that has it will seem conceptually deviant.203
Our conception of perception as a truth-conducive belief-source reflects a highly 
entrenched communal conviction, whereas the conviction of the crystal ball gazer 
about his belief-source lacks such ancient communal backing. For that reason 
incapacity to appreciate the relevance of perception for justification of belief about 
our surrounding environment would suggest that a radically different concept of 
justification for those beliefs is being applied, one that is not rooted in the entrenched 
communal conviction that enables one to appreciate the relevance of perception for 
justification. Audi acknowledges that our entrenched convictions about which 
sources are truth-conducive may change over time and as a consequence our 
conception of what justifies may change as well:
...the element we regard as justificatory, such as sensory and memorial 
experiences, are elements that we also normally take to be at least in fact 
reliable indicators of truth; and as our beliefs about reliability change, our 
conception of what justifies, and even of justification itself, can evolve 204
But as long as there are stable conceptions about which sources are truth-conducive, 
there will be stable ideas as to what are the proper ways of trying to show that a 
belief is true, and we will be able to know which those proper ways are through 
apriori reflection on those stable conceptions integral to our practice of justifying.
Nevertheless, the entrenchment of convictions about truth-conducivity should 
not conceal the fact that Audi invokes them as mere convictions that could be 
mistaken. No matter how entrenched our conceptions about which sources are truth- 
conducive invoking them as mere conceptions does not seem to explain the original 
explanandum of the veritistic philosopher, i.e. that perceptual conditions are 
sufficient for an epistemic good, but at best only why we think that they are 
conditions for an epistemic good. Effectively, citing the fact that we think or
203 Audi 1988:323.
204 Ibid.: 330-31.
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conceive of certain conditions as truth-conducive could explain why we think 
subjects are justified if they fulfil those conditions, but the original explanandum of 
the veritistic philosopher was not “We think that S is perceptually justified in 
believing that p” but “S is perceptually justified in believing that p”. Audi’s 
constraint seems to be a constraint for the former, not the latter; accordingly, his 
position seems to have the effect of shifting the veritistic explanandum from the later 
to the former. On the face of it this shift looks like a retreat to a more modest 
explanatory goal, but it should be recognized that the original explanatory goal has 
then been abandoned. Unlike Audi, Goldman is aware of the shift in explanandum 
produced by replacing truth-conducivity with a mere conception of truth-conducivity 
as a constraint on justification; he even holds that explaining the more modest 
explanandum is all that the veritistic theorist really wants:
What we really want is an explanation of why we count, or would count, 
certain beliefs as justified and others as unjustified. Such an explanation must 
refer to our beliefs about reliability, not to the actual facts. The reason we 
count beliefs as justified is that they are formed by what we believe to be 
reliable belief-forming processes. Our beliefs about which belief-forming 
processes are reliable may be erroneous, but that does not affect the adequacy 
of the explanation.205
The falsity of our beliefs as theorists concerning which belief-sources are truth- 
conducive would not affect the adequacy of our explanation only if our explanandum 
is “we count S as justified in believing that p”; it would affect it if the explanandum 
is “S is justified in believing that p”. For our conceiving (truly or falsely) that X is 
truth-conducive seems to explain why we think (truly or falsely) that S is justified 
only because we think that X being  truth-conducive would explain why S A justified; 
if we don't acknowledge this latter explanatory relation among the facts  it becomes 
obscure why should we see our conceptions about truth-conducivity as relevant to 
the explanation of our beliefs about justifiedness. But then our thinking 
(unbeknownst to us fa lsely) that X is truth-conducive cannot account for S being 
justified, although it would still account for why we think he is. The falsity of our 
beliefs about truth-conducivity does not affect the adequacy of a veritistic 
explanation only if the original explanandum is replaced with the subjectivised 
surrogate: “We think that S is justified”.
205 Goldman 1979: 349. My emphases.
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But there is a point in Audi’s and Goldman’s view. The veritistic philosopher 
is indeed interested in the first place in knowing why we count people as justified. 
Since the epistemic appraisals that people make are based on people’s beliefs about 
the truth-conducivity of the individuals’ sources, it follows that the veritistic 
philosopher is interested in people’s beliefs about which belief-sources are truth- 
conducive as well. But we recognize the difference between merely counting people 
as justified on the basis of beliefs about truth-conducivity that could be erroneous, 
and people actually being justified. As Goldman himself indicates:
People’s appraisals of doxastic attitudes as justified or unjustified reflect only 
their beliefs about justifledness, not the facts  of justifledness. When Smith
judges Jones’ belief to be justified   this indicates that Smith’s believes
that Jones’ belief accords with the right [epistemic principle]. It doesn’t mean 
that Jones’ belief does accord  with the right [epistemic principle], nor even 
that Smith is justified in believing that it so accords (though doubtless Smith 
thinks that he is justified).206
But if we recognize the difference between people’s beliefs about justifledness and 
the facts of justifledness, our mere entrenched convictions about which sources are 
truth-conducive could serve merely to formulate  putatively correct epistemic 
principles; whether they are really correct or not cannot be determined on the basis of 
whether they fulfil the constraint imposed by our entrenched conceptions about truth- 
conducivity; they trivially do, for they were formulated on the basis of those 
convictions. If a veritistic philosopher insists that our entrenched convictions about 
which types of conditions are truth-conducive, and hence which ones are constitutive 
of the proper way of trying to show our beliefs to be true, constitute an adequate 
constraint on the correctness of an epistemic principle that mentions a certain type of 
conditions in its antecedent, he is really surrendering the initial explanandum of the 
veritistic explanation and replacing it with a subjective surrogate; for only our mere 
opinions about when we are justified can be explained by our mere opinions about 
which of our belief-sources are truth-conducive.
If a mere entrenched conviction or presumption that the conditions mentioned 
in the antecedent of (EP) are truth-conducive is not an adequate constraint on the 
correctness of (EP), it seems that the adequate constraint on (EP) should be a 
straightforward truth-conducive constraint. Our mere convictions about truth-
206 Goldman 1980: 59.
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conducivity are relevant for explaining our beliefs about which epistemic principles 
are correct only because we think that the factual truth-conducivity of the conditions 
mentioned in the epistemic principle would help explain the correctness of the 
principle. If we don’t acknowledge this latter explanatory relation among the facts, it 
becomes obscure why we should take our beliefs about truth-conducivity as relevant 
for explaining our beliefs about which epistemic principles are correct.
But if respecting the original veritistic explanandum requires us to leave 
truth-conducive constraints in place, we are left with the task of dealing with the 
intuitions prompted by the Matrix scenario described in (III. 1.2) above that were 
used to argue for freedom from truth-conducive constraints. The issue of how to 
explain away such intuitions in the context of a veritistic epistemology that leaves 
truth-conducive constraints in place is complex and we cannot tackle it here. We will 
only point out that there are independent reasons for explaining those intuitions away. 
In (III. 1.2) we mentioned a few reasons to distrust such intuitions; one of those 
reasons is that such intuitions are incompatible with extemalism about intentional 
content. This incompatibility and the strength of the independent arguments in favour 
of extemalism about content provide excellent motivation for explaining away those
•  • 907intuitions uncongenial with truth-conducive constraints.
III.3.2. Complexity Reduction and Truth-Conducivity
Given our discussion in the previous section it seems that if an apriori attempt to 
establish the basic epistemic principle about perception is going to respect the 
original veritistic explanandum. and not weaken it in the way that Audi and Goldman 
advocate, it has to respect the idea that the principle is subjected to a truth-conducive 
constraint, and not merely to a weaker constraint concerning our entrenched 
convictions about truth-conducivity. But then that the principle fulfils a truth- 
conducive constraint must be establishable apriori, for that’s what has to be 
established in order to explain our perceptual justification, the original veritistic 
explanandum. In this section we will scrutinize a sophisticated attempt to show
207 See Williamson forthcoming, for a forceful critique o f  those intuitions on the basis o f  their 
incompatibility with semantic extemalism.
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apriori that the basic epistemic principle about perception fulfils a truth-conducive 
constraint. It has been developed by Christopher Peacocke.
Peacocke’s conception of how to show apriori that transitions form the 
perceptual conditions mentioned in (EP) to belief are truth-conducive is nested in 
what he takes to be the hallmark of a rationalistic understanding of what makes a 
way of knowing a proposition apriori. In accordance with his rationalism in order for 
the truth-conducivity of the transitions described in (EP) to be established apriori it 
has to be established on the basis of facts about the nature and the identity of the 
representational contents of the perceptual states mentioned in the antecedent of (EP),
1AO
facts which must be knowable apriori. Peacocke calls ‘apriori abduction’ the 
argument for the truth-conducivity of perception that allegedly complies with this 
constraint imposed by his rationalism on any way of knowing that is to count as 
apriori. We will now examine in detail that apriori abduction.
It is important to point out that Peacocke’s apriori argument for the truth- 
conducivity of perceptual states is meant to apply only to perceptual states of the 
type that he calls ‘instance individuated’.209 The mark of these is that “What makes 
these perceptions have the content they do is the fact that when the subject is 
properly related to the world the holding of these contents causally explains such 
perceptual experiences of their holding”.210 This excludes perceptions with contents
•^ 1  1
such as Swedish people or Mac computer, for even when the subject is properly 
related to the world experiences with those contents may not be causally explained 
by the holding of the correctness condition for that content. There are many 
questions on how to characterize the instance individuated perceptual contents that 
Peacocke focuses on, but here we need not go into those questions, as none of our 
criticisms of Peacocke’s apriori abduction depends on the specific characterization of 
instance individuated contents he offers. Here we just register that this are the only 
kind of perceptual state that his argument purports to show is truth-conducive. For 
the sake of brevity we will continue to talk about perceptual states and conditions 
without qualification, but for the rest of this section it must be understood that we are 
talking only about perceptual states with instance individuated contents in 
Peacocke’s sense.
208 Peacocke 2004: 52.
209 Ibid.: 69.
210 Ibidem.
2,1 Ibid.: 66.
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We can represent Peacocke’s apriori abduction as follows:
1. The occurrence of perceptual states is a complex event.
2. Explanations that best reduce complexity show the easiest way for things to 
come about.
3. Explanations that show the easiest way for things to come about are the most 
likely to be true.
4. Explanations that best reduce complexity are the most likely to be true. (From 
2 & 3)
5. A Natural Selection (NS) explanation of the occurrence of perceptual states 
best reduces complexity
6. Therefore, a (NS) explanation of the occurrence of perceptual states is the 
most likely to be true. (From 4 & 5)
7. A (NS) explanation of the occurrence of perceptual states implies that they 
are predominantly veridical
8. Therefore, on the most likely explanation perceptual states are predominantly 
veridical. (From 6 & 7)
9. Therefore, transitions form perceptual states to belief are predominantly 
truth-conducive.
Let’s explain the meaning of the central terms in this argument and how Peacocke 
presents the inferences in it.
Peacocke introduces the notion of complexity reduction with some illustrations 
where a good explanation of some complex conditions of type X is one that does not 
cite an explanans that involves conditions of the same type X. One of his illustrations 
concerns the explanation of the hexagonal structure of snowflakes. The explanation 
does not cite hexagonal structures at a different level to explain the hexagonal 
structure of the whole snowflake; it cites different types of facts, for example that 
frozen oxygen molecules are roughly spherical and arranged in a plane, and that the 
most efficient way of arranging spheres in a plane results in a hexagonal shape. 
Peacocke points out that we give good marks to explanations that do not repeat the 
same type of complexity:
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The correct explanation of the shape of snowflakes does not leave us with the 
same complexity again at another level. It reduces -in  this case it eliminates- 
that kind of complexity.212
Similarly the explanation of the occurrence of an intentional state should not repeat 
the same type of state in its explanans:
Any explanation of how the subject comes to be in that state, an explanation 
that accounts empirically for the presence of this complexity, must not simply 
presuppose similar intentional complexity.213
Peacocke goes on to elaborate the notion of complexity implicitly in these judgments 
as follows:
When there is an explanation of a complex property of some object or event, 
there is an explanation of why the object or event has a property which falls 
within a narrow range of the space of possible properties of that object or 
event. Shapes with hexagonal symmetry form a small subset of the 
geometrically possible shapes for a quantity of a frozen liquid. What needs to 
be explained is why the shapes of actual snowflakes fall within that narrow 
subset.214
According to this, the hexagonal shape of a snowflake is a complex property of this 
object because hexagonal shapes are a small subset of the set of possible properties 
the snowflake could have in respect of its shape. Accordingly, if hexagonal shapes 
formed a bigger subset of the possible properties the snowflake could have in respect 
of its shape having a hexagonal shape would be a less complex property; and if the 
sets of actual and possible properties of the snowflake in respect of its shape 
coincided there would not be an explanation of why the actual property falls in a 
narrower range from a wider range of possibilities it could have, simply because 
there wouldn't be a wider range of possibilities for it. A fortiori there would not be a 
complexity reduction explanation for such necessary property. We can formulate this 
notion of complexity saying that the complexity of a property X of an object or event 
M is proportional to the ratio: possible properties of M in respect Y / actual property
21" Peacocke 2004 : 78.
213 Ibid.: 85.
2,4 Ibid.: 81.
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X of M in respect Y, if this ratio is high the complexity of property X is high, if the 
ratio is low the complexity of property X is low.
According to Peacocke “[a]ny explanation of complexity as I am conceiving
215 •it must explain more complex states by less complex states”. Given the above 
notion of complexity this means that an explanation that reduces complexity does so 
by citing an explaining property X’ of an object or event M \ whose ratio: possible 
properties of M’ in respect Y’ / actual property X’ of M’ in respect Y’ is lower than 
the corresponding ratio for the explained property M. But then it becomes unclear 
whether the explanation of hexagonal shape of snowflakes that Peacocke mentions 
really reduces complexity in this sense. For that explanation cites the condition that 
oxygen molecules in frozen water have roughly spherical shape and it is unclear why 
we should regard the property of this explaining condition, i.e. having spherical 
shape, as less complex than the property of the condition to be explained, i.e. having 
a hexagonal shape. The ratio: possible properties of frozen oxygen molecules in 
respect their shape / actual property of frozen oxygen molecules of having a roughly 
spherical shape seems to be at least as high as the ratio: possible properties of 
snowflakes in respect of shape / actual property of snowflakes of having hexagonal 
shape; for hexagonal shapes and spherical shapes form an equally small subset of all 
possible geometrical shapes. If this is so then the explanation Peacocke describes as 
an example of complexity reduction does not really reduce complexity in the special 
sense he elaborates. Below we will see that Peacocke’s notion of complexity has 
other damaging consequences for the apriori justifiability of some of his claims.
Peacocke uses reduction of complexity as a criterion for good explanations. 
Here is what his Complexity Reduction Principle says:
Other things equal, good explanations of complex phenomena explain the 
more complex in terms of the less complex; they reduce complexity.216
If our explanation doesn't reduce complexity in this sense “one will have explained 
the apparently unlikely in terms of the apparently unlikely. One will not have shown
7 1 7how the complexity could easily have come about” . So the less complex 
conditions that a complexity reduction explanation cites as its explanans are
2.5 Peacocke 2004: 82.
2.6 Ibid.: 83.
2.7 Ibid.: 82.
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conditions that could easily come about. This is premise (2) in his argument. 
Peacocke holds that conditions that could easily come about are more likely to come 
about (this is premise (3)):
...other things equal, complexity reducing explanations of complex
phenomena are more likely to be true than those that do not reduce
• 218 complexity.
...the fact that an explanation reduces complexity counts in favour of its 
confirmation, because it is an explanation that does not make it hard or
219excessively improbable for the postulated explaining condition to be true.
According to Peacocke applying the principle of complexity reduction to the 
complex phenomena of the occurrence of perceptual experiences we find that its best 
explanation, i.e. the one that most reduces complexity, is a Natural Selection (NS) 
explanation (this is premise (5)) which says that perceptual states “are produced by a 
device which has evolved by natural selection to represent the world accurately to the 
subject”.220 Such explanation succeeds in reducing complexity because it doesn’t cite 
as explaining conditions states or events of the same kind that the states being 
explained:
The explanation by natural selection of the existence of roughly accurate 
perceptual systems reduces complexity. The explanation succeeds by citing 
states of affairs of lesser complexity than that which is to be explained. The 
explanation does not postulate the occurrence of other intentional states in the 
production of perceptual experience. Nor does it postulate other unexplained 
states of the same relational complexity as those to be explained.221
The explanation of perceptual experiences that most reduces complexity happens to 
be the one which predicts that perceptual experiences of creatures like us 
predominantly represent the world veridically (this is premise (7)). Since the 
explanation that most reduces complexity is the most likely to be true, we obtain the 
result that on the most likely explanation perceptual states predominantly represent 
correctly:
218 Peacocke 2004: 95.
219 Ibid.: 97.
220 Ibid.: 87.
221 Ibid.: 88.
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... explanations of the occurrence of experiences with instance-individuated 
contents which succeed in reducing complexity will also result in the 
representational contents of those instance-individuated experiences being 
predominantly correct. Such representational contents are predominantly 
correct in the case that is most likely, that of the complexity-reducing 
explanation which appeals to the evolution of a perceptual system through 
natural selection.
If on the most likely explanation perceptual states are predominantly veridical, then 
the most likely hypothesis is that transitions from perceptual states to belief are truth- 
conducive. This concludes the apriori case for the claim that the basic perceptual 
epistemic principle fulfils a truth-conducive constraint.
If Peacocke’s argument is going to furnish an apriori case for the conclusion 
that transitions from perceptual states to belief are predominantly truth-conducive all 
of its premises must be establishable apriori. I will dispute the apriority of the core 
steps in the argument that take us from complexity reduction to likelihood of truth, 
i.e. premises 2-4. Even if we concede that the rest of the premises of the argument 
are establishable apriori, if these crucial ones are not Peacocke’s abduction will not 
be an apriori one.
Let us begin with the Complexity Reduction Principle (CRP) itself. Why 
should we accept that the criterion of good (and as the steps from (2) to (4) purport to 
show, more likely) explanation is one that reduces complexity in Peacocke’s sense? 
He gives no principled argument for the (CRP), he only illustrates its plausibility 
with a few examples (like the one about snowflakes we mentioned above) and 
highlights the dissatisfaction we would feel if the principle was violated in some 
instances, for example, in an explanation of how intelligence comes about that cited 
capacities of similar intellectual richness.223 But this kind of argument by example is 
definitely insufficient as a justification of a principle that states a criterion for 
acceptable explanations in fu ll generality and which Peacocke treats as apriori 
correct. Moreover, as we argued above, the example of snowflakes Peacocke uses 
does not in fact seem to reduce complexity and so it wouldn’t support the (CRP).
In fact there are positive reasons for doubting the (CRP). In general, given 
Peacocke’s special sense of complexity reduction the (CRP) disqualifies as bad
222 Peacocke 2004: 97-98.
223 See Ibid.: 88
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explanations many paradigmatically good explanations in physical science that do 
not seem to reduce complexity in that special sense. All explanations that cite in the 
explanans a numerical constant do not seem to reduce complexity in the ratio
224  • 11 2sense. For example, the gravitational constant G = 6.67 x 10’ newton -m  /kg, is
used to calculate, among many other things, the mass of the planets. Given
Peacocke’s ratio notion of complexity reduction it is unclear why we should regard
11 2the property of having the numerical value 6.67 x 10' newton -m  /kg as less 
complex than the property of planet Earth of having a mass of value 5.9742 x 1024 kg. 
The ratio: possible values for gravitational constant / actual value of the gravitational 
constant seems to be at least as high as the ratio: possible values for the mass of 
planet Earth / actual value of the mass of planet Earth, for the actual value of the 
gravitational force and the actual value of the mass of planet Earth seem to be 
equally small subsets of all possible values for the gravitational constant and all 
possible values of the mass of planet Earth, respectively.
In response someone could argue that in fact the range of possible values that 
the gravitational constant could have taken is not as large as the possible values the 
mass of the Earth could have taken, and so the ratio that defines the complexity of 
the gravitational constant is lower then the ratio that defines the complexity of the 
mass of the Earth. But the question would then be how do we know that the range of 
possibilities for the gravitational constant is smaller than the range of possibilities for 
the mass of the Earth? This same question arises with respect to all purported 
examples of complexity reduction, and one central difficulty in answering it is that 
Peacocke does not explain what notion of possibility he uses in formulating the ratio 
notion of complexity reduction. If it is merely logical possibility then the explanation 
of the mass of the Earth which appeals to constant G is a good explanation that does 
not reduce complexity for the reasons already explained; the same holds for the 
explanation of snowflakes’ shape discussed above. If Peacocke wanted to argue that 
the ranges of possibilities for the gravitational constant and for the arrangement of 
frozen oxygen molecules is smaller than the ranges of possibilities for their 
respective explananda, it seems that he would have to invoke a notion of what is 
possible for those explaining conditions informed by empirical information, supplied 
by cosmological science and physics. Maybe these sciences have discovered that the
224 1 got this point about physical constants in connection with complexity reduction from Marcus 
Giaquinto.
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value of the gravitational constant, unlike the value of the mass of the Earth, could 
not be very different from its actual value; and that the arrangement of oxygen 
molecules in frozen water, unlike the shape of snowflakes, could not be very 
different from the arrangement it actually takes. But in that case judgments about the 
complexity of a purported explanans relative to its explanandum would have to be 
empirically informed; they could not be made apriori as Peacocke needs them to be.
For the sake of argument let us suppose that Peacocke’s (CRP) can be 
justified apriori and let us see if Peacocke succeeds in justifying apriori the other 
core premises in his abduction.
Premise (2) in Peacocke’s argument says that “the aim of complexity 
reduction in explanation is to show how the apparently unlikely can easily come 
about”.225 Why should we accept that the explanation that best reduces complexity in 
the non-repeating sense is the one that shows the easiest way things could come 
about? We can imagine counterexamples to such correlation. Imagine a world where 
all the brains that have existed in the last 1000 years have been always envated and 
manipulated by a super-computer designed by an evil scientist. In that world the 
explanation of perceptual experiences which best reduces complexity still is one that 
doesn’t cite the intentions of an evil scientist, but that explanation does not coincide 
with the one that shows the easiest way for perceptual experiences to come about, for 
in that world the easiest way for a perceptual experience to come about is by being a 
hallucination produced by the manipulations of a super-computer programmed by the 
evil scientist.226 In order to align complexity reduction and the easiest way as he 
needs Peacocke could add the premise that the actual world is not that Matrix world. 
But such a premise is not available to him neither as a piece of empirical knowledge 
nor as a piece of apriori knowledge. For if it is a piece of empirical knowledge then 
relying on would threaten the apriori status of this step of the abduction; on the other
225 Peacocke 2004: 90-91.
226 In this counterexample I am interpreting 'the easiest way for X to come about’ as within a w orld , 
but it may be interpreted over worlds. A suggestion for this interpretation (which I take from Marcus 
Giaquinto) is this:
W is the easiest way for X to come about iif(df) there are more worlds in which X comes
about in way W than worlds in which X comes about in any other way.
However, adopting an understanding o f  ‘the easiest way for X to come about’ over worlds would 
create a problem for Peacocke. The problem is that it just does not seem to be knowable apriori that a 
specific way W for X to come about is the easiest way in the above sense, for how can we know 
apriori that there are more possible worlds in which X comes via W than worlds in which it comes in 
any other way?
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hand he can’t take that premise to be established apriori for that is precisely what he 
is trying to show, that there is an apriori argument for the conclusion that we are 
entitled to take perceptual experiences at face value, and hence to take it that we are 
in a normal, as opposed to a Matrix, world. This counterexample to premise (2) 
exploits the fact that if the right hypothesis is in place then the easiest way for 
something to come about is not going to be the one that best reduces complexity. 
Peacocke is aware of the threat that this fact poses to his view and responds by 
saying that the judgment that aligns easiest ways with complexity reduction is not 
relativised to any hypothesis about any empirical conditions that hold in the world. 
He illustrates the point with the explanation of how a molecule of a specified type of 
DNA came into existence; he holds that relative to the empirical information that 
DNA molecules already exist the easiest way for the molecule of the specified kind 
to come about is for one of the existing molecules to be copied. But he holds that 
without relativisation to the information that DNA molecules already exists the 
easies way for a molecule of the specified type to come about is by some form of
9 9 7chemical evolution. He intends his judgment about the easiest way for a perceptual 
state to come about to be of this unrelativised kind:
It is a claim of the unrelativised kind I intend when I say that the easiest way 
for a perceptual experience to occur is one in which it is unlikely to be a 
hallucination. The case for this claim, whether right or wrong, is made on 
philosophical grounds, and does not rely for its justification on empirical 
information attained by perception. There is no relativization in this claim to998conditions which are known to hold only on empirical grounds.
That is exactly what the apriority of his explanation demands, i.e. that his judgment 
about the easiest way for things to come into existence does not rely on any empirical 
information. But the example he gives is not an argument that such kind of fully 
unrelativised judgments is possible. At best it illustrates independence from one 
specific piece of empirical information. Even conceding that the judgment that the 
easiest way for a specific type of DNA molecule to come into existence is through 
chemical evolution is not relativised to the specific piece of information that DNA 
molecules already exist, it is doubtful that it is not relativised to any empirical 
assumption at all. For instance, with what right could we hypothesize that chemical
227 Peacocke 2004: 92.
228 Ibidem.
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evolution is the easiest way for a certain type of DNA molecule to come into 
existence, without assuming some knowledge about how chemical evolution acts on 
other known DNA molecules? A hypothesis about the easiest way for a type of DNA 
molecule to come to exist postulated in a strictly empirical vacuum should look 
arbitrary; in any case Peacocke does not show that a judgment fully unrelativised to 
empirical information about the easiest way for empirical conditions to come into 
existence is possible, his illustration leaves this question open.
With different terminology Peacocke insists on the possibility of making the 
fully unrelativised judgments he envisages and that such judgments coincide with the 
explanation that best reduce complexity. He distinguishes ‘merely as-if states from 
genuine states. For example, a crowd of actors that behave as if they were playing a 
soccer game for the filming of a movie and a perfect hallucination that p are ‘merely 
as i f  states with respect to the genuine states of playing a soccer game and having a 
perception that p. He uses the phrase ‘as-if state’ in such a way that it applies to both 
merely as-if states and genuine states, although the later are not merely as-if states. 
Peacocke holds that if the only information given is that an as-if state occurs, with no 
more information about other empirical conditions that hold in the world, then the 
easiest way for it to come about is the way that best reduces complexity:
In a significant range of cases given just the information that an as if state 
qualitatively similar to an instance of S  occurs the easiest way for this to be 
the case is for it to be a genuine instance of S, and not a mere as-if state. For it 
to be a genuine instance of S  is the explanation that most reduces 
complexity.229
But this alleged illustration of the judgment unrelativised to empirical information 
raises the same doubts as the DNA example. In the same way that the judgment that 
singles out chemical evolution as the easiest way for a type of molecule to come 
about does seem to presuppose some empirical knowledge about the processes that 
govern other DNA molecules, the judgement that singles out the obtaining of a 
genuine state as the easiest way for a given as-if state to obtain seems to rely on 
background empirical hypotheses about how things usually come about in a ‘normal 
environment’. In any case Peacocke has not shown that this is not so; he has not
229 Peacocke 2004: 105.
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shown that the agreement between complexity reduction and easiest ways stated in 
his premise (2) is establishable apriori.
What should we say about premise (3), which connects easiest ways with 
likelihood of truth? Schematically premises (2) and (3) give us these connections:
Complexity reduction — Easiest way for X to come about — Most likely to be true
(2) (3)
We don’t need to enquire whether the connection between the easiest ways and the 
most likely ones, i.e. premise (3), can be established apriori; for even if it could we 
have argued that Peacocke fails to show that the connection between complexity 
reduction and easiest ways, i.e. premise (2), is establishable apriori. Therefore, the 
connection between complexity reduction and likelihood of truth, i.e. premise (4), 
which is inferred from (2) and (3), cannot be establishable apriori either.
If the foregoing criticisms are correct then even if Peacocke could somehow 
single out apriori the (NS) explanation as the one that best reduces complexity with 
respect to the occurrence of perceptual states, which is premise (5), the inference 
to its being the most likely, i.e. premise (6), will be mediated by (4), which itself 
depends on (2), which we have argued is not establishable apriori. For this reason the 
abduction in favour of the explanation that predicts that perceptual states are 
predominantly veridical cannot be regarded as apriori. Therefore, such abduction 
does not support an apriori case for the claim that transitions from perceptual states 
to belief are truth-conducive. Peacocke has not shown an apriori route to establish 
that the basic epistemic principle about perceptual justification fulfils a truth- 
conducive constraint.
230 But Peacocke also has trouble in defending the claim that the (NS) explanation is the one that best 
reduces complexity with respect to the occurrence o f  perceptual states, as he acknowledges (2004: 
98):
The argument is open ended in that I have not shown that explanations by natural selection o f  
the existence o f  perceptual systems provide the only satisfactory explanation o f  complexity 
that succeeds in reducing complexity. I have not proved that there are no others: I have 
merely not been able to construct any.
162
Chapter IV
Scope and Limitations
IV. 1. Reconceptualising the Goal of the Project: Vindications and 
Entitlements
The Conditional Position Problem (CPP) is an obstacle in the task of showing that 
we are justified in accepting the basic epistemic principle about perception; it 
obstructs the ability of the veritistic philosopher to conclude that we are justified in 
taking it that perception is truth-conducive, leaving him in the position of being able 
to conclude merely that we are justified in believing that perception is truth- 
conducive only if it is. (CPP) arises from a crude externalist treatment of self-support, 
its avoidance has to either eschew self-support altogether or give a non-crude 
externalist treatment of it. In the previous chapter close examination of each of these 
possible ways of overcoming (CCP) has reveal them as unpromising.
A common characteristic of attempts to overcome (CPP) we have examined is 
that they somehow attempt to justify the claim that perception is a truth-conducive 
belief-source and then, given minimal veritism, that the basic epistemic principle 
about perception is correct. This is a shared broad conception of the goal of the 
project as a justificatory goal. We have assumed that such a goal is a legitimate one, 
but a reaction to our results so far could contest that assumption. If the goal is not a 
legitimate one, failure to achieve it shouldn't be viewed as philosophically 
significant. Is the goal legitimate? It could be argued that the justificatory goal is 
somehow ill-conceived, for it aims to show or justify the claim that a basic belief- 
source is truth-conducive and it is not clear how a belief-source can be shown truth- 
conducive except by means of other more fundamental belief-sources. The task of 
testing and establishing the truth-conducivity of a non-basic belief source is normally 
a perfectly achievable goal, but such a task essentially presupposes appeal to 
independent belief sources which are not the object of testing. But by fixing on a 
basic belief-source we necessarily deprive ourselves of the requisite independent 
resources that made that kind of inquiry unproblematic, for there are no independent
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belief-sources to investigate the truth-conducivity of a basic belief-source; we must 
investigate it by itself. Of course it is not immediately obvious what is exactly 
problematic with such a necessary appeal to self-support. As the previous chapters 
illustrate, it takes some argument to identify what makes such appeal problematic. 
But the fact remains that in setting ourselves the task of showing that a basic belief- 
source is truth conducive we seem to be setting a goal which strangely deviates from 
similar goals pursued in other areas of knowledge. The deviation in question should 
make us suspect that the goal itself is illegitimate; the negative results we have 
obtained in searching the different available routes to accomplish that goal 
substantiate that suspicion.
The illegitimacy of the justificatory goal means that it is illegitimate to 
attempt to justify the claim that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. But 
justification is not the only epistemic standing that one might have in relation to this 
proposition. Moreover, the fact that we have evidence that it cannot be shown that 
we have such an epistemic standing with respect to that propositions suggests that we 
have been misconceiving the kind of epistemic status that we can sensibly aspire to 
in relation to that proposition. If we are going to retain veritism we still have to 
conceive of epistemic principles as subject to truth-conducive constraints; what we 
have to give up is the aspiration of showing or justifying that they fulfil such 
constraints. This is the point at which the goal has to be reconceptualised. What can 
go in place of this piece of showing or justifying? We can find an answer to this 
question in the approach of some philosophers to the problem of induction. These 
philosophers distinguished between validating and vindicating a method of belief 
formation.-31 Very crudely, to validate a method is to show that it is truth-conducive; 
to vindicate it is to show that if success in achieving a certain truth-linked goal is 
possible this method will achieve it. This is a mere slogan, but it's enough to 
introduce the sense of the contrast. In a vindication no evidence if offered for the 
claim that the method is truth-conducive, it rather consists in a proof that the method 
will take us to true beliefs, if true belief is achievable at all; this last claim could be 
true even if true belief is actually unachievable and therefore any putative evidence 
for the truth-conducivity of the method is necessarily spurious. A vindication of a
“,1 See for example Feigl 1952 and 1963; and Reichenbach 1949.
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method is distinct from the justification (validation) of the claim that it is truth- 
conducive.
A vindication was usually also called “pragmatic justification”, for its alleged 
resemblance to the justification underpinning decisions to take courses of action 
when our information about the conducivity of our means to our ends is incomplete, 
but where taking the course of action is our only chance to achieve the end. But the 
term ‘pragmatic’ is confusing, because it suggests non-epistemic, and the 
vindications of epistemic principles we will be discussing are epistemic in as much 
as they vindicate a method vis-a-vis a truth-linked goal, not, say, relative to 
prudential or pragmatic goals. In recent years the essentials in the idea of a 
vindication have been rehabilitated by Crispin Wright and others. If successful, 
this view promises a way a carrying forward the veritistic project of explaining 
epistemic principles. We will now examine how much of this promise is actually 
fulfilled.
In (II.4.1.) we examined Wright’s line of reasoning for charging certain 
arguments with a vicious form of epistemic dependence we termed (DW). (DW) is 
exhibited by an argument if and only if the justification for its premises depends on 
an antecedent and independent warrant for the conclusion. In Wright’s conception 
this latter warrant is an entitlement. In recent writings Wright has developed further 
the notion of entitlement that figures in his charge of (DW). Earlier we pointed out 
several problems in his characterisation of his notion of entitlement, but we were not 
as much interested in the notion itself as in the accusation of (DW) of which it is part. 
Now our interest will focus entirely on how Wright has developed the notion itself 
and on the conditions on which it has application, for his views on these matters 
suggest a direction in which the veritistic project of explaining epistemic principles 
could be pushed forward and away from the difficulties discussed in chapter III.
In chapter II we discuss some problems in the characterisation of the type of 
doxastic attitude that Wright’s entitlements attach to and of the range of propositions 
that such an attitude ranges over. Wright’s developed views on these issues constitute 
substantive improvements on his former ones. However, we don’t need to fix on 
them. Our discussion will focus exclusively on the conditions for the epistemic right 
he calls entitlement. For our purposes we need only point out that he calls
232 For example Enoch and Schechter MS.
165
‘cornerstones’233 the propositions that the special doxastic attitude ranges over and 
that he terms ‘taking on trust’ the doxastic attitude that entitlements attach to.234 So 
that a cornerstone is the appropriate kind of proposition that one can be entitled to 
take on trust. He remarks that taking on trust that p  is to be understood by its relation 
to the central doxastic attitude believe that p. Taking on trust that p is like believing 
that p in that it rationalises action and further belief acquisition, but unlike believing 
that p it is not rationalised by evidence. So, in Wright’s view an entitlement to 
taking on trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source makes it rational to 
form certain beliefs on the basis of the relevant perceptual experiences. But taking on 
trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source cannot be supported or 
justified evidentially. The epistemic right that attaches to taking in trust that p is not 
evidential justification but entitlement. From this point of view the way of carrying 
out the veritistic project in terms of showing that we are justified in claiming that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source is essentially misguided: it attempts to 
do the impossible. The aim of the project should be to show that we are entitled  to 
take on trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source.
Although Wright is not explicit about this he must share with Peacocke the 
ambition of building his explanation entirely apriori, for otherwise it would rely on 
sense experience and so it would fall prey to the problems haunting self-support that 
we have discussed. Is Wright’s explanation apriori? What Wright attempts to 
establish is that one is what he calls absolutely strategically entitled  to take on trust 
that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. The conditions for this are as 
follows:
A thinker X is absolutely strategically entitled  to accept P just in case
(i) X has no sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue;
and
(ii) In all contexts, it is a dominant strategy for X to act
exactly as if he had a justified belief that P.236
233 Wright 2004b: 167.
234 Ibid.: 194.
235 Ibid.: 183.
236 Ibid.: 183.
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And the reasoning that shows that one fulfils the conditions for being absolutely 
strategically entitled to accept that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source is 
this:
(a) It is of paramount importance to us to find our way around the world, 
make use of its resources, avoid danger, and so on. If we are to do these 
things, we need to be able to form reliable beliefs about the location and 
dispositions of material objects.
(b) (i) If the world is generally open to our perceptual faculties, ordinary
observation will be the most effective way of forming such beliefs.
(ii) If the world is not generally open to our perceptual faculties, no other 
capacities that we possess will fare any better.
Therefore
(c) Reliance on ordinary observation is a dominant strategy for arriving at 
reliable beliefs about the location and dispositions of material objects.
(d) We have no reason to believe that the world is not generally open to our 
perceptual faculties.
Therefore
(e) We are absolutely strategically entitled to accept that the world is 
generally open to our perceptual faculties.237
The crucial claims towards establishing that reliance on perception is a dominant 
strategy are (b)(i) and (b)(ii). Are those claims knowable apriori? In order to bring 
out the difficulties in giving a positive answer to this question it is pertinent at this 
juncture to compare Wright’s claims with the model by which they were inspired: 
Reichenbach's vindication of induction.
Reichenbach was interested in the vindication of one specific inductive rule: 
the rule of induction by enumeration. This rule permits the inference that the limit of 
the relative frequency or proportion of an attribute in an indefinitely extended 
sequence approximates within a small interval the proportion of the attribute in the 
observed section of the sequence. The term Timif applied to the relative frequency 
or proportion of an attribute in an indefinitely extended sequence denotes a value 
such that the observed proportion of the attribute in any sufficiently long section of 
the sequence matches that value to any degree of approximation. This means that
237 Wright 2004b: 186.
238 See Salmon 1963: 88.
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the supposition that the relative frequency of an attribute in an indefinitely extended 
sequence has a limit necessarily implies that the value of the observed relative 
frequency of a sufficiently long segment of the sequence will approximate to any 
desired degree the value of the limit. How long the observed segment has to be to 
approximate the value of the limit to a certain degree cannot be known a priori, but 
what can be known a priori, from the meaning of ‘limit of the relative frequency’, is 
that in the long run the observed relative frequency of the attribute will approximate 
the value of the limit as much as one likes. Reichenbach’s vindication of the rule of 
induction by enumeration is then captioned in the following thesis:
(Y) If there exists a limit of the frequency, then if the rule of induction is used 
in a sufficiently long repeated procedure, then the limit of the frequency will 
be found to a desired degree of approximation.239
(Y) is knowable apriori, indeed in Reichenbach’s view tautologically, from the 
meaning of ‘rule of induction by enumeration’ and of ‘limit of the relative 
frequency’ 240 From (Y) we can extract claims parallel to Wright’s premises (b)(i) 
and (b)(ii) only to the effect that reliance on the rule of induction by enumeration is a 
dominant strategy for finding out limits of frequencies of attributes in sequences:
(b)(i)A If there’s a limit of the frequency, application of the rule of induction 
by enumeration in the long run will find it to a desired degree of 
approximation.
(b)(ii)A If there’s no limit of the frequency, no rule will succeed in finding it.
It must be noted that while Reichenbach attempts to vindicate a method o f  belief- 
formation (i.e. a rule of induction), Wright’s reasoning purports to show that we have 
an entitlement to a presupposition for the effectiveness of a method of belief- 
formation (in the case we are fixing on: perception). Reichenbach’s vindication 
terminates at something equivalent to premise (c) of Wright’s reasoning, with the 
claim that a certain course of action, more specifically certain policy of belief-
~ 9 See Reichenbach 1949: 474. More colloquially at p. 475: “The rule o f  induction is justified as an 
instrument o f  positing because it is a method o f  which we know that if  it is possible to make 
statements about the future w e shall find them by means o f  this method”.
240 See Ibid.: 479: “A synthetic inference is justified by means o f  a tautology.... The relation between 
the inductive procedure and the aim o f know ledge....is analytic”.
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formation (i.e. use of an inductive rule) is vindicated. Wright goes farther. From the 
fact that a relevant policy is vindicated, or in his terminology that it is a dominant 
strategy for us, and the datum that we lack reason to think that a presupposition for 
the effectiveness of the policy does not hold he infers that one is strategically entitled 
to take on trust that such presupposition holds.
Despite the fact that Wright’s reasoning goes farther than Reichenbach’s in 
the above way, the Reichenbachian inspired reasoning is part of Wright’s reasoning; 
specifically it corresponds to his premises (b)(i), (b)(ii) and (c). Having emphasised 
this and assuming that premises (a) and (d) in Wright’s argument are knowable 
apriori we can now rephrase our question: do the premises (b)(i), (b)(ii) and (c) in 
Wright’s reasoning possesses the apriority of the model on which they are inspired? 
Only if they do would Wright be on firm ground for claiming that he has shown 
apriori that we are strategically entitled to take on trust that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source.
Wright’s premise (b)(i) asserts that the targeted method is “the most 
effective” on the condition that the world is amenable to the method, but the ‘the 
most effective’ qualification is not part of the original idea Wright seeks to generalise. 
For Reichenbach himself was aware that many other rules, besides the rule of 
induction by enumeration, would also in the long run find the limit of a frequency, if 
it exists. This means that those other rules of induction get vindicated as well and for 
exactly the same reason that the rule of induction by enumeration. The vindication 
does not uniquely pick any of those rules as “more effective” than the others as far as 
finding the limit of a frequency goes. If there are grounds for preferring any of those 
rules over the others those grounds are distinct form the considerations that equally
”741vindicate all those rules." In order to bring Wright’s claims closer to the model on 
which they are inspired we could delete the 'most effective’ qualification. Then we 
have:
(b)(i)* If the world is generally open to our perceptual faculties, ordinary 
observation is a reliable way of forming true beliefs about it.
(b)(ii)* If the world is not generally open to our perceptual faculties, no other 
capacity we have is a reliable way of forming true beliefs about it.
41 See Salmon 1963: 89-95 for a brief discussion o f  these issues.
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An obstacle to determining whether these claims are knowable a priori is that Wright 
does not explain what ‘the world is generally open to our perceptual faculties’ means. 
On his behalf we could stipulate that that phrase means that it is likely that by 
exercise of our perceptual faculties we will reliably form true beliefs about the world. 
Although on such understanding b(i)* is close to being analytically true, the 
stipulation does not have a similar effect on b(ii)*, for even if it is not likely that by 
exercise of our perceptual faculties we will reliably arrive at true beliefs about the 
world, it remains as a firmly empirical question whether any other capacities we have 
could enable us to reliably form true beliefs about the world. It might well be that 
none of the other capacities we have has this feature, but certainly we cannot deduce 
that none of them does from the supposition that our perceptual faculties do not have 
it. Even on the charitable stipulation b(ii)* seems to be knowable only empirically. 
We could try other stipulations of the meaning of ‘the world is generally open to our 
perceptual faculties’ but it is doubtful that they would do anything to overcome the 
basic problem: the hypothesis that the empirical world is not amenable to the 
successful exercise of some faculties relative to truth-linked goal, doesn’t entail that 
no other faculties are better fitted to achieve it; this is an empirical question.242
If premise b(ii)* in Wright’s argument for the claim that we are strategically 
entitled to take in trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief source is knowable 
only empirically, then his philosophical argument has not eschewed self-support. 
This brings Wright’s position dangerously close to the position of the philosopher 
who pursues the old goal of the veritistic project, i.e. to show that there’s justification 
for believing that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source; in both cases the 
route to the intended conclusion involves reliance on perception. This proved to be 
fatal for the pursuit of the old goal, for either the attempt assumes a crude externalist 
treatment of self-support, in which case the philosopher lands in the merely 
conditional position that there is justification for believing that perception is a truth-
242 B(i)* and b(ii)* delete the "most effective’ qualification in Wright’s original formulations, putting 
it back doesn’t help on the apriority score, if  anything it only makes things worse, since it is then not 
clear that even b(i) is knowable apriori on the suggested stipulation. For from the supposition that it is 
likely that by the exercise o f  our perceptual faculties w e will reliably form true beliefs about the world, 
it doesn’t follow that our perceptual faculties are the m ost effective means to reliably form true beliefs 
about the world. That it is likely that a method M reliably leads to true belief does not imply anything 
about how likely that is, much less that that it is more likely than any other method.
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conducive belief-source i f  perception is a truth-conducive belief-source (II.6). Or the 
attempt assumes a non-extemalist treatment of self-support which unsuccessfully 
attempts to lift truth-conducive constraints for justification (III. 1.3) or replaces the 
Conditional Position Problem by worse problems (III.2).
Does the fact that Wright’s argument involves self-support cause any similar 
damage to his attempt to show that we have an entitlement to take on trust that 
perception is truth-conducive? Wright rejects the kind of non-extemalist position 
discussed in (III. 1.2), for he takes truth-conducivity to be necessary for perceptual 
justification; however he rejects the externalist view that lands the old veritistic 
philosopher in the conditional position problem, for he thinks the truth-conducivity 
of the source is not sufficient for perceptual justification, an entitlement to take on 
trust that perception is truth-conducive is also necessary. This is Wright’s view about 
the role of entitlements. Because such an entitlement is a default position, and not 
itself a cognitive achievement, he also rejects the kind of non-extemalist treatment of 
self-support discussed in (III.2) which seeks to impose higher level-requirements on 
justification. So it would seem that Wright’s view is free from all the components in 
the externalist and non-extemalist treatments of self-support that were problematic 
for the philosopher attempting to show that there’s justification to believe that 
perception is truth-conducive. However, we must remember that Wright’s view does 
have a disastrous consequence for such an attempt, for it renders the track-record 
argument relied on by that philosopher a case of transmission-failure. That’s why 
endorsing Wright’s view about the role of entitlements is not an option for the 
philosopher pursuing the old veritistic goal, conceptualised in terms of seeking to 
justify the claim that perception is truth-conducive.
The question we have to ask then is if the fact that Wright’s argument 
involves self-support combined with his view about the role of entitlements causes 
any damage to his attempt to show that we have a strategic entitlement to take on 
trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. Given that for him a strategic 
entitlement to trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source is necessary for 
perception to give us justification to believe specific propositions, the fact that one of 
the premises in his argument can be justified only empirically entails that the 
justification of such a premise depends on the truth of the conclusion of the argument, 
i.e. that we are strategically entitled to take on trust that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source. But then his argument for the conclusion that we are
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strategically entitled to take on trust that perception truth-conducive shows this only 
i f  we are so strategically entitled. This is the same kind of position that the old 
veritistic philosopher found himself in: a track-record argument gives justification to 
believe that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source only if perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source. The probative force of Wright’s argument is conditional on 
what its conclusion asserts. Because any attempt to get past that conditional position 
will rely once again on a strategic entitlement to trust that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source, the attempt will merely replicate the conditional position 
that it tries to overcome. The effort to show that we have a strategic entitlement to 
trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source lands one in the same kind of 
conditional position that the effort to show that we have justification to believe that 
the perception is a truth-conducive belief-source.
IV.2. Limits of Explanation and Levels of Knowledge
IV.2.1. Entitlements and knowledge of knowledge
We have seen that Wright’s argument that we have an absolute strategic entitlement 
for the claim that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source is not entirely apriori, 
at least one of its premises is knowable only empirically. In virtue of needing some 
empirical justification Wright’s adaptation of the idea of a vindication fails to eschew 
self-support and this places his overall argument for a strategic entitlement alongside 
the arguments that try to show that there is justification to believe that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source. The promised reconceptualisation of the goal of the 
veritistic project in terms of the idea of a vindication makes no real difference for the 
prospects of carrying that project along successfully.
But Wright believes that he has shown that we have the entitlement in 
question, and he uses this result to highlight a concession he thinks we must make to 
certain forms of scepticism. He writes:
In general, the effect of conceding that we have mere entitlements for 
cornerstones is... to quality our claims to higher order cognitive achievement. 
I am right now in possession of a plethora of perceptual knowledge
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concerning occurrences around me. . That is a claim which.... I [am] 
rationally entitled to make.243
This is because he thinks that an entitlement to take on trust that P (a cornerstone) is 
an entitlement to claim that we know propositions in the region of enquiry for which 
P is a cornerstone 244 So, if his philosophical argument shows that we are entitled to 
take on trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source it ipso facto shows 
that we are entitled to claim knowledge of all sorts of things about our perceptible 
nearby environment. The qualification of higher order cognitive achievements that 
Wright wants to concede is that we cannot know that we know all those things about 
our nearby perceptible environment; the most that we can aspire to is to be entitled to 
claim to know those things about our environment. In his view we don’t know that 
we know that p, but this is consistent with being entitled to claim to know that p. The 
reason for this is that:
...in order to know that it is true [i.e. that we have perceptual knowledge], I 
need (this is a closure step, of course) to be able to know the presuppositions 
of its truth, some of which -we are taking it- sceptical argument has put 
beyond evidence. So scepticism demands the surrender of higher order 
knowledge -the claim to know that we know. But entitlement, in the best case, 
promises to save the warrantability nevertheless of the first order claim to 
know. And maybe that is enough to be going on with.245
It is not fully explicit here why one should surrender second order knowledge and 
why this is consistent with retaining an entitlement to claim first order knowledge. 
The full explanation would seem to be as follows. In Wright’s epistemological 
architecture one’s perceptual warrant and knowledge that p  depends on one’s 
entitlement to take on trust certain cornerstones, for example that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source. Such entitlement has the status of a necessary 
presupposition of one's perceptual knowledge and warrant. This is the architecture 
underlying his charge of (DW) and transmission-failure discussed in (II.4.2).246 
Given that architecture the following entailment holds:
243 Wright 2004b: 208. His emphasis.
244 Ibid.: 207-208.
245 Ibidem.
246 He has retained that architecture in his latest work, see Wright 2004b: 172.
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(A) If one knows perceptually that p => one is entitled to take on trust that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source.
(A) has the form p=>q. If we assume that knowledge is closed under entailment, that 
is to say, that the following holds: [Kp & (p => q)] => Kq; then it follows from (A) 
that:
(B) If one knows (that one knows perceptually that p) => one knows (that one 
is entitled to take on trust that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source).
One might think that this is the ‘closure step’ that Wright refers to in the last 
quotation. The step is correct in the context of his epistemological architecture. 
However, a moment’s reflection shows that the closure step he is assuming cannot be
(B), on pain of incoherence. For in order to obtain from (B) the conclusion that one 
lacks second order knowledge we need the negation of the consequent of (B) as 
another premise and then apply modus tollens. But the negation of the consequent of
(B) is that one does not know that one is entitled to take on trust that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source and Wright cannot concede such a premise, for his 
philosophical argument discussed in the previous section is meant to afford precisely 
the (allegedly apriori) knowledge that we are so entitled. He cannot coherently think 
that his argument succeeds and concede to the sceptic the negation of the consequent 
of (B). Given (B) and what Wright thinks his argument establishes, he should not 
surrender second order knowledge to the sceptic as he does.
The closure step operative in Wright’s concession to the sceptic must be 
different from (B). We can guess what it is by noting that in the last quotation he 
credits to the sceptic having ‘put beyond evidence’ the presuppositions of our 
ordinary perceptual knowledge. The presuppositions in question cannot be the 
entitlements to take on trust the relevant cornerstones, again because that concession 
would be inconsistent with what Wright thinks his argument accomplishes (at least 
on the assumption that he thinks that his argument provides evidence that we are 
entitled to take on trust the relevant cornerstones). What Wright is alluding to as the 
presuppositions that the sceptic has shown to be ‘beyond evidence’ are the 
propositions that articulate the cornerstones themselves, not the propositions that 
articulate our alleged entitlement to the cornerstones. For Wright indeed thinks that 
the sceptic is right in claiming that one cannot obtain evidence for, and therefore
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cannot know, the relevant cornerstones.247 At this stage we need not go into the 
details of why he concedes this to the sceptic; what matters here is that he makes that 
concession and believes that it follows from it, via a closure step, that we lack second 
order knowledge. The needed closure step is this:
(C) If one knows (that one knows perceptually that p) => one knows (that
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source).
Given (C) and the thesis that one doesn’t know that perception is a truth-conducive 
belief source, it does follow by modus tollens that one doesn’t know that one knows 
perceptually that p, which is the limitation on second order cognitive achievements 
that Wright wants to grant to scepticism. However, (C) is a valid closure step only if 
the following entailment holds:
(D) If one knows perceptually that p => perception is a truth-conducive
belief-source.
Intuitively, (D) is correct, but it has no place in Wright’s epistemological architecture. 
In this architecture what is a necessary condition for one’s perceptual knowledge and 
justification for p is that one is entitled to take on trust the relevant cornerstone, from 
which it doesn’t follow that the cornerstone (its truth) is also necessary, for Wright’s 
entitlements are not factive.248 The opposite direction, first accepting (D) and from 
there working towards (A), is not available to Wright either; for that would involve 
the structural fallacy discussed in (II.4.1). In any case (D) is incongruous with the 
epistemological outlook that has (A) as its central tenet. If (D) is intuitively very 
plausible, that only goes to suggest that maybe that epistemological outlook is 
mistaken. But this is not the point at issue. The point is that in order to surrender to 
the sceptic second order knowledge as Wright thinks we should, he needs the closure 
step (C), but (C) is valid only if (D) is correct. Given that there’s no room in 
Wright's epistemology for (D), the validity of (C) is inexplicable within that 
epistemological architecture, and therefore so is Wright’s final concession to the 
sceptic.
247 Wright 2004b: 169. 172.
248 Wight 2004a: 53.
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Wright would face difficulties in surrendering second order knowledge to the 
sceptic even on the assumption that he somehow manages to accommodate (D) 
within his epistemology. For even if the closure step (C) is valid we still need as a 
premise the negation of the consequent of (C) to derive by modus tollens the 
conclusion that we lack second order knowledge, and it is not clear that Wright has 
sound reasons to concede the negation of the consequent of (C).
One reason why Wright thinks one doesn’t know the relevant cornerstones is 
that he thinks that knowledge requires evidence, or as he also puts it, evidential 
warrant and he thinks that one cannot obtain evidence for a cornerstone. In reaching 
this conclusion he assumes what he terms the 'proper execution principle’ (PEP).249 
This principle says that:
...evidence acquired as the result of an empirical procedure cannot rationally 
be regarded as any stronger than one’s independent grounds for supposing
9S0that the procedure in question has been executed properly.
Wright thinks that a simple application of (PEP) yields the conclusion that we cannot 
acquire evidence for a cornerstone; the cornerstone he chooses to exemplify is that 
we are not the victims o f a coherent and sustained dream. Applying (PEP) we have 
that:
Evidence for the proposition that I am not now dreaming, acquired as a result 
of executing some appropriate empirical procedure, cannot rationally be 
regarded as any stronger than my independent warrant for thinking that the 
relevant procedure was properly executed, and hence for thinking that it was 
executed at all -ergo: that I did not merely dream its execution! So it appears 
that my acquiring a warrant by empirical means for the proposition that I am 
not now dreaming requires that I already have a warrant for that same 
proposition. So I cannot ever acquire such a warrant (for the first time).251
Because the hypothesis that the empirical procedure, used to obtain evidence for the 
cornerstone, was executed properly is just the hypothesis that the cornerstone holds, 
(PEP) entails that the warrant gained through the procedure is not any stronger than 
the independent warrant for the cornerstone; so if one starts from the position of
249 See Wright 1991:99
250 Wright 2004b: 168.
251 Ibid.: 169.
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having zero warrant for the cornerstone one will gain no warrant for it through the 
execution of the procedure. Wright agrees with this conclusion as long as ‘warrant’ is 
qualified by ‘evidential’, for he thinks that we do have a standing independent 
warrant for the cornerstone in the form of an entitlement.
Wright faces a difficulty here because his positive view on the role of 
entitlements seems to falsify (PEP). Indeed, if his view on the role of entitlements is 
correct then an entitlement to take on trust that one is not the victim of a sustained 
and coherent dream is necessary for gaining perceptual knowledge and evidential 
warrant. So, in a particular case where we gain perceptual (evidential) warrant, for p  
that’s so partly because we have an entitlement to take on trust that we are not the 
victims of a sustained dream. Given that we gained that evidential warrant for p  
through an empirical procedure, (PEP) implies that that warrant can7 be stronger 
than the independent warrant for thinking that procedure was properly executed, 
which in Wright’s view includes a warrant for thinking that we are not dreaming. But 
this implication of (PEP) for the present case is false, for it is a case where the 
evidence acquired for p  as the result of the empirical procedure is stronger than one’s 
independent warrant for supposing that the procedure was executed properly and that 
one was not dreaming, for by Wright’s own lights this warrant is not evidential at all 
but a mere entitlement. Wright’s positive view on the role of entitlements seems to 
counterexamplify (PEP), an application of which is essential for reaching the 
conclusion that we cannot obtain evidential warrant for the cornerstone, and hence 
that we cannot know the cornerstone to hold. In any case, (PEP) is too controversial 
to be assumed as Wright does in granting the sceptic the premise necessary to derive 
from (C) the conclusion that we lack second order knowledge.
Wright has a different argument for thinking that the sceptic is right that we 
cannot obtain evidence for cornerstones. He alleges that the evidential routes to 
cornerstones involve an inference which exhibits (DW) and hence transmission- 
failure; therefore through those evidential routes one will not gain evidential warrants
9 S9for the cornerstones. This argument hinges on the charge of (DW) and 
transmission-failure against the targeted inferences. We saw in chapter (II.4.1) that 
Wright fails to argue soundly for those charges.
252 See Wright 2004b: 172.
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The reasons why Wright surrenders second order knowledge to the sceptic do 
not sit well with his overall epistemology. Not only is there no room in his 
epistemology for the closure step (C) needed to derive that concession, but the 
second premise needed for the derivation of the conclusion that we lack second order 
knowledge is based either on a principle, i.e. (PEP), which seems to be falsified by 
his own positive theory on the role of entitlements, or on an unsound accusation of 
(DW) and transmission-failure against some types of inferences. The fact that Wright 
is in no position to make the concession about second order knowledge to the sceptic 
does not imply that the claim that we lack second order knowledge is false; it only 
means that the truth of such claim is not explicable within Wright’s epistemology.
However, from the point of view of the problem developed in II.6 for self- 
support concerning basic belief-sources, the attempt to obtain evidential warrant 
(justification), and hence knowledge, for a cornerstone produces an instance of (CPP). 
This means that the philosopher cannot conclude that he’s got warrant to think that, 
say, perception is a truth-conducive belief-source, but only that he’s got that warrant 
i f  perception is a truth-conducive belief source. Such conditional position is 
compatible with his actually having warrant for believing and knowledge that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. Hence being in such conditional 
position falls short of the sceptical lemma that we don’t know that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source, which is needed to derive the conclusion that we don’t 
know that we have first order perceptual knowledge. Therefore, acknowledging the 
existence of (CPP) doesn’t result in surrendering second order knowledge to the 
sceptic. Nevertheless, the conditionality of the epistemic position typified by (CPP) 
is an obstacle for attaining the positive, reassuring conclusion that we do know that 
we have first order perceptual knowledge. For given that truth-conducivity is 
necessary for perceptual knowledge, in order to know that one knows perceptually 
that p, one needs to know that the perceptual method that produced belief in p is 
truth-conducive. But the evidential routes to the claim that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source land one in (CPP); one can only conclude that one knows 
that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source if it is, which is not the categorical 
claim that one needs to know in order to know that one knows perceptually that p.
The prospects of achieving the kind of second order epistemological 
assurance are not bettered by aiming at an entitlement to claim first order knowledge 
rather than aiming at knowledge of knowledge. For an entitlement to claim first order
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perceptual knowledge is just an entitlement to trust that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source and we argued in the previous section that the argument that 
purports to show that we have such entitlement lands the theorist in the same kind of 
conditional position as before: he can only conclude that one is entitled to trust that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source if perception is a truth-conducive 
belief-source. This theorist faces the same kind of impasse as his predecessor; the 
sought epistemological assurance about our first order perceptual knowledge remains 
unattainable. In terms of the project of explaining fundamental epistemic principles 
this means that what remains unattainable is the epistemological assurance that they 
are correct, that we are justified in thinking that they define conditions for the 
achievement of epistemic goods.
IV.2.2. Knowledge of Knowledge and Philosophical Knowledge
The veritistic project of explaining the correctness of the basic epistemic principle 
about perception has been thwarted by two failures. First, the failure to show that 
there’s justification to believe that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source; and 
second, the failure to show that there’s a strategic entitlement to take on trust that 
perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. Reconceptualising the goal of the 
project in terms of a strategic entitlement to take on trust the relevant cornerstone has 
made no difference to the situation the philosopher faced with the goal 
conceptualised in the old terms. The persistence of the failure to attain those pieces 
of the philosophical knowledge rises the question what we can know about the 
correctness of a fundamental epistemic principle.
The failures we have reviewed impair the attempts to show that we have a 
justification to believe or a strategic entitlement to trust that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source. We should not ignore that the knowledge that the pursuit of 
any of those satisfying epistemic positions fails in the ways we have described is 
itself a piece of philosophical knowledge. It is the knowledge that we cannot gain 
any of those satisfying epistemic positions with respect to the correctness of a 
fundamental epistemic principle about perception. Given that the goal of the 
veritistic explanation is understood as gaining such reassuring epistemic position,
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that negative philosophical knowledge constitutes evidence that so understood the 
goal is not attainable.
I want to discuss a heroic strategy to rescue the veritistic goal so understood 
which takes the philosophical evidence so far  obtained concerning the unattainability 
of the goal as a premise to show that the goal is after all attainable. This is not 
incoherent because the reassuring epistemic position that the heroic strategy purports 
to show we can attain utilises neither the concept of justification nor the concept of 
strategic entitlement, but a concept of yet another epistemic right. The strategy takes 
the evidence that the goal conceptualised in terms of a justification or a strategic 
entitlement is unattainable as evidence that we must have the new kind of epistemic 
right to the proposition that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source.
The heroic strategy constitutes a generalisation of the reasoning that leads 
Wright to think that there is a form of entitlement that he calls ‘entitlement of 
cognitive project’. In his view there are three conditions that a proposition has to 
fulfil in order for one to be entitled to it in this new special sense. First, the 
proposition has to be a presupposition of a particular cognitive project in the 
following sense:
P is a presupposition of a particular cognitive project if to doubt P (in 
advance) would rationally commit one to doubting the significance or 
competence of the project.
Although it is not explicit here, the competence of the project alluded to is its 
competence to generate epistemic justification. To doubt a presupposition of an 
epistemic project is to doubt its ability to generate justified beliefs about the world. 
The other two conditions for entitlement of cognitive project are these:
(i) We have no sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue
(ii) The attempt to justify P would involve further presuppositions in turn 
of no more secure a priori standing.... And so on without limit; so that 
someone pursuing the relevant enquiry who accepted that there is 
nevertheless an onus to justify P would implicitly undertake a 
commitment to an infinite regress of justificatory projects, each 
concerned to vindicate the presuppositions of its predecessor.253
253 Wright 2004b: 191-192.
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Clause (ii) comprises the idea that the heroic strategy described above generalises. 
This clause registers the fact that the attempt to justify a presupposition of a 
cognitive project leads one to a hopeless epistemic position, in the case Wright 
mentions: an infinite regress of justificatory projects. The philosophical argument 
that shows that the attempt to justify a particular presupposition of a cognitive project 
leads to an infinite regress of justificatory projects gives us knowledge that such a 
presupposition satisfies clause (ii) for entitlement of cognitive project. Such 
knowledge constitutes evidence that we have an entitlement of cognitive project for 
the relevant presuppositions; if we know that the other conditions for that kind of 
entitlement are fulfilled then we have the philosophical knowledge that we have an 
entitlement of cognitive project to the relevant presupposition. In this way the 
evidence that justification cannot be achieved with respect to P, is used to show that 
we have an entitlement of cognitive project with respect to P. A negative 
philosophical conclusion concerning P is turned into a step in an argument to show 
that we enjoy a reassuring epistemic position with respect to P.
To obtain other instances of this idea we only need to use our previous 
negative results to fill in variants of a modified clause (ii) for entitlement of cognitive 
project. The attempt to show that we are justified in believing or that we are 
strategically entitled to trust P lands one in a merely conditional epistemic position, 
which is as hopeless as an infinite regress of justificatory projects. The generalisation 
of clause (ii) is then clear:
(ii)* The attempt to gain a justified belief or a strategic entitlement with
respect to the presuppositions of a cognitive project leads to an epistemically
hopeless position.
The proposition that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source satisfies the 
generalised version of clause (ii). We know that the attempt to show that we have a 
justification to believe or a strategic entitlement to trust that perception is truth- 
conducive leads to an unsatisfactory conditional position. We also know that that 
proposition also satisfies the other two conditions for entitlement of cognitive project: 
one lacks sufficient reason to think that perception is not truth-conducive and 
doubting that perception is truth-conducive would rationally commit one to doubting 
the competence to generate epistemic justification of all cognitive projects that rely 
on perception. Therefore, we know that we have an entitlement of cognitive project
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for the proposition that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. The knowledge 
that a justification to believe and a strategic entitlement to trust that perception is 
truth-conducive are not attainable is used to show that we do have a reassuring 
epistemic position with respect to the proposition that perception is truth-conducive.
The heroic strategy seems to deliver the philosophical knowledge that would 
fulfil the veritistic goal of showing that there is a reassuring epistemic position with 
respect to the pivotal proposition that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source 
and hence with respect to the fundamental principle about perception. In line with 
our previous assessments of the various attempts to carry forward the veritistic goal 
we must ask if all the premises needed to prove that we have an entitlement of 
cognitive project for the proposition that perception is a truth-conducive belief- 
source are knowable apriori. We must grant that fulfilment of the generalised clause 
(ii)’ is knowable apriori, for the philosophical knowledge that justification and 
strategic entitlement with respect to the claim that perception is truth-conducive are 
not attainable is reached via apriori argument. We can also grant that we can know 
apriori whether P is a presupposition of a given cognitive project, for no empirical 
tests are needed to determine whether doubting P rationally commits one to doubting 
the results of the cognitive project. The case of clause (i) is less clear. Can we know 
apriori that we have no sufficient reason to think that perception is not generally a 
truth-conducive belief-source? Plausibly, a sufficient reason for thinking that one’s 
perception is not generally truth-conducive could be given by the conjunction of the 
following:
(1) One judges that one’s perception represents di, dj, d3 , etc.
(2) The set of contents [di, d2 , d3 , etc.] is so incoherent that the incoherence is 
best explained by supposing that perception is not generally truth-conducive.
It seem that one can know without relying on perception that the conjunction (1)& (2) 
is false, i.e. that one doesn 7 have sufficient reason to think that perception is truth- 
conducive.
If all three clauses for entitlement of cognitive project can be known apriori 
to be fulfilled the threat of self-support in establishing that we have such entitlement 
is averted. But there’s a different doubt concerning the aptness of the entitlement of 
cognitive project to genuinely achieve the goal of the veritistic project. We should
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ask why the conditions for this kind of entitlement are conditions for an epistemic 
good at all.
Suppose that our best attempts to gain a reassuring epistemic position with 
respect to the presuppositions of our cognitive projects fail, but doubting such 
presuppositions is not an option for us, because doubting them would commit us to 
doubting the competence of such projects to deliver justification for our beliefs. If 
this is so then we must carry on assuming that such presuppositions hold, otherwise it 
would be incoherent to treat such products as epistemically justified. Why should we 
accept that the existence of this kind of requirement, together with fulfilment of the 
other conditions for entitlement of cognitive project, yield an epistemic right for the 
presuppositions of the cognitive projects? The reason to doubt that a positive answer 
to this question is available is expressed by Wright himself when he acknowledges 
that:
To be entitled to accept a proposition in this way [as an entitlement of 
cognitive project], of course, has no connection whatever with the likelihood 
o f its truth. We are entitled to proceed on the basis of certain beliefs merely 
because there’s no extant reason to disbelieve them and because, unless we 
make some such commitments, we cannot proceed at all.254
The claim that if we are not entitled to the presuppositions of our cognitive projects 
we ‘cannot proceed at all’ is a different way of saying that if we are not entitled to 
such presuppositions we cannot continue to coherently attach to our cognitive 
projects the epistemic significance we attach to them. The truth of the conditional: if 
we are not entitled to P our cognitive projects loose the epistemic significance we 
normally attach to them, only formulates the structure of our commitments; it 
articulates what we are committed to if we are not entitled to P. Of course, we carry 
on attaching epistemic significance to our cognitive projects and this brings on the 
commitment to be entitled to P. But the fact that our commitments have this structure 
has no tendency to increase the likelihood of P. It might be true that if one attaches 
epistemic significance to what my guru says one is committed to be entitled to the 
claim that my guru’s testimony is a truth-conducive belief-source. But the structure 
of these commitments has no tendency to show that it is likely that my guru’s 
testimony is a truth-conducive belief-source. Of course, we do not have an
254 Wright 2004a: 53. My emphasis.
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entitlement of cognitive project for the proposition that my guru’s testimony is truth- 
conducive because we have sufficient reason to believe that my guru’s testimony is 
not truth-conducive, i.e. clause (i) of entitlement of cognitive project is not fulfilled. 
But the point is that even when that clause is fulfilled, as it is with respect to the 
proposition that perception is a truth-conducive belief-source, that still doesn’t imply 
that that proposition is likely to be true, for I  have no sufficient reason to believe not- 
p  doesn’t entail p  is likely to be true. More clearly, fulfilment of clause (ii)’ of 
entitlement of cognitive project doesn’t contribute either to the likelihood of the 
proposition P that our practice commits us to be entitled to, for fulfilment of clause
(ii)’ registers the failure to prove that we have a justification or a strategic 
entitlement for P. Since, given minimal veritism, a justification for P increases the 
likelihood of P, fulfilling the condition of failing to prove that there is a justification 
for P obviously cannot make P likely to be true.
But if there’s no connection whatsoever between fulfilment of the conditions 
for having an entitlement of cognitive project for P and the likelihood of P, then that 
entitlement cannot be an epistemic right towards P, given a veritistic understanding 
of epistemic goods. This makes the entitlement of cognitive project inapt to figure in 
a veritistic explanation of the correctness of an epistemic principle about perception, 
for such a principle is correct only if perception is a truth-conducive belief-source. 
But if our entitlement of cognitive project for the proposition that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source is neutral with respect to the truth of this very 
proposition, then it is neutral with respect to the correctness of the relevant epistemic 
principle about perception. Such entitlement is then unfit for the explanatory task 
undertaken by the veritistic philosopher.
The heroic attempt to fulfil the veritistic goal fails to deliver a reassuring 
epistemic position with respect to the pivotal proposition that perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source capable of fulfilling the explanatory role it should fulfil with 
respect to the basic epistemic principle about perception. The knowledge of the 
failure of the heroic strategy is yet another piece of philosophical knowledge; like the 
philosophical knowledge we already had concerning the inability to show a 
justification to believe or a strategic entitlement to trust, it constitutes further 
evidence that the veritistic goal, conceived as a mission to show that there is a 
reassuring epistemic position with respect to fundamental epistemic principles, is not 
attainable. The unattainability of such a goal does not impair our ability to obtain
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knowledge about fundamental epistemic principles; it rather constitutes an essential 
part of the subject matter of that philosophical knowledge.
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CONCLUSION
The goal of the reassuring philosophical project we have examined is to show that 
we are justified or entitled to think that the following epistemic principle is correct:
(EP) If on the basis of its perceptually appearing to one that p  one believes
that p , one is prima facie justified in believing that p.
Given truth-conducive constraints (EP) is correct only if perception is a truth- 
conducive belief-source. Hence the veritistic philosopher tries to reach what we have 
called an epistemically reassuring position from where he knows that we are justified 
or entitled in treating perception as a truth-conducive belief-source. With respect to 
this aspiration the results of our investigation have been mainly negative. The 
epistemically assuring position proves to be elusive in interesting ways.
The attempt to show that we are justified in believing that perception is a 
truth-conducive belief-source (hereafter, (PERCEPTION)), necessarily involves 
reliance on perception and this leads the veritistic theorist to the vacuous position of 
having shown that we are justified in believing (PERCEPTION) only if 
(PERCEPTION). The failures of the attempts to overcome this Conditional Position 
Problem suggest important conclusions. The attempt to lift truth-conducive 
constraints leads to constraints on perceptual justification which seem inefficient to 
explain why our perceptual justification can be defeated by evidence that suggests 
lack of truth-conducivity. Given that its liability to being defeated by precisely that 
kind of evidence is one of the essential features of perceptual justification, lifting 
truth-conducive constraints seems to alter an essential feature of perceptual 
justification. Such attempt to overcome (CPP) is proposing to negotiate with a non- 
negotiable feature of perceptual justification. On the other hand, the attempt to 
construct an apriori route that evades (CPP) either smuggles empirical assumptions 
and hence constitutes no improvement on the initial position that takes the theorist to 
(CPP), or in fact replaces truth-conducive constraints with a ‘subjectivised’ version 
of them which shifts the explanatory focus from the facts of our perceptual
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justification to an equally ‘subjectivised’ version of those facts. We explored a 
further attempt to avoid (CPP) which reconceptualises the goal of the veritistic 
project in terms of a strategic entitlement. Showing that we have such entitlement to 
take on trust that perception is truth-conducive still is to show that there is a species 
of reassuring epistemic position with respect to perception. We argued that this 
attempt also fails to fully eschew reliance on perception and that this creates for the 
theorist trying to show that we have such entitlement a problem exactly analogous to 
(CPP).
These results constitute evidence that given a non-negotiable component in 
perceptual justification, we cannot attempt to show that we have a reassuring 
epistemic position with respect to the truth-conducivity of perception without relying 
on perception. Conceiving that reassuring position as the possession of justification 
or of an entitlement makes no difference with respect to this point. But it is precisely 
that necessary reliance on perception that is at the heart of the Conditional Position 
that thwarts the attempts to show that we have whatever of those reassuring positions. 
The very nature of our cognitive equipment seems to prevent us from satisfying 
ourselves in showing that we occupy a positive epistemic position with respect to 
(PERCEPTION).
But our results concerning the failures to show that we have a reassuring 
epistemic position with respect to (PERCEPTION) must not be confused with the 
sceptical view which denies that there is such position. The reasons we have offered 
do not justify an outright denial of the claims that we are justified in believing 
(PERCEPTION) or that we are entitled to take on trust (PERCEPTION); they only 
support the conclusion that even if we have such epistemic standings with respect to 
(PERCEPTION) we cannot satisfy ourselves in showing that we do. In this sense, the 
philosophical knowledge that would consist in showing that we do have such 
standings remains elusive. The philosophical knowledge that the project purports to 
achieve is somehow inaccessible. Other philosophical projects seem to have a similar 
fate. For example, some philosophers have argued that the project of explaining why 
certain neurophysiological states of the brain yield a definite subjective quality 
cannot be carried out successfully because the very nature of our concepts for 
neurophysiological states and of our concepts for experiential states necessarily bar 
us from constructing the desired explanation. Clearly, this is not to say that 
neurophysiological states and experiential states are not in fact identical, or otherwise
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modally related; it is only to say that if they are we cannot understand how that can 
be so. This piece of satisfying philosophical knowledge is somehow inaccessible.
The comparison with the mind-body problem also serves to highlight another 
aspect of the conclusions we can draw from our investigation. The failure to 
philosophically explain the relation between neurophysiological states and 
experiential states does not warrant the conclusion that there’s no philosophical 
knowledge to be gained concerning that relation. Quite the opposite, the 
philosophical argument that explains why the sought explanatory bridge cannot be 
constructed itself constitutes a valuable piece of philosophical knowledge concerning 
the problematic relation between our brain and our experience. The unattainability of 
the bridging explanation is a rich area of philosophical knowledge. Similarly, the 
failure to show that we have a justification or an entitlement to believe or trust 
(PERCEPTION) does not warrant the conclusion that there’s no philosophical 
knowledge to be gained about our epistemic position with respect to the truth- 
conducivity of perception and the epistemic principle founded on it. On the contrary, 
the lengthy argumentation that we have gone through which suggests that we cannot 
satisfy ourselves in showing that we have any of those epistemic positions with 
respect to (PERCEPTION), itself constitutes philosophical knowledge about our 
epistemic position with respect to (PERCEPTION). The unattainability of the sought 
demonstration of the goodness of our position is a rich area of philosophical 
knowledge.
Nevertheless, the question may arise as to whether that kind of knowledge 
concerning the unattainability of the demonstrations that we have certain reassuring 
epistemic positions is the only kind of philosophical knowledge we can have with 
respect to (PERCEPTION) and the epistemic principle founded on it. Certainly not. 
Our results do not affect projects that usually run parallel to the project we have 
investigated. One of such projects is precisely that of specifying the conditions for 
different types of epistemic goods captured in various epistemic principles. Indeed, 
the philosophical work that, for example, Wright does in specifying the conditions 
for his different notions of entitlement is work in that project; in general the work 
that the veritist philosopher has to do in order to define the exact conditions that an 
epistemic principle has to fulfil in order to be adequate is work in this latter project. 
In the first chapter of this investigation we did some work in that area in explaining 
and articulating the ideas that underpin the imposition of a truth-conducive constraint
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on epistemic principles, the feasibility of that kind of task is not endangered by our 
results in the other chapters. What we did in Chapter I was to expound the rationale 
for only a crude truth-conducive constraint for epistemic principles, for that kind of 
crude version of a veritistic constraint is enough to bring out the obstacles that the 
reassuring project faces. But obviously there’s much more to say about the 
conditions of adequacy for epistemic principles than merely that they are subject to a 
crude truth-conducive constraint; this is a rich area of philosophical knowledge. For 
example, there are ongoing hot debates concerning whether we should think that the 
perceptual conditions mentioned in the antecedent of an epistemic principle about 
perception have ‘conceptual content’, whether this is necessary for them to justify 
belief. Also, applications of extemalism about intentional content to perceptual 
experiences have suggested that we should explain the truth-conducivity necessary 
for certain epistemic goods as rooted in the individuation conditions of the perceptual 
states in question. These are simply two examples of the areas of philosophical 
knowledge concerning epistemic principles that the results of our investigation leave 
untouched. Our results do not cast doubt on the feasibility of those theories that 
attempt to spell out illuminating conditions for the epistemic goods mentioned in 
epistemic principles. They only pretend to cast some doubt on the feasibility of the 
project of satisfying ourselves in showing that we have a reassuring epistemic 
position with respect to the correctness of those very principles; and even in this area 
the arguments that justify our doubt are themselves valuable pieces of philosophical 
knowledge concerning epistemic principles.
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